• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.9
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• pp.85-143
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• 1997

The main purpose of the investigation of an accident caused by aircraft is to be prevented the sudden and casual accidents caused by wilful misconduct and fault from pilots, air traffic controllers, hijack, trouble of engine and machinery of aircraft, turbulence during the bad weather, collision between birds and aircraft, near miss flight by aircrafts etc. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability for offender of aircraft accidents. Accidents to aircraft, especially those involving the general public and their property, are a matter of great concern to the aviation community. The system of international regulation exists to improve safety and minimize, as far as possible, the risk of accidents but when they do occur there is a web of systems and procedures to investigate and respond to them. I would like to trace the general line of regulation from an international source in the Chicago Convention of 1944. Article 26 of the Convention lays down the basic principle for the investigation of the aircraft accident. Where there has been an accident to an aircraft of a contracting state which occurs in the territory of another contracting state and which involves death or serious injury or indicates serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the state in which the accident occurs must institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident. That inquiry will be in accordance, in so far as its law permits, with the procedure which may be recommended from time to time by the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO). There are very general provisions but they state two essential principles: first, in certain circumstances there must be an investigation, and second, who is to be responsible for undertaking that investigation. The latter is an important point to establish otherwise there could be at least two states claiming jurisdiction on the inquiry. The Chicago Convention also provides that the state where the aircraft is registered is to be given the opportunity to appoint observers to be present at the inquiry and the state holding the inquiry must communicate the report and findings in the matter to that other state. It is worth noting that the Chicago Convention (Article 25) also makes provision for assisting aircraft in distress. Each contracting state undertakes to provide such measures of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find practicable and to permit (subject to control by its own authorities) the owner of the aircraft or authorities of the state in which the aircraft is registered, to provide such measures of assistance as may be necessitated by circumstances. Significantly, the undertaking can only be given by contracting state but the duty to provide assistance is not limited to aircraft registered in another contracting state, but presumably any aircraft in distress in the territory of the contracting state. Finally, the Convention envisages further regulations (normally to be produced under the auspices of ICAO). In this case the Convention provides that each contracting state, when undertaking a search for missing aircraft, will collaborate in co-ordinated measures which may be recommended from time to time pursuant to the Convention. Since 1944 further international regulations relating to safety and investigation of accidents have been made, both pursuant to Chicago Convention and, in particular, through the vehicle of the ICAO which has, for example, set up an accident and reporting system. By requiring the reporting of certain accidents and incidents it is building up an information service for the benefit of member states. However, Chicago Convention provides that each contracting state undertakes collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and improve air navigation. To this end, ICAO is to adopt and amend from time to time, as may be necessary, international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with, among other things, aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents. Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident Injuries were first adopted by the ICAO Council on 11 April 1951 pursuant to Article 37 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and were designated as Annex 13 to the Convention. The Standards Recommended Practices were based on Recommendations of the Accident Investigation Division at its first Session in February 1946 which were further developed at the Second Session of the Division in February 1947. The 2nd Edition (1966), 3rd Edition, (1973), 4th Edition (1976), 5th Edition (1979), 6th Edition (1981), 7th Edition (1988), 8th Edition (1992) of the Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) of the Chicago Convention was amended eight times by the ICAO Council since 1966. Annex 13 sets out in detail the international standards and recommended practices to be adopted by contracting states in dealing with a serious accident to an aircraft of a contracting state occurring in the territory of another contracting state, known as the state of occurrence. It provides, principally, that the state in which the aircraft is registered is to be given the opportunity to appoint an accredited representative to be present at the inquiry conducted by the state in which the serious aircraft accident occurs. Article 26 of the Chicago Convention does not indicate what the accredited representative is to do but Annex 13 amplifies his rights and duties. In particular, the accredited representative participates in the inquiry by visiting the scene of the accident, examining the wreckage, questioning witnesses, having full access to all relevant evidence, receiving copies of all pertinent documents and making submissions in respect of the various elements of the inquiry. The main shortcomings of the present system for aircraft accident investigation are that some contracting sates are not applying Annex 13 within its express terms, although they are contracting states. Further, and much more important in practice, there are many countries which apply the letter of Annex 13 in such a way as to sterilise its spirit. This appears to be due to a number of causes often found in combination. Firstly, the requirements of the local law and of the local procedures are interpreted and applied so as preclude a more efficient investigation under Annex 13 in favour of a legalistic and sterile interpretation of its terms. Sometimes this results from a distrust of the motives of persons and bodies wishing to participate or from commercial or related to matters of liability and bodies. These may be political, commercial or related to matters of liability and insurance. Secondly, there is said to be a conscious desire to conduct the investigation in some contracting states in such a way as to absolve from any possibility of blame the authorities or nationals, whether manufacturers, operators or air traffic controllers, of the country in which the inquiry is held. The EEC has also had an input into accidents and investigations. In particular, a directive was issued in December 1980 encouraging the uniformity of standards within the EEC by means of joint co-operation of accident investigation. The sharing of and assisting with technical facilities and information was considered an important means of achieving these goals. It has since been proposed that a European accident investigation committee should be set up by the EEC (Council Directive 80/1266 of 1 December 1980). After I would like to introduce the summary of the legislation examples and system for aircraft accidents investigation of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Swiss, New Zealand and Japan, and I am going to mention the present system, regulations and aviation act for the aircraft accident investigation in Korea. Furthermore I would like to point out the shortcomings of the present system and regulations and aviation act for the aircraft accident investigation and then I will suggest my personal opinion on the new and dramatic innovation on the system for aircraft accident investigation in Korea. I propose that it is necessary and desirable for us to make a new legislation or to revise the existing aviation act in order to establish the standing and independent Committee of Aircraft Accident Investigation under the Korean Government.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.101-124
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• 2018

Recently, most of the technologies have been developed in various forms through the advancement of single technology or interaction with other technologies. Particularly, these technologies have the characteristic of the convergence caused by the interaction between two or more techniques. In addition, efforts in responding to technological changes by advance are continuously increasing through forecasting promising convergence technologies that will emerge in the near future. According to this phenomenon, many researchers are attempting to perform various analyses about forecasting promising convergence technologies. A convergence technology has characteristics of various technologies according to the principle of generation. Therefore, forecasting promising convergence technologies is much more difficult than forecasting general technologies with high growth potential. Nevertheless, some achievements have been confirmed in an attempt to forecasting promising technologies using big data analysis and social network analysis. Studies of convergence technology through data analysis are actively conducted with the theme of discovering new convergence technologies and analyzing their trends. According that, information about new convergence technologies is being provided more abundantly than in the past. However, existing methods in analyzing convergence technology have some limitations. Firstly, most studies deal with convergence technology analyze data through predefined technology classifications. The technologies appearing recently tend to have characteristics of convergence and thus consist of technologies from various fields. In other words, the new convergence technologies may not belong to the defined classification. Therefore, the existing method does not properly reflect the dynamic change of the convergence phenomenon. Secondly, in order to forecast the promising convergence technologies, most of the existing analysis method use the general purpose indicators in process. This method does not fully utilize the specificity of convergence phenomenon. The new convergence technology is highly dependent on the existing technology, which is the origin of that technology. Based on that, it can grow into the independent field or disappear rapidly, according to the change of the dependent technology. In the existing analysis, the potential growth of convergence technology is judged through the traditional indicators designed from the general purpose. However, these indicators do not reflect the principle of convergence. In other words, these indicators do not reflect the characteristics of convergence technology, which brings the meaning of new technologies emerge through two or more mature technologies and grown technologies affect the creation of another technology. Thirdly, previous studies do not provide objective methods for evaluating the accuracy of models in forecasting promising convergence technologies. In the studies of convergence technology, the subject of forecasting promising technologies was relatively insufficient due to the complexity of the field. Therefore, it is difficult to find a method to evaluate the accuracy of the model that forecasting promising convergence technologies. In order to activate the field of forecasting promising convergence technology, it is important to establish a method for objectively verifying and evaluating the accuracy of the model proposed by each study. To overcome these limitations, we propose a new method for analysis of convergence technologies. First of all, through topic modeling, we derive a new technology classification in terms of text content. It reflects the dynamic change of the actual technology market, not the existing fixed classification standard. In addition, we identify the influence relationships between technologies through the topic correspondence weights of each document, and structuralize them into a network. In addition, we devise a centrality indicator (PGC, potential growth centrality) to forecast the future growth of technology by utilizing the centrality information of each technology. It reflects the convergence characteristics of each technology, according to technology maturity and interdependence between technologies. Along with this, we propose a method to evaluate the accuracy of forecasting model by measuring the growth rate of promising technology. It is based on the variation of potential growth centrality by period. In this paper, we conduct experiments with 13,477 patent documents dealing with technical contents to evaluate the performance and practical applicability of the proposed method. As a result, it is confirmed that the forecast model based on a centrality indicator of the proposed method has a maximum forecast accuracy of about 2.88 times higher than the accuracy of the forecast model based on the currently used network indicators.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.