• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.5219-5243
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• 2019

In electronic ticketing system, the malicious behavior of scalpers damages the customer's interest and disturbs the normal order of market. In order to solve the problem of scalpers, we took two steps. Firstly, we established the electronic ticketing system based on the consortium blockchain (CB-ETS). By establishing CB-ETS, we can make the ticketing market develop better in a controlled environment and be managed by the members in the consortium blockchain. Secondly, we put forward a kind of taxation mechanism for suppressing scalpers based on CB-ETS. Together with the regulatory mechanism, our scheme can effectively reduce the scalpers' profits and further inhibit scalpers. Through the above two steps, the scheme can effectively resist the malicious behavior of scalpers. Among them, in the process of transferring tickets, we optimized the transfer mechanism to achieve a win-win situation. Finally, we analyzed the security and efficiency of our scheme. Our scheme realizes the anonymity through the mixed currency protocol based on ring signature and guarantees the unforgeability of tickets by multi-signature in the process of modifying the invalidity of tickets. It also could resist to Dos attacks and Double-Spending attacks. The efficiency analysis shows that our scheme is significantly superior to relevant works.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.197-204
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• 2019

The transfer pricing mechanism is a tool commonly used to transfer the tax base from countries with high taxation in countries with low taxation. In many countries, this financial operations generate significant tax revenue losses. In an attempt to limit tax revenue losses, many public authorities have introduced regulations on transfer pricing, but the effectiveness of these rules has proved limited, and they contributed to the increasing complexity of tax laws and to the appearance of additional costs for companies. Historically, transfer pricing (TP) was not a substantial issue in Mongolia. The tax legislation contains basic TP rules, but there is limited guidance and enforcement in practice. At the moment, Mongolian tax authorities are not conducting specific transfer pricing audits. Nevertheless, tax authorities are starting to pay more attention to transactions between related parties and potential transfer pricing adjustments. This study examines a transfer pricing regulations of Mongolia.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.81-88
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• 2007

In on-line transaction, the transparency is the key factor for the taxation and customer's rights. Using the cash register concept of the off-line transaction, we studied on-line transaction register model for the e-commerce transparency. Although on-line transaction register may be used under the related e-commerce laws, in this paper, we only considered the mechanism of the register. The register issues the digital receipt, and then the receipt can be verified the validation by the models developed in this paper.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.1-20
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• 2023

Carbon pricing is in the spotlight as an economically efficient policy to limit global warming and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We examine how policymakers can improve social acceptance of a carbon tax, which is the main obstacle in implementing the policy. We conduct a survey experiment to analyze this topic and adopt two different interventions focusing on the use of revenue from a carbon tax and types of information to be provided. Regarding revenue use, we consider 1) tax reductions, 2) lump-sum transfers, and 3) green project investments. For information types, we focus on 1) the economic value of a carbon tax, and 2) the environmental value of a carbon tax. We find that lump-sum transfers have negative impacts on social acceptance of a carbon tax. For those who perceive climate change as a serious issue, moreover, both lump-sum transfers and tax reductions have negative impacts on acceptability. Regardless of the type of information provided, on the other hand, the social acceptance of a carbon tax is increased after the provision of information. Furthermore, the impact of information provision on the social acceptance interacts with the revenue use impacts. When the revenue use and the type of information are consistent with the aim of the policy, the effects of these strategies can be amplified.