A Structural Relationship among Job Requirements, Job Resources and Job Burnout, and Organizational Effectiveness of Private Security Guards (민간경비원의 직무요구 직무자원과 소진, 조직유효성의 구조적 관계)
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- Korean Security Journal
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- no.48
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- pp.9-33
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- 2016
The purpose of the present study was to find out cause-and-effect relationship between job requirements and job resources, with job burnout as a mediator variable, and the effects of these variables on organizational effectiveness. The population in the present study was private security guards employed by 13 private security companies in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do areas, and a survey was conducted on 500 security guards selected using purposive sampling technique. Out of 460 questionnaires distributed, 429 responses, excluding 31 outliers or insincere responses, were used for data analysis. For analysis, data were coded and entered into SPSS 18.0 and AMOS 18.0, which were used to analyze the data. Descriptive analyses were performed to find out sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents. The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were used to test the validity of the measurement tool, and the Cronbach's Alpha coefficients were calculated to test the reliability. To find out the significance of relationships among variables, Pearson's correlation analysis was performed. Covariance Structure Analysis (CSA) was performed to test the relationship among latent factors of a model for job requirements, job resources, job burnout, and organizational effectiveness of the private security guards, and the fitness of the model analyzed with CSA was determined by the goodness-of-fit index (
The Yeonhwa II zinc-lead mine is characterized by a dozen of moderately dipping tabular orebodies of skarn and zinc-lead sulfides, developed in accordance with the ENE-trending bedding thrusts and bedding planes of the Pungchon Limestone and underlying Myobong Formation, mostly along the contacts of a ENE-trending sill and a NW-trending dike of quartz mononite porphyry. The orebodies occur in three groups: (1) the footwall Wolgok orebodies with respect to the sill, (2) the hangingwall Wolgok orebodies, and (3) the Seongok orebodies extended from dike contacts into carbonate beds. Mineral compositions of these orebodies are dominated by calc-silicates (skarn) associated with ore minerals of sphalerite, galena, and chalcopyrite, as well as sulfide gangue of pyrrhotite. A pair of exo- and endo-skerns in the Wolgok footwall contact aureole between the Pungchon Limestone and quartz monzonite porphyry on the -120 level represents a well-developed symmetrical pattern of mineral zoning: a garnet/quartz zone in the center of exoskarn, two zones of pyroxene with ore minerals on both sides of the garnet/quartz zone, further outwards-an epidote/chlorite-bearing hornfelsic zone in the Myobong slate beyond a zone of unaffected limestone, and an epidote-dominated zone of endo skarn on the opposite side toward fresh quartz monzonite porphyry. These features indicate a combination of two effects on the skarn formation: (1) differences in composition of the host rocks(sedimentary and ignous), and (2) progressive outward migration of inner zones on outer zones on the course of metasomatic replacement of the pre-existing minerals. Microprobe analyses of garnet, pyroxene, pyroxenoids, epidote, and chlorite for nine major elements on a total of 23 mineral grains revealed that: the pyroxenes are hedenbergitic, in most zones, with a gradual decrease of Fe- and Mn-contents toward the central zone, whereas the garnets are andraditic in outer zones, but are grossularitic in the central zone. This indicates a reverse relationship of Fe-contents between pyroxene and garnet across the exoskarn zones. Pyroxenoids are lacking in wollastonite but are dominated by pyroxmangite, rhodonite and bustamite, indicating a Mn-rich nature in bulk chemistry. Pseudomorphic fluorite after garnet occurs abundantly reflecting a fluorine-enhanced evidence of the skarn-forming fluids. Epidote contains 0.19-0.25mole fraction of pistacite, and chlorite is Mn-rich but is Mg-poor. Sulfide mineralization took place with the most Fe-rich pyroxene rather than with garnet as indicated by the fact that the highest value of hedenbergite mole fraction occurs in the ore-bearing pyroxene zone. The Yeonhwa II ores are characterized by high zinc and low lead in metal grade, with minor quantity of copper content in almost constant grade. The hangingwall Wolgok and Seongok orebodies, that formed in a more open environment with respect to their local configurations of geologic setting, are more variable in metal grades and ratios, than are the footwall Wolgok orebodies formed in a more closed condition in a narrow interval of sedimentary beds.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
Knowledge of intangible cultural heritage is usually disseminated through word-of-mouth and actions rather than written records. Thus, people assemble to teach others about it and form communities. Accordingly, to understand and spread information about intangible cultural heritage properly, it is necessary to understand not only their attributes but also a community's relational characteristics. Community members include specialized transmitters who work under the auspices of institutions, and general transmitters who enjoy intangible cultural heritage in their daily lives. They converse about intangible cultural heritage in close relationships. However, to date, research has focused only on professionals. Thus, this study focused on the roles of general transmitters of intangible cultural heritage information by investigating intangible cultural heritage communities centering around Jeongseon Arirang; a social network analysis was performed. Regarding the research objectives presented in the introduction, the main findings of the study are summarized as follows. First, there were 197 links between 74 members of the Jeongseon Arirang Transmission Community. One individual had connections with 2.7 persons on average, and all were connected through two steps in the community. However, the density and the clustering coefficient were low, 0.036 and 0.32, respectively; therefore, the cohesiveness of this community was low, and the relationships between the members were not strong. Second, 'Young-ran Yu', 'Nam-gi Kim' and 'Gil-ja Kim' were found to be the prominent figures of the Jeongseon Arirang Transmission Community, and the central structure of the network was concentrated around these three individuals. Being located in the central structure of the network indicates that a person is popular and ranked high. Also, it means that a person has an advantage in terms of the speed and quantity of the acquisition of information and resources, and is in a relatively superior position in terms of bargaining power. Third, to understand the replaceability of the roles of Young-ran Yu, Nam-gi Kim, and Gil-ja Kim, who were found to be the major figures through an analysis of the central structure, structural equivalence was profiled. The results of the analysis showed that the positions and roles of Young-ran Yu, Nam-gi Kim, and Gil-ja Kim were unrivaled and irreplaceable in the Jeongseon Arirang Transmission Community. However, considering that these three members were in their 60s and 70s, it seemed that it would be necessary to prepare measures for the smooth maintenance and operation of the community. Fourth, to examine the subgroup hidden in the network of the Jeongseon Arirang Transmission Community, an analysis of communities was conducted. A community refers to a subgroup clearly differentiated based on modularity. The results of the analysis identified the existence of four communities. Furthermore, the results of an analysis of the central structure showed that the communities were formed and centered around Young-ran Yu, Hyung-jo Kim, Nam-gi Kim, and Gil-ja Kim. Most of the transmission TAs recommended by those members, students who completed a course, transmission scholarship holders, and the general members taught in the transmission classes of the Jeongseon Arirang Preservation Society were included as members of the communities. Through these findings, it was discovered that it is possible to maintain the transmission genealogy, making an exchange with the general members by employing the present method for the transmission of Jeongseon Arirang, the joint transmission method. It is worth paying attention to the joint transmission method as it overcomes the demerits of the existing closed one-on-one apprentice method and provides members with an opportunity to learn their masters' various singing styles. This study is significant for the following reasons: First, by collecting and examining data using a social network analysis method, this study analyzed phenomena that had been difficult to investigate using existing statistical analyses. Second, by adopting a different approach to the previous method in which the genealogy was understood, looking at oral data, this study analyzed the structures of the transmitters' relationships with objective and quantitative data. Third, this study visualized and presented the abstract structures of the relationships among the transmitters of intangible cultural heritage information on a 2D spring map. The results of this study can be utilized as a baseline for the development of community-centered policies for the protection of intangible cultural heritage specified in the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage. To achieve this, it would be necessary to supplement this study through case studies and follow-up studies on more aspects in the future.