• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.90-97
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• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.17 no.1_2_3
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• pp.185-194
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• 2005

A Server-Proxies-Users communication system is studied by using Stackelberg strategy theory of game. A new model, in which the server, proxies and users are not equal is established, and that is a three-level programming. The solution existence of the model is proved.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.379-389
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• 2002

In this paper, we study the competition between two kinds of suppliers, a bricks and mortars(B&M) and a clicks and mortars(C&M). Using the circular spatial market model, we derive and analyze the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of offline market share and efficiency of online channel of the C&M supplier. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium, (2) Under certain conditions, the price of online channel can be higher than that of offline channel, (3) It is impossible for the C&M supplier to encroach on all of the B&M supplier's market, (4) In some cases, the C&M supplier has incentive to lower the efficiency of its online channel for more profit.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.181-189
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• 2001

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies and applications has led to a new form of market place known as the electronic store. In this paper, we study competition between two shopping channels, an electronic store and traditional retailers. Based on the circular spatial market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the efficiency of the electronic store. The result shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium for both channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the electronic store has incentive to decrease its efficiency to gain more profit.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.135-144
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• 2009

This paper deals with an information security problem that involves the strategies of both an attacker and an administrator of a web-based system. A game-theoretic model for the problem, based on an Stackelberg game environment, is presented. In the model, the administrator selects a set of anti-virus vaccines to cope with potential system attackers and the intruder chooses attacking modes that are most effective against the administrator's chosen set of vaccines. Moreover, the model considers a number of practical constraints, such as a budget limit on the vaccine purchase and a limit on the system performance. In addition, two different scenario analyses are provided, based on the results of the proposed model applied to a simulated pseudo-real-world data.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.2 s.73
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• pp.65-76
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• 2004

교통망설계문제란, 교통시스템을 최적상태로 만들기 위한 최적의 설계변수를 결정하는 문제이다. 대표적인 교통망설계문제로는 도로를 신설하거나 확장하는 문제가 있으며, 이외에 교통신호시간의 결정, 교통정보의 제공, 혼잡통행료 부과, 새로운 교통수단의 도입 등 여러 교통정책분야가 교통망설계문제에 포함된다고 볼 수 있다. 일반적으로 교통망설계문제는 bi-level 구조로 구축되는데, 기존 대부분의 연구들은 상위문제와 하위문제를 서로 협력없이(Noncooperative) 자신들만의 목적을 최적화시키는 Cournot-Nash게임형태로 구성하여 풀고 있으나, 실제 교통분야에서 다루는 문제들은 리더(leader)와 추종자(follower)가 존재하는 Stackelberg게임에 가깝다고 할 수 있다. 기존 bi-level 문제들이 Cournot-Nash게임형태로 구성되어 풀고 있는 이유는 Stackelberg게임으로 구성할 경우 풀기가 어렵기 때문이다. 이런 측면에서 본 연구는 리더와 추종자가 존재하는 Stackelberg게임으로 교통망설계문제를 구성하며, 설계 변수값에 따른 통행자의 행태변화도 인지오차(perceived error)를 고려한 확률적 통행배정문제로 구성하여 좀더 현실적인 결과를 도출하도록 한다. 제시된 모형을 풀기 위하여 민감도분석(Sensitivity analysis)을 이용하며, 설계문제의 해를 구하는 알고리듬도 제시한다. 또한, 이 기법을 일반 도로교통망(general transportation road network)에 적용할 수 있도록 민감도(sensitivity) 유도과정을 자세히 기술하였다. 개발된 모형을 평가하기 위하여 2개의 예제 교통망을 대상으로 모형을 적용한 결과, 합리적인 값들을 도출하고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.4293-4304
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• 2014

In order to ensure the wireless connectivity and seamless service to mobile users, the next generation network system will be an integration of multiple wireless access networks. In a heterogeneous wireless access system, bandwidth allocation becomes crucial for load balancing to avoid network congestion and improve system utilization efficiency. In this article, we propose a new dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme for hierarchical wireless network systems. First, we derive a multi-objective decision criterion for each access point. Second, a bargaining strategy selection algorithm is developed for the dynamic bandwidth re-allocation. Based on the intervenient Stackelberg game model, the proposed scheme effectively formulates the competitive interaction situation between several access points. The system performance of proposed scheme is evaluated by using extensive simulations. With a simulation study, it is confirmed that the proposed scheme can achieve better performance than other existing schemes under widely diverse network environments.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.31 no.4
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• pp.277-288
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• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.94-98
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• 2010

In this paper, we formalize a new adaptive online price control scheme based on the Stackelberg game model. By using the hierarchical interaction strategy, control decisions in each mechanism act cooperatively and collaborate with each other to satisfy conflicting performance criteria. In addition, our dynamic online approach is practical for real network implementation. With a simulation study, the proposed scheme can adaptively adjust the network price to approximate an optimized solution under widely diverse network situations.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.