• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.255-276
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• 2016

This paper is designed to investigate the dynamic structure of optimal tariff imposed by the oil importing country from OPEC when OPEC increases the oil reserves through exploration and development. For this purpose, we used a Stckelberg differential game modeling approach, and tried to analyze two cases such that the one is the extraction cost is dependent on the oil reserves and the other is the extraction cost is independent of it. On the basis of this analysis, we propose that the importing contry has to impose dynamically inconsistent tariffs if the extraction cost is dependent on the oil reserves. Otherwise, she should impose dynamically consistent tariffs announced at initial time. In addition, we found that whether or not the exporting country uses some portion of oil produced for domestic consumption does not affect our policy proposition stated above.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.27 no.6
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• pp.147-156
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• 2009

We present a methodology for modeling and solving the transit frequency design problem with variable demand. The problem is described as a bi-level model based on a non-cooperative Stackelberg game. The upper-level operator problem is formulated as a non-linear optimization model to minimize net cost, which includes operating cost, travel cost and revenue, with fleet size and frequency constraints. The lower-level user problem is formulated as a capacity-constrained stochastic user equilibrium assignment model with variable demand, considering transfer delay between transit lines. An efficient algorithm is also presented for solving the proposed model. The upper-level model is solved by a gradient projection method, and the lower-level model is solved by an existing iterative balancing method. An application of the proposed model and algorithm is presented using a small test network. The results of this application show that the proposed algorithm converges well to an optimal point. The methodology of this study is expected to contribute to form a theoretical basis for diagnosing the problems of current transit systems and for improving its operational efficiency to increase the demand as well as the level of service.

• Proceedings of the KOR-KST Conference
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• 2002.02a
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• pp.17-42
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• 2002

전통적인 OD조사에 의한 OD추정의 여러 문제점들로 인해 링크관측교통량과 기존OD를 결합해 OD를 추정하고자 하는 연구들이 제시되고 있다. Yang(1995)은 일반화최소자승법을 풀기 위한 IEA와 SAB 알고리즘을 제시하였다. 그러나 두 알고리즘의 문제점은 첫째 실제 OD를 알기가 어렵기 때문에 기존 OD를 중요한 추정기준으로 설정한다는 것으로, 이러한 추정의 종속성으로 인해, 기존 OD와 실제 OD의 차이가 큰 경우 정확한 해를 도출하지 못한다. 두 번째 문제는 통행패턴 추정시 선형근사화를 가정하기 때문에 게임이론적 측면에서 전제로 설정한 완전한 Stackelberg 상황을 구현하지 못한다는 것이다. 이러한 문제점을 피하기 위해서는 기존 OD나 관측교통량의 오차에 일관적인 해도출 기법이 필요하다. OD추정 문제는 본질적으로 비선형이고 비볼록하여 전역해 탐색기법이 필요하기 때문에 전역최적화가 가능한 유전알고리즘을 이용한 OD추정모형(GAM)을 개발하였다. 사례네트워크 분석결과, GAM은 기존 OD의 오차에 대해 크게 종속적이지 않으며 OD구조가 변하는 경우에도 추정이 가능하여, 일반적으로 실제 OD를 알 수 없는(기존OD의 오차가 어느 정도인지를 알 수 없는) 도시부 네트워크에서 신뢰성있는 추정력을 보였다. 또한 기존 OD 추정모형은 비교적 용이하게 차종별로 관측할 수 있는 링크교통량을 차종구분 없이 단일차종으로 이용함으로써, 정보의 손실을 초래하여 결과적으로 모형의 추정력을 저하시켰다. 그렇지만 다차종 링크관측교통량으로부터 다차종 OD 추정연구는 거의 없었으며, 그 결과가 단일차종에 대한 추정결과와 어떻게 다른지에 대한 연구도 전무하였다. 본 연구에서는 유전알고리즘을 이용한 OD 추정모형을 다수단 OD 추정모형(GAMUC)으로 확대하였다. 사례 분석 결과 단일차종 OD추정기법은 심각한 추정오류를 범할 수 있으며, 그 적용성도 낮다는 것을 보였다. 다차종 OD 추정기법이 단일차종 OD 추정기법보다 양호한 추정력을 보였으며, 다차종 기법 중에서는 GAMUC가 IEAMUC보다 우수한 추정력을 보였다.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.7 s.78
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• pp.155-159
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• 2004

Recently, there are many trials about Artificial neural networks : ANNs structure and studying method of researches for forecasting traffic volume. ANNs have a powerful capabilities of recognizing pattern with a flexible non-linear model. However, ANNs have some overfitting problems in dealing with a lot of parameters because of its non-linear problems. This research deals with the application of a variety of model selection criterion for cancellation of the overfitting problems. Especially, this aims at analyzing which the selecting model cancels the overfitting problems and guarantees the transferability from time measure. Results in this study are as follow. First, the model which is selecting in sample does not guarantees the best capabilities of out-of-sample. So to speak, the best model in sample is no relationship with the capabilities of out-of-sample like many existing researches. Second, in stability of model selecting criterion, AIC3, AICC, BIC are available but AIC4 has a large variation comparing with the best model. In time-series analysis and forecasting, we need more quantitable data analysis and another time-series analysis because uncertainty of a model can have an effect on correlation between in-sample and out-of-sample.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.7 s.78
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• pp.119-129
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• 2004

This paper is designed to report the results of development and validation procedures in relation to the Freeway Incident Management System (FIMS) prototype development as part of Intelligent Transportation Systems Research and Development program. The central core of the FIMS is an integration of the component parts and the modular, but the integrated system for freeway management. The whole approach has been component-orientated, with a secondary emphasis being placed on the traffic characteristics at the sites. The first action taken during the development process was the selection of the required data for each components within the existing infrastructure of Korean freeway system. After through review and analysis of vehicle detection data, the pilot site led to the utilization of different technologies in relation to the specific needs and character of the implementation. This meant that the existing system was tested in a different configuration at different sections of freeway, thereby increasing the validity and scope of the overall findings. The incident detection module has been performed according to predefined system validation specifications. The system validation specifications have identified two component data collection and analysis patterns which were outlined in the validation specifications; the on-line and off-line testing procedural frameworks. The off-line testing was achieved using asynchronous analysis, commonly in conjunction with simulation of device input data to take full advantage of the opportunity to test and calibrate the incident detection algorithms focused on APID, DES, DELOS and McMaster. The simulation was done with the use of synchronous analysis, thereby providing a means for testing the incident detection module.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.123-137
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• 2007

The advent of the Internet and related Web technologies has created an easily accessible link between a firm and its customers, and has provided opportunities to a firm to use information technology to support supplementary after-sale services associated with a product or service. It has been widely recognized that supplementary services are an important source of customer value and of competitive advantage as the characteristics of the product itself. Many of these supplementary services are information-based and need not be co-located with the product, so more and more companies are delivering these services electronically. Net-based customer service, which is defined as an Internet-based computerized information system that delivers services to a customer, therefore, is the core infrastructure for supplementary service provision. The importance of net-based customer service in delivering supplementary after-sale services associated with product has been well documented. The strategic advantages of well-implemented net-based customer service are enhanced customer loyalty and higher lock-in of customers, and a resulting reduction in competition and the consequent increase in profits. However, not all customers utilize such net-based customer service. The digital divide is the phenomenon in our society that captures the observation that not all customers have equal access to computers. Socioeconomic factors such as race, gender, and education level are strongly related to Internet accessibility and ability to use. This is due to the differences in the ability to bear the cost of a computer, and the differences in self-efficacy in the use of a technology, among other reasons. This concept, applied to e-commerce, has been called the "e-commerce divide." High Internet penetration is not eradicating the digital divide and e-commerce divide as one would hope. Besides, to accommodate personalized support, a customer must often provide personal information to the firm. This personal information includes not only name and address, but also preferences information and perhaps valuation information. However, many recent studies show that consumers may not be willing to share information about themselves due to concerns about privacy online. Due to the e-commerce divide, and due to privacy and security concerns of the customer for sharing personal information with firms, limited numbers of customers adopt net-based customer service. The limited level of customer adoption of net-based customer service affects the firm profits and the customers' welfare. We use a game-theoretic model in which we model the net-based customer service system as a mechanism to enhance customers' loyalty. We model a market entry scenario where a firm (the incumbent) uses the net-based customer service system in inducing loyalty in its customer base. The firm sells one product through the traditional retailing channels and at a price set for these channels. Another firm (the entrant) enters the market, and having observed the price of the incumbent firm (and after deducing the loyalty levels in the customer base), chooses its price. The profits of the firms and the surplus of the two customers segments (the segment that utilizes net-based customer service and the segment that does not) are analyzed in the Stackelberg leader-follower model of competition between the firms. We find that an increase in adoption of net-based customer service by the customer base is not always desirable for firms. With low effectiveness in enhancing customer loyalty, firms prefer a high level of customer adoption of net-based customer service, because an increase in adoption rate decreases competition and increases profits. A firm in an industry where net-based customer service is highly effective loyalty mechanism, on the other hand, prefers a low level of adoption by customers.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.