• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제27권2호
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• pp.181-189
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• 2001

The proliferation of the Internet and related technologies and applications has led to a new form of market place known as the electronic store. In this paper, we study competition between two shopping channels, an electronic store and traditional retailers. Based on the circular spatial market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the efficiency of the electronic store. The result shows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium for both channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the electronic store has incentive to decrease its efficiency to gain more profit.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제31권4호
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• pp.277-288
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• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:정보통신
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• 제37권2호
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• pp.94-98
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• 2010

무선 네트워크상에서 자원의 단위가격을 결정하는 문제는 매우 중요한 문제이다. 기존의 기법들은 네트워크 운영자 중심 혹은 사용자 중심의 방법들이었기 때문에 최근에는 운영자와 사용자 모두를 만족시킬 수 있는 새로운 기법이 요구되었다. 본 논문에서는 네트워크에서 제공하는 대역폭을 사용하여 정보를 전송하는 유저들이 얻는 이익과 네트워크 운영자가 얻는 이익을 포함한 사회 전체적인 이익인 사회적 편익(social welfare)을 최대화 할 수 있는 적응적 가격 결정 기법을 제안하였다. 제안된 기법에서는 게임이론의 일종인 슈타켈버그 게임과 수요-효율 그래프를 사용하여 현재 네트워크 상황에 적합한 최적가격을 결정하도록 설계하였고, 성능분석을 통해 제안된 기법이 기존의 가격결정 기법에 비해 우수한 성능을 가지는 것을 확인하였다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권12호
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• pp.5759-5779
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• 2017

As the main means to cope with the stubborn problem of drunk driving, the inspection of drunk driving has already been paid more attention and thus reinforced. In this paper, we model this scenario as a Stackelberg game, where the police department (called defender) allocates resources dynamically in terms of the traffic situation on the traffic network to arrest drink drivers and drivers who drink (called attacker), whether choosing drunk driving or designated driving service, expect to minimize their cost for given travel routes. However, with the number of resources are limited, our goal is to calculate the optimal resource allocation strategy for the defender. Therefore, first, we provide an effective approach (named OISDD) to fulfill our goal, i.e., generate the optimal strategy to inspect drunk driving. Second, we apply OISDD to directed graphs (which are abstracted from Dalian traffic network) to analyze and test its correctness and rationality. The experimental results show that OISDD is feasible and efficient.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권11호
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• pp.4291-4310
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• 2015

This paper investigates the traffic offloading over unlicensed bands for two-tier multi-mode small cell networks. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game and apply a hierarchical learning framework to jointly maximize the utilities of both macro base station (MBS) and small base stations (SBSs). During the learning process, the MBS behaves as a leader and the SBSs are followers. A pricing mechanism is adopt by MBS and the price information is broadcasted to all SBSs by MBS firstly, then each SBS competes with other SBSs and takes its best response strategies to appropriately allocate the traffic load in licensed and unlicensed band in the sequel, taking the traffic flow payment charged by MBS into consideration. Then, we present a hierarchical Q-learning algorithm (HQL) to discover the Stackelberg equilibrium. Additionally, if some extra information can be obtained via feedback, we propose an improved hierarchical Q-learning algorithm (IHQL) to speed up the SBSs' learning process. Last but not the least, the convergence performance of the proposed two algorithms is analyzed. Numerical experiments are presented to validate the proposed schemes and show the effectiveness.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제12권5호
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• pp.1973-1991
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• 2018

Multimedia applications over wireless networks have been evolving to augmented reality or virtual reality services. However, a rich data size compared to conventional multimedia services causes bandwidth bottlenecks over wireless networks, which is one of the main reasons why those applications are not used widely. To overcome this limitation, bandwidth aggregation techniques, which exploit a multi-path transmission, have been considered to maximize link utilization. Currently, most of the conventional researches have been focusing on the user end problems to improve the quality of service (QoS) through optimal load distribution. In this paper, we address the joint pricing and load distribution problem for multi-homing in heterogeneous wireless access networks (ANs), considering the interests of both the users and the service providers. Specifically, we consider profit from resource allocation and cost of power consumption expenditure for operation as an utility of each service provider. Here, users decide how much to request the resource and how to split the resource over heterogeneous wireless ANs to minimize their cost while supporting the required QoS. Then, service providers compete with each other by setting the price to maximize their utilities over user reactions. We study the behaviors of users and service providers by analyzing their hierarchical decision-making process as a multileader-, multifollower Stackelberg game. We show that both the user and service provider strategies are closed form solutions. Finally, we discuss how the proposed scheme is well converged to equilibrium points.

• 정보보호학회논문지
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.135-144
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• 2009

이 연구는 웹기반 시스템의 운영자와 침해자의 전략과 관계된 정보보안문제를 다룬다. 슈타켈버그 게임상황을 이용하여, 백신 선택 문제의 게임이론적 모형을 제시한다. 이 모형에서 운영자는 잠재적 시스템 침해자에 대응하는 백신조합을 선택하고, 침해자는 운영자의 백신 조합에 가장 효율적으로 침입할 수 있는 방법을 선택한다. 제시된 모형은 운영자의 예산, 시스템 성능 등을 고려한 추가적 현실제약조건을 동시에 고려한다. 더불어, 가정을 적용해 수정된 현실 데이터를 이용하여 2가지 시나리오 분석을 제시한다.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.