• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.9 no.1
• /
• pp.90-97
• /
• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• v.15 no.4
• /
• pp.385-395
• /
• 2016

Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing the Supply chain (SC) with different conflicting elements. Among them, the Stackelberg game is the one in which a player as leader has more power than the other ones as followers. Since in many SC systems one element has, in essence, more power than the others; the Stackelberg game has found many applications in SC studies. In this paper, we apply the Stackelberg game-theoretic approach and the corresponding equilibrium point to formulate and analyze a two echelon VMI SC. Comprehensive computational results on an experimental case are conducted to numerically analyze the performance of VMI system against three groups of critical parameters. Moreover, a critical comparison demonstrates the poorer performance of decentralized VMI system than centralized one. This naturally necessitates designing proper contracts between VMI partners in order to more effectively implement the realistic decentralized system.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
• /
• v.17 no.1_2_3
• /
• pp.185-194
• /
• 2005

A Server-Proxies-Users communication system is studied by using Stackelberg strategy theory of game. A new model, in which the server, proxies and users are not equal is established, and that is a three-level programming. The solution existence of the model is proved.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.5 no.2
• /
• pp.37-43
• /
• 1979

A sufficient condition for a Stackelberg strategy to coincide with an equilibrium point is presented. Information pattern of a Stackelberg strategy is essentially different from that of an equilibrium solution and therefore the two strategies need not be the same. However, under score restrictions on the cost functions the difference in information patterns between the two strategies can be disregarded so that the two strategies coincide. The result is extended to the case of discrete-time dynamic games.

• Proceedings of the KOR-KST Conference
• /
• 2007.11a
• /
• pp.256-263
• /
• 2007

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.22 no.7 s.78
• /
• pp.99-106
• /
• 2004

This paper presents some comparisons between Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg game in bi-level program, composed of both upper level program and lower level one. The upper level can be formulated to optimize a specific objective function, while the lower formulated to express travelers' behavior patterns corresponding to the design parameter of upper level problem. This kind of hi-level program is to determine a design parameter, which leads the road network to an optimal state. Bi-level program includes traffic signal control, traffic information provision, congestion charge and new transportation mode introduction as well as road expansion. From the view point of game theory, many existing algorithms for bi-level program such as IOA (Iterative Optimization Assignment) or IEA (Iterative Estimation Assignment) belong to Cournot-Nash game. But sensitivity-based algorithms belongs to Stackelberg one because they consider the reaction of the lower level program. These two game models would be compared by using an example network and show some results that there is no superiority between the models in deterministic case, but in stochastic case Stackelberg approach is better than that of Cournot-Nash one as we expect.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
• /
• v.22 no.2 s.73
• /
• pp.65-76
• /
• 2004

교통망설계문제란, 교통시스템을 최적상태로 만들기 위한 최적의 설계변수를 결정하는 문제이다. 대표적인 교통망설계문제로는 도로를 신설하거나 확장하는 문제가 있으며, 이외에 교통신호시간의 결정, 교통정보의 제공, 혼잡통행료 부과, 새로운 교통수단의 도입 등 여러 교통정책분야가 교통망설계문제에 포함된다고 볼 수 있다. 일반적으로 교통망설계문제는 bi-level 구조로 구축되는데, 기존 대부분의 연구들은 상위문제와 하위문제를 서로 협력없이(Noncooperative) 자신들만의 목적을 최적화시키는 Cournot-Nash게임형태로 구성하여 풀고 있으나, 실제 교통분야에서 다루는 문제들은 리더(leader)와 추종자(follower)가 존재하는 Stackelberg게임에 가깝다고 할 수 있다. 기존 bi-level 문제들이 Cournot-Nash게임형태로 구성되어 풀고 있는 이유는 Stackelberg게임으로 구성할 경우 풀기가 어렵기 때문이다. 이런 측면에서 본 연구는 리더와 추종자가 존재하는 Stackelberg게임으로 교통망설계문제를 구성하며, 설계 변수값에 따른 통행자의 행태변화도 인지오차(perceived error)를 고려한 확률적 통행배정문제로 구성하여 좀더 현실적인 결과를 도출하도록 한다. 제시된 모형을 풀기 위하여 민감도분석(Sensitivity analysis)을 이용하며, 설계문제의 해를 구하는 알고리듬도 제시한다. 또한, 이 기법을 일반 도로교통망(general transportation road network)에 적용할 수 있도록 민감도(sensitivity) 유도과정을 자세히 기술하였다. 개발된 모형을 평가하기 위하여 2개의 예제 교통망을 대상으로 모형을 적용한 결과, 합리적인 값들을 도출하고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
• /
• v.23 no.8
• /
• pp.159-167
• /
• 2023

Objective: • To detect black hole and warm hole attacks in wireless sensor networks. • To give a solution for energy depletion and security breach in wireless sensor networks. • To address the security problem using strategic decision support system. Methods: The proposed stackelberg game is used to make the spirited relations between multi leaders and multi followers. In this game, all cluster heads are acts as leaders, whereas agent nodes are acts as followers. The game is initially modeled as Quadratic Programming and also use backtracking search optimization algorithm for getting threshold value to determine the optimal strategies of both defender and attacker. Findings: To find optimal payoffs of multi leaders and multi followers are based on their utility functions. The attacks are easily detected based on some defined rules and optimum results of the game. Finally, the simulations are executed in matlab and the impacts of detection of black hole and warm hole attacks are also presented in this paper. Novelty: The novelty of this study is to considering the stackelberg game with backtracking search optimization algorithm (BSOA). BSOA is based on iterative process which tries to minimize the objective function. Thus we obtain the better optimization results than the earlier approaches.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.8 no.12
• /
• pp.4293-4304
• /
• 2014

In order to ensure the wireless connectivity and seamless service to mobile users, the next generation network system will be an integration of multiple wireless access networks. In a heterogeneous wireless access system, bandwidth allocation becomes crucial for load balancing to avoid network congestion and improve system utilization efficiency. In this article, we propose a new dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme for hierarchical wireless network systems. First, we derive a multi-objective decision criterion for each access point. Second, a bargaining strategy selection algorithm is developed for the dynamic bandwidth re-allocation. Based on the intervenient Stackelberg game model, the proposed scheme effectively formulates the competitive interaction situation between several access points. The system performance of proposed scheme is evaluated by using extensive simulations. With a simulation study, it is confirmed that the proposed scheme can achieve better performance than other existing schemes under widely diverse network environments.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.28 no.4
• /
• pp.379-389
• /
• 2002

In this paper, we study the competition between two kinds of suppliers, a bricks and mortars(B&M) and a clicks and mortars(C&M). Using the circular spatial market model, we derive and analyze the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of offline market share and efficiency of online channel of the C&M supplier. The result can be summarized as follows: (1) Stackelberg equilibrium is always superior to the Nash equilibrium, (2) Under certain conditions, the price of online channel can be higher than that of offline channel, (3) It is impossible for the C&M supplier to encroach on all of the B&M supplier's market, (4) In some cases, the C&M supplier has incentive to lower the efficiency of its online channel for more profit.