• STI Policy Review
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.54-86
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• 2015

The study examines the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, with a focus on the recent Reauthorization, and compares, in the political context, the U.S. and East Asian countries-Japan, Korea and Taiwan-that adopted the U.S. SBIR program. For the systematic analysis and cross-country comparison, the study employs Kingdon (2003)'s framework-his political theory and Garbage Can Model-to identify political participants and processes underlying the SBIR Reauthorization and to analyze the differences in problem, policy, and politics streams between the U.S. and East Asian countries. For the cross-country comparison, specifically, the study uses various data sources such as OECD, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions, and World Value Survey. Based on the analysis outcomes, implications of U.S. practices on East Asian countries are extracted as follows. East Asian countries tend to: Have higher entrepreneurial aspiration while lower entrepreneurial activity and attitude than the U.S.; bear higher long term orientation and uncertainty avoidance while lower individualism than the U.S.; and have greater expectations of technology development and higher confidence in political parties while participating less in political action than the U.S. Drawing on the differences, the following policy recommendations are suggested. East Asian countries should: Improve entrepreneurs' access to resources (in particular, financial resource) in order to link their high entrepreneurial aspiration to actual entrepreneurial activities; cultivate failure-tolerating culture and risk-taking entrepreneurs, for instance, by providing a second chance to SBIR-participating businesses that failed to materialize their innovative ideas; and leverage their high expectations of new technology in order to take bold actions regarding their SBIR programs, and update the programs by drawing out constructive dialogues between SBIR stakeholders.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.444-475
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• 2013

This study explores the trajectories of institutionalization for technology transfer both in the U.S. and Korea, particularly focusing on two universities: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), and the University of California (UC). By comparing the diverging paths of the two universities in setting up institutions, this paper examines the limits of and lessons for technology transfer policies both to Korean government and universities in Korea. The University of California was involved in designing rules and codes, on one hand, to stimulate its members' engagements with technology transfer activity and, on the other hand, to keep its academic integrity since, no later than, the 1960s. The efforts and consequences range from its rules of patenting system to its codes of conducts. Through making rules formal and resolving conflicts on technology transfer activity, the U.S., and the University of California have decreased uncertainties for its members' engagements with industries. By contrast, KAIST has not built up such range of rules or codes due to its shorter experience and its constraining legal contexts. Korea introduced the legal format of the US Bayh-Dole Act in 2002, and its central government has led the initiatives for technology transfer, not allowing much latitude for its universities. This study implies a set of policy recommendations to the Korean government and KAIST: to build entrepreneurial universities, the government should give greater latitude to universities, so universities should be more rigorously engaged in developing their own rules and routines; the government, rather, should focus on providing bridging R&D funds like the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), so researchers could draw on resources to move their basic research into next phases; KAIST would be better to promote its members to engage with industries, and introduce conduct codes that allow its academics to engage in industrial activity, rather than building up its commercialization facilities.