Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
/
v.28
no.6
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pp.1695-1705
/
2016
With the rapid development of global economic and trade, the ports in the North-east Asia region have developed greatly. In such a fierce competition, how to ascertain right evaluation methods to assess the competitiveness of the ports, and make scientific and rational development strategy for upgrading the overall level of competitiveness of ports in North-east Asia, has become the first task for all the ports for coping with the challenges. As China's sustained economic growth of more than 30 years, the economic power and comprehensive national strength has been changed, China's international status has been greatly improved. Also China has achieved remarkable new results in the construction of peripheral diplomacy, and further has consolidated the relationship of countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt. The strong position of RMB in foreign exchange market and the implementation of the strategy of "area" opening to the outside world accelerated economic belt along the silk road in China to the west open pace. On the basis of the SWOT analysis of the Lianyungang Port, combined with the comprehensive and practical port competitiveness evaluation indicators system and competitiveness evaluation method, calculate the competitiveness level of Lianyungang port in East China, and find out the problems must be solved. The development strategies for Lianyungang port under One Belt One Road were suggested.
Produced by Chinese local television stations, Maritime Silk Road is a documentary which adopts ancient Maritime Silk Road as a historical nostalgia to interpret "the Belt and Road Initiative", a contemporary Chinese economic, political, and cultural strategy put forward by Chinese government mainly aiming at the countries of Southeast Asia. The main body of this article has three parts and the first part analyses how the documentary adopts computer-generated imagery (CGI) to create a historical nostalgia about ancient Maritime Silk Road in the period of Imperial China. At the same time, this part also presents a sense of diasporic nostalgia of the overseas Chinese. This historical and diasporic nostalgia is related to Chinese President Xi Jinping's political discourse: "Chinese dream" that propagandises to build a strong China put forward by Xi in 2013. The second part analyses how this historical and diasporic nostalgia legitimates Xi's "Chinese dream" and how it responds to recent territorial dispute when China continuously claims its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In this light, the documentary repeatedly mentions two political rhetoric: "coexistence" (gongcun) and "mutual benefit"(huli gongying) as a practical strategy to deal with the dispute between China and some countries of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the third section, the concept of "community of common destiny" (mingyun gongtongti) is adopted by the documentary to depict a convenient and effective organization of China and ASEAN, which is framed as an ultimate goal that Chinese government is depicted as the potential leader of this nostalgic community. At the same time, by providing different and even opposite viewpoints, this article discusses three controversial political rhetoric to present how historical and diasporic nostalgia is politicalized and served for Chinese diplomacy and national interest. Overall, this article argues that the documentary creates a glorious ancient Maritime Silk Road, as a sense of nostalgia, to expand China's economic and political influence, to respond to the controversial issues, and to reassert China's leadership as the centre of Asia.
Pax Sinica is a historiographical term, modeled after the original phrase Pax Romana. It refers, in Latin, to a Chinese-provided peace which in turn is used to describe an era of peace in East Asia sustained by Chinese hegemony. In historical terms, both the Pax Sinica of the Eastern hemisphere through Han China and the Pax Romana of the Western hemisphere through Rome signified a trans-regional order based on rules and regulations. This orderly world of the Pax Sinica generated a number of positive results such as the intensification of travel, ever-expanding trade relations, an increase in the overall living standards of the populace, the proliferation of cities, and a demographic upsurge in Eurasia along the ancient Silk Road. During this period, China was the dominant civilization not only in the Eastern hemisphere but also in the Middle hemisphere due to its political, economic, military and cultural influence. This paper aims to reintroduce this historiographical term to elucidate the recent Chinese initiatives in Eurasia along the Silk Road to facilitate the integration and connectivity of the continent.
The 'One Belt One Road (OBOR)' initiative, which was promulgated as part of the enlargement policy along with the advent of Xi Jinping in 2013, is a policy to expand China's political and economic power externally through linkages with neighboring countries. China's overseas port investment plays an important role in the promotion of the 'OBOR' policy from the coast of China through maritime transportation routes from S.E Asia to Mediterranean and Europe. Since China's overseas port investment has been made from several factors such as political, economic, and military motives, it differs in purpose and character from investments made by private companies, such as Global Port Operators(GTO) which consider profitability first. This study aims to address future prospects and implications by analyzing the geopolitics of China's overseas port investment under the 'One Belt One Road' initiative. According to the results, China's overseas port investment is dominated by state-owned enterprises and political and security factors are more important than profitability. China's overseas port investment has been on a large scale in a short period of time, and China has faced with various problems both domestically and internationally. such as debt default, environmental problems, subordination problems from recipient countries and political and military confrontation with great countries such as United States, Japan and India etc.
China's 'One Belt and One Load' initiative is a mega-infrastructure project that connects China and the Eurasian Economies Area by overland and sea routes. Therefore, if it goes smoothly, It will be a new engine for economic development in China and the world, and It is expected to be a factor that will change the structure of the international economy. Especially, the Eurasian continent is likely to develop into the center of the global economy. But China's 'One Belt and One Load' initiative is not only macro and long-term, but also implies complexity, making it hard to be optimistic about development. China's 'One Belt and One Load' initiative is not only strongly promoted as a long-term national development strategy to be completed by 2049, but also strong economic complementarity between China and 'One Belt and One Load' consecutive countries. And many of the successive countries are expecting 'One Belt and One Load' construction. Therefore, there is no possibility at all. In particular, the possibility of development can not be completely ruled out, given the various policies of 'One Belt and One Load' currently being pursued by China. Even if it doesn't go smoothly, the process alone will have significant economic effects on China and neighboring countries, so it will be meaningful. With the help of information technology.
Purpose: To investigate the intensity of bilateral international trade of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) countries with Kazakhstan, its relationship with logistics (LPI), to assess their contribution to economic growth and distribution of commodity flows. Research design, data, and methodology: The method of analyzing the bilateral trade flow was applied by using the trade intensity index (TII) and a multidimensional regression model describing the relationship between LPI and its components, TII, the volume of exports and imports, GDP. Results: The nature and directions of the relationship between TII and the key components of logistics, the positive impact of LPI on the intensity of trade are established. It is revealed that the intensity of trade between the countries in the direction of the EAEU-Kazakhstan has a greater impact on the growth of LPI than in the opposite direction. At the same time, the higher the level of trade integration and the volume of GDP, the stronger their impact on the efficiency of logistics and distribution of commodity flows. Conclusions: Effective distribution of commodity flows will require the development of logistics components based on the direction of bilateral trade and the size of countries, the intensification of state reforms in the field of international trade and distribution logistics.
This paper uses super-efficiency DEA model and Malmquist index to evaluate the carbon emission efficiency (CEE) values of the nine western provinces along the "Silk Road Economic Belt" for the period from 2000 to 2015, and analyses the influencing factors of the CEE. The major findings of this study are the following: (1) the overall CEE of the nine western provinces is not high, and there are significant inter-provincial differences in the CEE. Meanwhile, the provinces with higher levels of economic development generally have higher CEE. (2) The annual total factor productivity (TFP) of the nine western provinces, which is mainly determined by technological change, is greater than 1. Moreover, the total average growth rate of the TFP is 15.5%. (3) The CEE of the nine western provinces is not spatially dependent. In addition, the urbanization, openness, use of energy-saving technologies and research and development (R&D) investment have a significant positive impact on the CEE values, while the industrial structure, foreign direct investment, fixed asset investment, government expenditure levels and energy structure have a significant negative impact on the CEE. Among them, R&D investment is the primary factor in promoting the development of CEE, and the government expenditure has the greatest negative impact on the CEE.
In September 2013, President Park Geun-hye announced her controversial "Look North" policy, of which the most salient aspect is the "Eurasia Initiative". This comprises various proposals designed to overcome existing constraints by developing new markets and creating new economic partners in continental areas from which South Korea has been alienated since the end of World War II, and this dovetails nicely with China's One Belt, One Road Initiative. The concepts of the "Silk Road Rail Express (SRX)" and the "East Sea Rim Maritime Community (ESRMC)" have also been discussed. SRX is at present a purely symbolic railroad project intended to encourage individual, cultural, trade and diplomatic exchanges. ESRMC is a model for establishing an ad hoc community to promote regional economic cooperation around the East Sea. President Park's Eurasia Initiative will provide South Korean investment for the Northeast to complement Russian plans, like the "Northern Energy Road" being built by Gazprom, and Chinese plans, like the Chang-Ji-Tu Development Plan for the North Korean port of Rajin. China's trade, as well as its energy and food supplies, pass through the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean, and are thus vulnerable to interdiction by India or the US. China is therefore trying to reduce its exposure geopolitical risk by establishing a network of corridors between the Belt and the Road to provide alternative paths. The "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" and the "China-Myanmar Economic Corridor" provide such connections, and South Korea hopes that SRX and ESRMC can become part of a "China-South Korea Economic Corridor". This concept could do much to revitalize the underdeveloped northern provinces of China and Russia's Far East, not to mention North Korea. By linking up the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Trans-China Railway, the Trans-Mongolian Railway and the Trans-Korean Railway all these Asian countries will be connected to one another, and ultimately to Europe. An interim connection between China and South Korea using a rail-ferry has also been proposed.
China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.
China launched the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015 as part of the existing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its influence in digital and technological development across Asia, Europe, and Africa. Southeast Asia is one of the key targets of the Digital Silk Road due to its geographical proximity to China and the rapid growth of the digital sphere. Although the DSR opens several potential opportunities for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states to foster the digitalization process in the region, how each country reacts to projects under the DSR is varied. Secondly, Vietnam is the only ASEAN member state that has not signed any official agreement under the BRI framework, and thirdly, Vietnam opted out of Huawei technology. This paper aims to understand the perspective of Vietnam and how Vietnam has responded to the growing technological presence of China in Southeast Asia until 2021. By using qualitative methods, the author argues that the DSR has allowed Beijing to overcome the limitations of the original strategy, BRI, and strengthen its influence in the field of information and communication technologies, particularly fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications. Furthermore, the paper examines Vietnam's digital development and digital diplomacy and how the Vietnamese government has responded to DSR projects. In light of both the potential threats and economic benefits that the DSR has brought to Vietnam and Southeast Asian countries, in the last section, the policy implications for cooperation are discussed.
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