• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.195-221
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• 1994

This study investigates the wealth effect of foreign acquisition of U.S. based firms. Contrary to previous studies, this analysis demonstrates that after appropriate control of domestic-acquired targets, the wealth gains to the shareholders of targets in foreign takeovers are similar to those in domestic takeovers. This paper investigates the validity of the competitive acquisition market in cross-border takeovers and concludes that : 1) in cases of inward foreign direct investment into the U.S., foreign firms do not realize significant net benefits from acquisitions; and 2) the foreign acquirer is as well informed as its U.S, counterparts about the target's market. The results of this study are consistent with the view that each country has different motivations for investing in the U.S. market. Consider, for example, Japan. The evidence suggests that Japanese companies pay a considerable price for U.S. targets which have performed poorly before the takeover. While there is no specific rationale to explain why Japanese firms buy the most volatile and worst performing firms, international barriers may provide a possible reason for these anomalies. Overall, the evidence of this paper supports the view that foreign takeovers occur in a competitive acquisition market.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.267-299
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• 1996

The takeover boom of the 1980s was accompanied by a series of innovations in debt contracts, including the poison put that allows bonds to be redeemed in the event of a corporate control change. The poison put was included in a large majority of convertible debt offerings, shortly after the first issues with such provisions. We attempt to understand the factors that contributed to the widespread adoption of this innovation in convertible bonds and the consequences for shareholder wealth. Our, findings suggest that by reducing the potential for bondholder-shareholder conflicts and by conveying positive information about future takeover prospect'5, poison puts result in significant benefits to issuing firm shareholders, particularly if the firm is under takeover speculation. There are, however, no benefits when a firm has adopted anti-takeover measures prior to the offering. There is weaker evidence that existing bondholders do worse when poison puts are present.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.1-18
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• 2020

Purpose - This study investigates whether a listing effect exists in cross-border M&As and whether the effect can be attributed to the uncertainty of the GDP growth rate in the target firm's home country. We apply a joint variable analysis using M&A announcement data from the Korea Exchange (KRX), Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), and the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) from 2004 to 2013. We also conduct an event study using the measure of the uncertainty of the GDP growth rate (based on IMF statistics) in 55 target countries. Design/methodology - We measure the abnormal return (AR) using the market-adjusted model. We test the significance of the AR and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using a one-sample t-test. We examine the characteristics of the CARs depending on whether the target company is listed by applying a difference analysis using CAR as a test variable. In addition, we set CAR (-5, +5) as a dependent variable to identify the cause of the listing effect, and test both the financial characteristic variables of the acquirer and the collective characteristic variables of the merger as independent variables in the multiple regression analysis. Findings - First, we find the listing effect of cross-border M&As in the KRX, SSE, and TWSE, which represent the capital markets in Korea, China, and Taiwan, respectively. This listing effect persists during the global financial crisis and has a negative effect on the wealth of acquiring shareholders, especially when the target countries are emerging markets. Second, greater uncertainty regarding the target countries' economic growth in cross-border M&As has a negative effect on the wealth of acquiring firms' shareholders. Third, our empirical analysis demonstrates that the listing effect is attributable to the fact that firms listed in a target country with greater uncertainty of economic growth are more directly and greatly exposed to uncertain capital markets through stock markets, than are unlisted firms. Originality/value - This study is significant in that it presents a new strategic perspective in the study of cross-border M&As by demonstrating empirically that the listing effect is attributable to the uncertainty regarding the economic development of the target firms' home countries.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.8
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• pp.297-308
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• 2020

This study exemines the roles of corporate social activity (CSR) and executive compensation structure on the pricing of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) with special focus on the role of CSR in reducing the level of information asymmetry between managers and future shareholders of issuing firms through SEOs. This study also investigates the interaction between executive compensation structure and CSR on the discounting of SEOs. We use a sample of 2,102 seasoned equity offerings of U.S. firms with CSR scores from 1995 to 2015 in our OLS fixed effect regression analysis. The results show that issuing firms with high CSR are more likely to expericence a lower degree of the SEO discount. The results also document a positive association between CSR and a high proportion of equity-based compensation of issuing firms' executives. The findings of this paper confirm that CSR attenuates the impact of information asymmetry and the pre-SEO price uncertainty on the pricing of the offers and hence the SEO discount. Furthermore, CSR reinforces the impact of executive firm-related wealth on the discounting of seasoned equity offerings. It appears that firm-related wealth motivates managers to actively engage in reducing information asymmetry activities before SEOs, thereby decreasing the SEO discount.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.37-69
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• 2005

This study intends to verify whether stock repurchase, as well as stock dispositions, affects shareholder's wealth and also whether repurchase/dispositions has varying impact de-pending on its purpose. According to empirical analysis, announcement of stock repurchase results in positive abnormal returns when the objective of stock repurchase is stock price stabilization or cancellation of shares. However, when the purpose of stock repurchase is granting incentives to executives/employees, we get the negative abnormal returns. Also, the termination of stock trust for reason of expiration or stock dispositions of which goal is to give incentives to executive/employees has a negative impact on stock price, whereas direct dispositions of stock to raise cash or to improve financial structrue are shown to significantly increase the wealth of shareholders. Cross-section analysis also confirms that stock repurchase and dispositions has different impact on excess returns depending on its purpose. The results of this study imply that the dispositions of stock should be regarded as an important financial strategic tool to be used by companies and what's more, such studies dealing with stock repurchase or dispositions should take firm's purpose into consideration in their approach.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.85-117
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• 1997

This paper is focused on management control system. From a management control perspective, strategies should be viewed as useful, but not absolutely necessary, guides to the proper design of an MCS. When strategies are formulated more clearly, more control alternatives become feasible and it becomes easier to implement each form of management control effectively. The common and important category of controls are action controls, personnel and cultural controls, and results controls. Action controls involves ensuring that employees perform(or do not perform) certain actions that are known to be beneficial(or harmful) to the organization. Personnel and cultural controls take steps to ensure that employees will control each others' behaviors. Results controls involve rewarding individuals(and sometimes groups of individuals) for generating good outcomes or punishing them for poor outcomes. The results controls of ROI-type measure cause to make managers excessively short- term oriented, or myopic. When managers' orientations to the short - term become excessive -when the management are more concerned with short-term profit than entity value-the managers are said to be myopic. We car, solve myopic problem by introducing AR(abnormal return), near-perfect indicators of value creation. The results - control ideal would be to hold all employees accountable for the wealth they individually create(or destroy) for the owners of the entities in which they work. This ideal is approachable for top management of publicly traded corporations because for these organizations, the wealth created(returns to shareholders) can be measured directly for any period(such as a year, a quarter, or a month) as the measurement period pin(or minus) the change in the market value of the stock.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.33-61
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• 2009

From the perspective of corporate governance, we examine the acquirers' performance of mergers and acquisitions in KOSDAQ Market. The empirical results of our study show that inside an executive shareholders and outside minor shareholders, affect acquirers' performance in M&A's : the ownership of outside minor shareholders is positively correlated with the performance of acquirers. and, the ownership of insiders, such as that of an executive shareholders, does have significant effect on the performance of M&A's. Since the current literature concludes that the improvement of corporate governance in KOSDAQ Market would enhance the shareholders' wealth, the results of our study implies that outside minor investors, as well as insiders, are playing an important role in the corporate governance.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.111-134
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• 2002

본 연구에서는 건설업종에 특화된 신용평가 모형을 개발하여 건설업종에 대한 부도 예측력를 제고하고자 하였다. 건설업은 여타 업종과는 다른 재무적 특성을 지니고 있다. 특히, 재무적 안정성이 취약하고 자산의 대부분이 매출채권, 재고자산으로 구성되어 유동성이 극히 낮은 실정이다. 본 연구는 이러한 건설업종의 특성을 충분히 감안한 신용평가 모형을 개발하고자 한것이다. 신용평가 모형 중 그 현실적 유용성이 높아 많이 이용되어 오던 신용평점 모형을 개발하였다. 총 2,475개 건설업체를 대상으로 모형구조 및 각종 계량지표 및 비계량지표에 대한 분석을 주로 평균차이 검증과 로짓분석에 의거 선정하였다. 그 결과 새로운 신용평점 모형은 매출액 경상이익률, 총 현금흐름 대 차입금 비율 등 9개의 재무지표와 5분류의 비재무지표로 구성되었다. 이 모형을 기존의 신용평점모형과 비교한 결과 신규모형의 변별력이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구가 제시한 신용평점모형과 그 개발 방법이 향후 금융기관들의 부실을 줄이고 결과적으로 수익성을 개선하는데 일조하리라 기대된다.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.9
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• pp.112-119
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• 2016

This study aims to examine propping by the controlling shareholders and the corporate value of Korean firms with agency problems and propping perspectives. Propping refers to a transfer of resources from a higher ownership firm to a lower ownership firm, in order to prevent the latter from going bankrupt. This study used a sample of 4,077 companies listed on the KRX data exchange from 2004 to 2014. We used proxy variables such as long-term supply contracts, asset and business sales, credit facilities, loans, and equity investments to affiliates as wealth transfer instruments of the controlling shareholders. We found that propping occurred by the equity investment of affiliates in Korean firms. Also, we found that the Korean firm's value was decreased by the affiliate equity investment.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.179-196
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• 2013

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.