• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.51-57
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• 2016

Purpose - If control-ownership disparity is large, managers will not actively reduce costs; rather, they will maintain unutilized resources or possess surplus resources even when sales decrease with the purpose of increasing personal utility from status, power, compensation, and prestige. These managers' utility maximizing tendencies cause cost stickiness. We examine whether asymmetric behavior related to costs becomes stronger when there is a large disparity between ownership and control rights. Research design, data, and methodology - We construct a regression model to examine the relationship between control-ownership disparity and cost stickiness. STICKY, a dependent variable representing cost stickiness is a value found using the method of Weiss (2010), and Disparity is an interest variable that shows control-ownership disparity. Results - This study is based from the unique situations in Korea, in which high control-ownership disparity is common in firms. Large control-ownership disparity was found to increase cost stickiness of corporations. Conclusions - The results of this study imply that controlling shareholders may be regarded as a threat to the interests of minority shareholders and corporate values especially when controlling shareholders have significant influence over managers or the power to make managerial decisions as owners of a corporation.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.99-125
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• 2002

Fisheries cooperative requires dual characteristics in performing its original function. Economic characteristic as an business enterprise and democratic characteristic as cooperative entity need to complete its objectives and survive in the complex rapidly-changing environment. After IMF crisis, fisheries cooperative received enormous government's financial support and credit-business department is perfectly under government's control. Regional fisheries cooperative also faces business failure, therefore pure cooperative movement can't save the fisheries cooperative. Economic characteristic as an business enterprise is more emphasized than democratic characteristic as cooperative entity in recent years. The theory of corporate ownership and governance can be applied to explain the ownership and governance of fisheries cooperative because fisheries cooperative is now similar to an business enterprise. During the IMF crisis the board, the auditors and the minority shareholders in business enterprise were revealed to be powerless against the mighty influence of controlling shareholders. Unconstrained discretion exercised by those controlling shareholders not only led to the firms'insolvency, but also brought down the country's financial system. During the past few years, Korea has experienced many institutional changes regarding its corporate governance structure. The introduction of outside directors, the strengthening of minority shareholders' rights, and enhanced accounting transparency are achieved to improve the efficiency of economic system. Investors, including institutional and individual, also seem to be more aware of governance issues now. Credit-business department of fisheries cooperative is recommended to introduce the institutions same as the case of the corporate governance structure. Fisheries cooperative except economic and credit-business department requires other prescriptions because it is emphasized as democratic cooperative entity. But we should be careful to interpret the ownership and governance structure because they are products of nations, eras and organizations.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.9
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• pp.5829-5835
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• 2015

This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance structure on the firm's debt costs under different governance environments. We find that after the 2008 banking crisis, family firms with controlling shareholders benefit from lower debt cost through the strong control rights of dominating large shareholders, compared with the firms with diversified minority-shareholders. Foreign investors are related statistically to the higher cost of debt. Before the 2008 banking crisis, cash flows and growth potentials are positively associated with the firm's cost of debt.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.313-325
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the process of determining control in a situation where investors hold less than a majority of the voting rights of the investee through case. Design/methodology/approach - In this study, the various and complex considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 'Consolidated Financial Statements' were systematically classified and stratified. Findings - First, the agreement to delegate voting rights does not necessarily have to be documented, but it can be said to be substantive rights right only if it is not of the nature that one party can discontinue at any time. Second, if it is clear that investors do not have power due to the relative size of voting rights and the degree of stock dispersion, there is no need to review the past shareholders' meeting resolutions and additional facts and circumstances. Research implications or Originality - This study expects to minimize errors in applying the standards by classifying and stratifying the various considerations presented in K-IFRS 1110 into first and subsequent considerations. In addition, it is expected to contribute to reducing practical confusion in determining control by presenting a step-by-step review through case on whether or not to have power to judge control when holding voting rights of less than a majority.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.7
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• pp.293-315
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• 2001

In America, there has been increased empasis on corporates social responsbility in connect with corporate governance. Modern statutes have been enacted expressly empowering corporations to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientiffic, or educational purposes. the Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1970's stressed improvement in corporate accountability by changing the traditional corporate governance, with emphasis on independent directors, and disintrested overview. The Korean Commerce Code and the Securities Exchange Law have introduced the independent outside-director and the audit committee. This outside-directors and the audit committee should supervise the corporate management by the managing directors to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientiffic, or educational purposes. Korean statutes include many problems that would lose effect of corporates social responsbility in management. In order to become effective the corporates social responsbility, it should be established newly a provision of corporates social responsbility. And the outside-directors should be independent of and supervise the managing directors, and make donations for the public welfare. And the shareholders' supervisement rights on the managment should be strengthen.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.21 no.6
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• pp.29-34
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• 2021

The article formulates the key characteristics and features of country models of corporate governance. It was revealed that all countries are characterized by a fairly high concentration of ownership, insider control; Key gaps in the implementation of corporate governance principles were found: transparency and disclosure of information, protection of shareholders' rights, gender diversity of boards of directors, implementation of recommendations on the share of independent directors; The criterion of countries' efficiency (total investments) was identified and recommendations for their improvement were developed.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.2
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• pp.95-107
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• 2019

The ICSID arbitral tribunal shall determine the suitability of investors in accordance with the Article 25 of the ICSID convention and the investment or investor's provisions under the BIT. The eligibility of investors has an important role in establishing jurisdiction under international investment disputes. Therefore, this study draws implications on issues related to investor qualification, focusing on ICSID arbitration. The investor's nationality shall be taken into consideration in determining whether the investor is eligible. The criteria for determining the nationality of a corporate investor include the place of incorporation, main business location, and substantial ownership or control. The criterion of the place of incorporation that is used in a number of BIT have the problem of protecting investors from third countries not involved in the BIT. So, in recent years it is stipulated that the actual economic activity or the main business location as well as the place of incorporation criteria. And this problem is complemented by the denial of benefit clause. When determining whether a local corporation is controlled by foreigner in the host state it considers the shareholding rate, voting rights, and the exercise of managerial rights. There is a tendency to recognize shareholder's right to petition. Thus the same damage should not cause problems such as duplicate repayment or double reimbursement between the shareholders and the company. Unexpected problems can arise if the scope of investments and investors is broadly specified in the BIT. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the scope of investment to be protected.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.11 no.11
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• pp.5-11
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• 2013

Purpose - Considering corporate companies that are continually growing and bearing in mind the theory of agency, how confident can stakeholders be about their benefits in relation to managers' decisions? Previous research has indicated that the type of corporate governance can have an effective impact on companies' performance. The current study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure on listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Research Design, Data, and Methodology - Through use of the correlation coefficient, the results indicate a positive correlation among the percentage of common stock held by board members, the percentage of non-executive board members, and separation of the positions of chairperson of the board of directors and managing director. Results - Based on the return on assets index, only the correlation between the proportion of ownership of the managing director and financial investment company ownership is significant. Conclusion -Managers can potentially make decisions that benefit themselves but are detrimental to shareholders' interests. Corporate governance is a factor that can mitigate agency costs. Corporate governance comprises the laws, regulations, structures, processes, cultures, and systems that lead to the achievement of objectives such as accountability, transparency, justice, and stakeholders' rights.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.853-866
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• 2020

The purposes of this research were: 1) to investigate the effect of participatory management on financial information asymmetry, 2) to investigate the effect of corporate governance on financial information asymmetry, 3) to examine the influences of benefits incentives on financial information asymmetry, and 4) to test the mediating effects of benefits incentive that influences the relationship between participatory management, corporate governance, and financial information asymmetry. The research sample consisted of 388 Thai-listed firms. Data were collected through a survey questionnaire. Descriptive analysis, Multiple Regression Analysis, and Structural Equation Modeling were used for the data analysis. The results revealed: 1) participatory management and participation in evaluation had a negative influence on financial information asymmetry. 2) Corporate governance and the rights of shareholders had a negative influence on financial information asymmetry. 3) Benefits incentive was negatively associated with financial information asymmetry. 4) The model's influences of participatory management, corporate governance on the reduction of financial information asymmetry through benefits incentive as mediator fit the empirical data (Chi-square = 104.459, df = 84, p = 0.065, GFI = 0.967, RMSEA = 0.025). The variables in the model explained 78.00% and 4.70 % of the variance of benefits incentive and financial information asymmetry, respectively.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.9
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• pp.287-300
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• 2021

The study is conducted to find out the impact of the country- and corporate-level governance and firm internationalization on stock liquidity of 120 listed firms in Japan, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and India. Panel data is used in the current study. The annual time span covered in the current study is 10 years. The current study explores results based on secondary data. The findings of the 'robust panel corrected standard error' estimator shows that the internationalization strategy of firms positively influences the stock liquidity. The internationalization strategy of multinational corporations proves to be an effective methodology for improving stock liquidity in the home market as well as abroad. The study also shows that a stronger relationship exists between stock liquidity and internationalization in those countries where the regulatory settings are effective, the judiciary system is efficient and shareholders' rights are protected. Corporate governance and stock liquidity are negatively associated. The study also finds a negative relationship between country-level governance mechanisms and stock liquidity. Whereas the 'robust panel corrected error' estimator shows a positive association between corporate governance mechanisms and firm internationalization. The study depicts that effective corporate governance motivates multinational companies to expand their business abroad.