• 마케팅과학연구
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.247-269
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• 2007

현대에 있어 동질적인 품질과 편익을 제공하는 제품을 가지고 다수의 기업들이 시장점유율 증대와 고객확보를 위하여 치열한 경쟁을 벌이고 있는 가운데 가격할인은 기업이 즐겨 사용하는 촉진수단이다. 가격할인은 단기적 매출향상, 소비자의 브랜드전환, 신제품의 시장침투 등의 목적을 달성하기 위하여 사용된다. 실제로 과거의 실증연구에 의하면 다양한 형태의 가격할인이 판매증대에 효과적이며 가격할인은 소비자의 지각가치를 증가시킨다고 하였다. 하지만 할인된 가격은 제품의 품질을 의심하게 하거나 낮게 평가하는 부정적인 효과가 있다는 사실이 밝혀졌으며, 모든 제품카테고리와 모든 구매상황에 대하여 가격할인이 소비자의 지각가치를 향상시킨다고 볼 수 없다. 이에 따라 본 연구에서는 브랜드애호도의 차이가 있는 제품을 대상으로 가격할인율에 따라 소비자의 지각가치에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 연구함으로서 브랜드애호도의 조절효과를 분석하였다. 브랜드애호도가 강한 제품에 대한 지각획득가치와 지각거래가치는 가격할인율이 낮을 때 보다 큰 경우에 증가할 것으로 예측하였으나 분석결과 유의적인 차이가 없는 것으로 나타났는데, 이것은 브랜드애호도가 강한 경우에는 가격할인에 의한 지각희생의 감소량이 크지 않았고 브랜드 자체에 대한 신뢰도와 속성에 대한 만족도가 높기 때문에 가격인하가 브랜드선택에 큰 영향을 미치지 않았다는 것을 의미한다고 할 수 있다. 반면 브랜드애호도가 약한 제품에 대한 지각획득가치와 지각거래가치는 가격할인율이 낮을 때 보다 큰 경우에 감소한 것으로 나타났다. 이는 브랜드애호도가 약한 경우에는 제품으로부터 획득하게 되는 편익에 대한 만족도와 신뢰도가 낮은데 이러한 특성을 고려해보면 가격할인이 클 때에 제품의 품질과 편익을 더욱 평가절하하거나 심리적으로 지각희생의 크기가 증가됨에 따라 지각가치가 감소되었음을 의미한다고 할 수 있다.

• 마케팅과학연구
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.