• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.152-171
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• 2019

In opportunistic networks, nodes may appear some selfishness while transmitting the message, however, most of the existing research works consider the individual selfishness or social selfishness respectively, and these two types of selfishness may coexist in opportunistic networks. In this paper, we propose an Incentive Aware Routing based on Game Theory for selfish OPPNETs, named IAR-GT, which uses Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game model to incentivize selfish nodes cooperation in data forwarding. IAR-GT scheme not only considers the resources of nodes, but also uses a new method to calculate the social ties between them. Trace-driven simulations show that our incentive aware routing scheme achieves better performances than comparing schemes under two types of selfishness coexistence environments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.5322-5342
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• 2016

In vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) networks, where selfishness degrades node activity, countermeasures for collaboration enforcement must be provided to enable application of a sage and efficient network environment. Because vehicular networks feature both high mobility and various topologies, selfish behavior judgment and establishment of a stable routing protocol become intensely challenging. In this paper, a two-phase-based generous cooperative routing protocol (called GEC) is presented for V2V networks to provide resistance to selfishness. To detect selfish behaving vehicles, a packet forwarding watchdog and an average connection rate based on the multipath weight method are used, where evidence is gathered from different watchdogs. Then, multihop relay decisions are made using a generous cooperative algorithm based on game theory. Finally, through buffering of the multiple end-to-end paths and judicious choice of optimal cooperative routes, route maintenance phase is capable of dealing with congestion and rapidly exchanging traffic. Specifically, it is proved that the GEC is theoretically subgame perfect. Simulation results show that for V2V networks with inherently selfish nodes, the proposed method isolates uncooperative vehicles and is capable of accommodating both the mobility and congestion circumstances by facilitating information dissemination and reducing end-to-end delay.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.149-155
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• 2006

Existing routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have assumed that all nodes voluntarily participate in forwarding others' packets. In the case when a MANET consists of nodes belonging to multiple organizations, mobile nodes may deliberately avoid packet forwarding to save their own energy, resulting in network performance degradation. In this paper, to make nodes volunteer in packet forwarding, a credit payment scheme called Protocol-Independent Fairness Algorithm (PIFA) is proposed. PIFA can be utilized irrespective of the type of basic routing protocols, while previous methods are compatible only with source routing mechanisms like DSR. According to simulation results, we can know that PIFA can prevent network performance degradation by inducing selfish nodes to participate in packet forwarding.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.12
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• pp.6214-6242
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• 2019

Routing in mobile ad hoc networks is performed in a distributed fashion where each node acts as host and router, such that it forwards incoming packets for others without relying on a dedicated router. Nodes are mostly resource constraint and the users are usually inclined to conserve their resources and exhibit selfish behaviour by not contributing in the routing process. The trust and reputation models have been proposed to motivate selfish nodes for cooperation in the packet forwarding process. Nodes having bad trust or reputation are detected and secluded from the network, eventually. However, due to the lack of proper identity management and use of non-persistent identities in ad hoc networks, malicious nodes can pose various threats to these methods. For example, a malicious node can discard the bad reputed identity and enter into the system with another identity afresh, called whitewashing. Similarly, a malicious node may create more than one identity, called Sybil attack, for self-promotion, defame other nodes, and broadcast fake recommendations in the network. These identity-based attacks disrupt the overall detection of the reputation systems. In this paper, we propose a reputation-based scheme that detects selfish nodes and deters identity attacks. We address the issue in such a way that, for normal selfish nodes, it will become no longer advantageous to carry out a whitewash. Sybil attackers are also discouraged (i.e., on a single battery, they may create fewer identities). We design and analyse our rationale via game theory and evaluate our proposed reputation system using NS-2 simulator. The results obtained from the simulation demonstrate that our proposed technique considerably diminishes the throughput and utility of selfish nodes with a single identity and selfish nodes with multiple identities when compared to the benchmark scheme.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.6 no.9
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• pp.2202-2217
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• 2012

The transmission opportunities between nodes in Delay Tolerant Network (DTNs) are uncertain, and routing algorithms in DTNs often need nodes serving as relays for others to carry and forward messages. Due to selfishness, nodes may ask the source to pay a certain reward, and the reward may be varying with time. Moreover, the reward that the source obtains from the destination may also be varying with time. For example, the sooner the destination gets the message, the more rewards the source may obtain. The goal of this paper is to explore efficient ways for the source to maximize its total reward in such complex applications when it uses the probabilistic two-hop routing policy. We first propose a theoretical framework, which can be used to evaluate the total reward that the source can obtain. Then based on the model, we prove that the optimal forwarding policy confirms to the threshold form by the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. Simulations based on both synthetic and real motion traces show the accuracy of our theoretical framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the performance of the optimal forwarding policy with threshold form is better through extensive numerical results, which conforms to the result obtained by the Maximum Principle.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.12 no.11
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• pp.1593-1608
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• 2009

If a certain relay node in multi-hop wireless networks might become a malicious node that does not cooperate with other nodes or a selfish node, network throughput will be dramatically decreased. Most of existing ad hoc routing protocols assuming that the nodes will fully cooperate with other nodes do not resolve the problem of network performance degradation due to malicious and selfish nodes. This paper presents the CARE (Cooperative Ad hoc routing protocol based REputation) scheme incorporating the reputation management that can achieve a multi-hop wireless network with high throughput performance. The proposed scheme provides the horizontal cross-layer approach which can identify misbehaving malicious, selfish nodes dropped out of the hop-by-hop based packet processing in the network and then set up an optimal packet routing path that will detour misbehaving nodes. And the vertical cross-layer approach contained in the CARE scheme attempts to improve the quality of routing paths by exploiting the quality of link information received from the MAC layer. Besides, it provides high TCP throughput by exploiting the reputation values of nodes acquired from the network layer into the transport layer. A case study on experiments and simulations shows that the CARE scheme incorporating vertical and horizontal cross-layer approaches yields better performance in terms of the low rate of packet loss, fast average packet delivery time, and high TCP throughput between end-to-end nodes.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2004.05a
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• pp.1433-1436
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• 2004

The ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes dynamically forming a temporary network without the use of any existing network infrastructure of centralized administration. Load-Balanced Ad hoc Routing(LBAR) protocol is an on-demand routing protocol intended for delay-sensitive applications where users are most concern with packet transmission delay. Although LBAR mechanism is a novel load balancing routing protocol for ad hoc network, it has own limitation in route path maintenance phase. Therefore, in this paper, we propose Advanced Load-Balanced Ad hoc Routing(A-LBAR) that is delay-sensitive and has an efficient path maintenance scheme. The robust path maintenance scheme is maintained by considering about nodal loads all over network and misbehavior of overloaded or selfish nodes. The proposed scheme provides good performance over DSR and AODV in terms of packet delay and packet loss rate when some misbehaving nodes exist in the network.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.3
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• pp.198-203
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• 2010

In this paper, a new routing protocol is proposed to manage selfish nodes which make a strategic choice to maximize only their own profits. To provide incentives to nodes on the path, VCG mechanism is introduced. Therefore, based on the collaborative actions among nodes, the entire network performance can be improved. With a simulation study, the proposed scheme can approximate an optimized solution while ensuring a well-balanced network performance under widely diverse network environments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.3639-3662
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• 2020

The network capability to accomplish its functions in a timely fashion under failures and attacks is known as survivability. Ad hoc routing protocols have been studied and extended to various domains, such as Intelligent Transport Systems (ITSs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), underwater acoustic networks, and Internet of Things (IoT) focusing on different aspects, such as security, QoS, energy. The existing solutions proposed in this domain incur substantial overhead and eventually become burden on the network, especially when there are fewer attacks or no attack at all. There is a need that the effectiveness of these routing protocols be analyzed in the presence of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks without any intrusion detection or prevention system. This will enable us to establish and identify the inherently stable routing protocols that are capable to survive longer in the presence of these attacks. This work presents a DoS attack case study to perform theoretical analysis of survivability on node and network level in the presence of DoS attacks. We evaluate the performance of reactive and proactive routing protocols and analyse their survivability. For experimentation, we use NS-2 simulator without detection or prevention capabilities. Results show that proactive protocols perform better in terms of throughput, overhead and packet drop.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.35-44
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• 2006

The area of ad hoc networking has been receiving increasing attention among researchers in recent years and a variety of routing protocols targeted specifically at the ad hoc networking environment have been proposed. Selfish nodes are those which do not perform certain operations that the protocol specifies that they should, through a wish to conserve power. We propose a scheme as a mean to mitigate the detrimental effect of selfish nodes. We also propose a new area that might affect nodes' behavior - the environment's influence. In order to let nodes fairly be able to communicate in the networks we proposed solution to this problem. And our scheme can be applied to other reputation methods. We also contain the simulation results in our paper, and through the result, we can conclude that we can solve the problem by adding a little overhead.