• Journal of Digital Contents Society
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• v.18 no.5
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• pp.1001-1008
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• 2017

Because cyber attacks on industrial control systems can lead to massive financial loss or loss of lives, the standardization and the research on cyber security of industrial control systems are actively under way. As a related system, the industrial control system of social infrastructures must be equipped with the verified cryptographic module according to the e-government law and appropriate security control should be implemented in accordance with the security requirements of the industrial control system. However, the industrial control system consisting of the operation layer, the control layer, and the field device layer may cause a problem in performing the main function in each layer due to the security control implementation. In this paper, we propose things to check when performing security control in accordance with the security control requirements for each layer of the industrial control system and proper application.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.757-770
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• 2020

Industrial Control System(ICS) is a system that measures, monitors, and controls various distributed assets, and is used in industrial facilities such as energy, chemical, transportation, water treatment, and manufacturing plants or critial infrastructure. Because ICS system errors and interruptions can cause serious problem and asset damage, research on prevention and minimization of security threats in industrial control systems has been carried out. Previously wireless communication was applied in limited fields to minimize security risks, but the demand for industrial wireless communication devices is increasing due to ease of maintenance and cost advantages. In this paper, we analyzed the security threats of industrial wireless communication devices supporting WirelessHART and ISA100.11a. Based on the analysis results, we proposed the security requirements for adopting and operating industrial wireless communication devices. We expect that the proposed requirements can mitigate security threats of industrial wireless devices in ICS.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.26 no.5
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• pp.1223-1234
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• 2016

The Industrial control system is adopted by various industry field and national infrastructure, therefore if it received cyber attack, the serious security problems can be occured in the public sector. For this reason, security requirements of the industrial control system have been proposed, in accordance with the security guidelines of the electronic control system, and it is operated by separate from the external and the internal network. Nevertheless, cyber attack by malware (such as Stuxnet) targeting to control system have been occurred continuously, and also the real-time detection of untrusted traffic is very difficult because there are some difficulty of keeping up with quickly evolving the advent of new-variant malicious codes. In this paper, we propose the traffic analysis architecture for providing secure industrial control system based on the analyzed the security threats, the security requirements, and our proposed architecture.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.72-81
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• 2011

In this paper, we propose adaptive convergence security policies and management technologies to improve security assurance in the home networking environment. Many security issues may arise in the home networking environment. Examples of such security issues include the user privacy, the service security, the integrated networking security, the middleware security and the device failure. All these security issues, however, should be fulfilled in phase due to many difficulties including deployment cost and technical complexity. For instance, fundamental security requirements such as authentication, access control and prevention of crime and disaster should be addressed first. Then, supplementary security policies and diverse security management technologies should be fulfilled. In this paper, we classify these requirements into three categories, a service authentication, a user authentication and a device authentication, and propose security policies and management technologies for each requirement. Since the home gateway is responsible for interconnection of many home devices and external network access, a variety of context information could be collected from such devices.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.137-142
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• 2014

Industrial control system (ICS) is a computer based system which are typically used in nation-wide critical infra-structure facilities such as electrical, gas, water, wastewater, oil and transportation. In addition, ICS is essentially used in industrial application domain to effectively monitor and control the remotely scattered systems. The highly developed information technology (IT) and related network techniques are continually adapted into domains of industrial control system. However, industrial control system is confronted significant side-effects, which ICS is exposed to prevalent cyber threats typically found in IT environments. Therefore, cyber security vulnerabilities and possibilities of cyber incidents are dramatically increased in industrial control system. The vulnerabilities that may be found in typical ICS are grouped into Policy and Procedure, Platform, and Network categories to assist in determining optimal mitigation strategies. The order of these vulnerabilities does not necessarily reflect any priority in terms of likelihood of occurrence or severity of impact. Firstly, corporate security policy can reduce vulnerabilities by mandating conduct such as password usage and maintenance or requirements for connecting modems to ICS. Secondly, platfom vulnerabilities can be mitigated through various security controls, such as OS and application patching, physical access control, and security software. Thirdly, network vulnerabilities can be eliminated or mitigated through various security controls, such as defense-in-depth network design, encrypting network communication, restricting network traffic flows, and providing physical access control for network components.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.8
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• pp.919-928
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• 2012

The applications of computers and communication system and network technologies in nuclear power plants have expanded recently. This application of digital technologies to the instrumentation and control systems of nuclear power plants brings with it the cyber security concerns similar to other critical infrastructures. Cyber security risk assessments for digital instrumentation and control systems have become more crucial in the development of new systems and in the operation of existing systems. Although the instrumentation and control systems of nuclear power plants are similar to industrial control systems, the former have specifications that differ from the latter in terms of architecture and function, in order to satisfy nuclear safety requirements, which need different methods for the application of cyber security risk assessment. In this paper, the characteristics of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems are described, and the considerations needed when conducting cyber security risk assessments in accordance with the lifecycle process of instrumentation and control systems are discussed. For cyber security risk assessments of instrumentation and control systems, the activities and considerations necessary for assessments during the system design phase or component design and equipment supply phase are presented in the following 6 steps: 1) System Identification and Cyber Security Modeling, 2) Asset and Impact Analysis, 3) Threat Analysis, 4) Vulnerability Analysis, 5) Security Control Design, and 6) Penetration test. The results from an application of the method to a digital reactor protection system are described.

• IEMEK Journal of Embedded Systems and Applications
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.255-265
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• 2012

A cyber-physical system(CPS) is a collection of cyber and physical components that interact with each other to achieve a particular application. Here, the CPS is emerged the reliability and security problems. Particularly, the defect of reliability in the data/control transmission under the CPS can lead to serious damage. We discuss the reliability and security problem on CPS architecture. Then we would suggest the considerations of cyber security in industrial control systems built with CPS.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.140-149
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• 2021

Most industries have introduced and operate an information security management system (ISMS) or a personal information security management system (PIMS) to suitably protect and maintain customer's information and company trade secrets. This study starts with the premise that it is desirable for every industry considering information security to maintain an ISMS. ISMS can be of different types among various organizations, taking into consideration culture, practical work procedures, and guidelines for information security. This study intends to derive primary control areas of an ISMS for each industry based on organizational size and audit type by analyzing non-conformity trends and control factors according to certification audits for organizations introduced for international ISMS under ISO27001. This study analyzed improvement effects of ISMS through case analyses. It is meaningful as exploratory research, although it was difficult to acquire data for empirical study because few organizations maintain certification in major industrial sectors. The requirements presented the highest frequency of non-conformity for each type from the 2013-initiated ISO27001; the years 2013 to 2020 were extracted as the primary control area. The study found that for primary control areas of ISMS for each of three industries, organizational size and audit type had differences.

• Proceedings of the Korea Society for Industrial Systems Conference
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• 1999.12a
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• pp.373-377
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• 1999

Role Based Access Control(RBAC) reduces the cost of administering access control policies as well as making the process less error-prone. The administration tool is most important component in the concept of RBAC. The administration tool for the RBAC security system is required the consistency of a relationships between user and role in the RBAC Database. In this paper, we propose formal specification in order to manage user-role and role-role relationships. The proposed formal specification leads to the consistency requirements for the RBAC database which are defined as a set of relationship. This paper can easily derive the implementation of the RBAC administration tool by formal specification of operations.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.11 no.6
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• pp.193-204
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• 2022

In a smart factory environment in a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) environment, sensors and actuators operating on actual manufacturing lines, programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to manage them, human-machine interface (HMI) to control and manage such PLCs, and consists of operational technology server to manage PLCs and HMI again. PLC and HMI, which are in charge of control automation, perform direct connection with OT servers, application systems for factory operation, robots for on-site automation, and production facilities, so the development of security technology in a smart factory environment is demanded. However, smart factories in the SME environment are often composed of systems that used to operate in closed environments in the past, so there exist a vulnerable part to security in the current environment where they operate in conjunction with the outside through the Internet. In order to achieve the internalization of smart factory security in this SME environment, it is necessary to establish a process according to the IEC 62443-4-1 Secure Product Development Life cycle at the stage of smart factory SW and HW development. In addition, it is necessary to introduce a suitable development methodology that considers IEC 62443-4-2 Component security requirements and IEC 62443-3 System security requirements. Therefore, this paper proposes an application plan for the IEC 62443 based development security process to provide security internalization to smart factories in an SME environment.