• Title/Summary/Keyword: Safeguards

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Sensitivity simulation on isotopic fissile measurement using neutron resonances

  • Lee, YongDeok;Ahn, Seong-Kyu;Choi, Woo-Seok
    • Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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    • v.54 no.2
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    • pp.637-643
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    • 2022
  • Uranium and plutonium are required to be accounted in spent fuel head-end and major recovery area in pyro-process for safeguards purpose. The possibility of neutron resonance technique, as a nondestructive analysis, was simulated on isotopic fissile analysis for large scale process. Neutron resonance technique has advantage to distinguish uranium from plutonium directly in mixture. Simulation was performed on U235 and Pu239 assay in spent fuel and for scoping examination of assembly type. The resonance energies were determined for U235 and Pu239. The linearity in the neutron transmission was examined for the selected resonance energies. In addition, the limit for detection was examined by changing sample density, thickness and content for actual application. Several factors were proposed for neutron production and the moderated neutron source was simulated for effective and efficient transmission measurement. From the simulation results, neutron resonance technique is promising to analyze U235 and Pu239 for spent fuel assembly. An accurate fissile assay will contribute to an increased safeguards for the pyro-processing system and international credibility on the reuse of fissile materials in the fuel cycle.

Plutonium mass estimation utilizing the (𝛼,n) signature in mixed electrochemical samples

  • Gilliam, Stephen N.;Coble, Jamie B.;Goddard, Braden
    • Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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    • v.54 no.6
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    • pp.2004-2010
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    • 2022
  • Quantification of sensitive material is of vital importance when it comes to the movement of nuclear fuel throughout its life cycle. Within the electrorefiner vessel of electrochemical separation facilities, the task of quantifying plutonium by neutron analysis is especially challenging due to it being in a constant mixture with curium. It is for this reason that current neutron multiplicity methods would prove ineffective as a safeguards measure. An alternative means of plutonium verification is investigated that utilizes the (𝛼,n) signature that comes as a result of the eutectic salt within the electrorefiner. This is done by utilizing the multiplicity variable a and breaking it down into its constituent components: spontaneous fission neutrons and (𝛼,n) yield. From there, the (𝛼,n) signature is related to the plutonium content of the fuel.