• Title/Summary/Keyword: Russian Navy

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China's Naval Strengthening and US Navy's Counter-Forces (중국의 해군력 증강과 미국 해군의 대응전략 -중국 해군의 반접근/지역거부(A2/AD)전략 수행능력을 중심으로-)

  • Kim, Duk-ki
    • Strategy21
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    • s.42
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    • pp.196-223
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    • 2017
  • The aim of this paper is to analyze China's naval strengthening and threat reflected in submarines, aircraft, destroyers and missile capabilities and US Navy's counter-forces. China is strengthening its naval forces in accordance with its three-step naval force build-up plan, and the introduction of Russian destroyers and submarines is a foothold for China's naval enforcement. The Chinese Navy also converted the concept of the First-Second Island Chain Defense, which it had already maintained, to the concept of maritime layer defense. Currently, the Chinese Navy maintains the concept of a Three-Maritime Layer Defense which includes the South China Sea, where artificial islands are being built by China, in the First Layer Defense and the East China Sea in the Third Layer Defense. Along with the advancement of Chinese Navy's submarines, surface vessels and aircraft's operational capabilities, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities become a major threat to the US Navy. If a crisis occurs in the East China Sea or in the Taiwan Waters, the US Navy will face more difficulties in employing the Carrier Strike Group to manage the crisis. Meanwhile, if a crisis occurs on the Korean Peninsula, it will be a burden to dispatch Carrier Strike GroupS to the East and West Seas of the Korean Peninsula. For the stable future, the US Navy should develop a strategy to respond more effectively to the Chinese Navy, which is challenging new maritime supremacy in East Asia.

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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Historical Development of Russian Principle on Arrangement and Classification Archives : In Case of Russian State Historical Archive(RGIA) (러시아 기록물 분류체계의 발전 러시아국립역사기록보존소(RGIA)를 중심으로)

  • Bang, Il-Kwon
    • The Korean Journal of Archival Studies
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    • no.7
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    • pp.75-105
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    • 2003
  • Russian State Historical Archive (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv - RGIA) received its present name in June 1992, and before 1961 was known as TsGIA. RGIA holds the major records of high-level and central state and administrative institutions and agencies of tsarist Russia from the eighteenth century to 1910s (except the records of the Army, Navy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), as well as fonds of social organizations, institutions, and individuals of prerevolutionary Russia. The main goal of this article is to assist understanding russian principle on arrangement and classification archives with its historical development focusing on one of the biggest historical archive in Russia. The primary set of historical records in RGIA remain arranged in 3-steps classification system: fond (collection) -- opis' (inventory) -- delo (file). In this general survey of RGIA author offers detailed information on the collection of archives and the system for classification of its huge amounts of primary sources in connection with influence upon historical studies. Despite the general economic crisis Russian archives are struggling to keep their doors open for public research and are exerting their energies in present electronic information to scholars and other researchers from throughout the world. The result, however, is not rewarded enough, considering the effort involved.

USN's Efforts to Rebuild its Combat Power in an Era of Great Power Competition (강대국 간의 경쟁시대와 미 해군의 증강 노력)

  • Jung, Ho-Sub
    • Strategy21
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    • s.44
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    • pp.5-27
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.

The Tactical review of the Battle of Tsushima - with focus on disposition & maneuver, and damage control - (쓰시마 해전의 전술적 재조명 - 배진과 기동, 손상통제를 중심으로 -)

  • Lee, Chang Hyun
    • Strategy21
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    • s.44
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    • pp.213-253
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    • 2018
  • The Russo-Japanese War(1904-1905) in the early 20th century greatly influenced the international politics in Northeast Asia and the destiny of both countries. There are many studies on the cause of the outbreak and its effect on the Korean peninsula. The victory and defeat of the battle of Tsushima also the subject of research by renowned scholars and navy officers. Many previous studies have analyzed the process of engagement. However, There was a lack of research that analyzed at the tactical level of naval commanders. Therefore, this study tries to review the battle of Tsushima in terms of tactical level, that is formation, maneuvering, damage control. Naval operations at sea with many variables are not always done as planned. The intuitive judgement and readiness have had a decisive impact on victory and defeat. The analysis of the naval warfare on the basis of formation, maneuvering, and damage control makes the cause of the win more clearly. The conclusion of the this study can be summarized in five ways. First, victory would be achieved through the suppression of the beginning. The destiny of the Tsushima battle was determined by an 1 hour after first firing. The Japanese fleet caught fire by paralyzing the command and control capabilities of the Russian fleet. Second, the Japanese fleet's power was superior to the Russian fleet. In general, Japan and Russia had similar powers, and Admiral Togo's "T crossing tactics" decisively contributed the victory. However, when compared to the weapon system level, formation and maneuvering, Japan was much more dominant. Third, people realized that one side to be annihilated in the battle between similar powers after the Tsushima battle. The common perception before the Battle of Tsushima was that the battle ship would not sunken, and that the result of wiping out was difficult. However, there is s time for one sided victory and defeat depending on the early suppression nad the destruction of the command and control ability. Fourth, it is the importance of damage control ability. The main cause of the Russian fleet's loss of command and control ability was thick smoke from fire, and maneuverability was greatly deteriorated due to coal overload. In this way, importance is still valid after more than 100 tears. Fifth, the area of uncertainty. In the navy battles, one or two shots of clear firing in the beginning and small misconception and minor mistakes decide win or loss. Ultimately, this area of fortune can be linked to mindset of the commander. I hope this research will be help to naval researchers and naval commanders at the sea.

Japanese Broadcasting in Shanghai during the Periods of Solitary Island and Occupation: A Case Study on the Great Eastern Broadcasting Station (Daito Hoso Kyoku)

  • Ge, Tao
    • Journal of East-Asian Urban History
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.113-128
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    • 2020
  • Right before the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937-1954), the Great Eastern Broadcasting Station (GEBS) was established in Shanghai under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Prior to the launching of the GEBS, Japan had not owned similar radio stations in China for years. As a result, the Embassy of Japan in China held rounds of discussions on the plan and Japanese governments, ranging from the MOFA, the Navy, the Army, the Ministry of Communications (MOC), and NHK-Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyoku) provided financial, technological, and equipment support. In the mid-1930s when the Sino-Japanese relations became intensified, the GEBS assumed the primary role of disseminating government policies to over 30,000 Japanese expatriates in Shanghai to make sure that they could remain settled while supporting military endeavors of the Japanese army once the war between China and Japanese broke out. After 1937, the GEBS became an essential propaganda tool to advance imperial policies of Japan. Although the station differed from the Army-controlled Greater Shanghai Broadcasting Station (Dai Shanhai Hoso Kyoku) in many aspects, it was in line with the latter in terms of advancing wartime ideology of the Japanese empire. As the Japanese-occupied areas were enlarged, target audience of the GEBS also expanded to Chinese people and foreign nationals when Japanese, English, Russian, and Shanghai-dialect news was broadcast by the station. Suffice it to say that the GEBS was closely related to wartime propaganda of the Japanese imperial expansion.