• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.439-448
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• 2017

It is news from nowhere that post-quantum cryptography has side-channel analysis vulnerability. Side-channel analysis attack method and countermeasures for code-based McEliece cryptosystem and lattice-based NTRU cryptosystem have been investigated. Unfortunately, the investigation of the ring-LWE cryptosystem in terms of side-channel analysis is as yet insufficient. In this paper, we propose a chosen ciphertext simple power analysis attack that can be applied when ring-LWE cryptography operates on 8-bit devices. Our proposed attack can recover the key only with [$log_2q$] traces. q is a parameter related to the security level. It is used 7681 and 12289 to match the common 128 and 256-bit security levels, respectively. We identify the vulnerability through experiment that can reveal the secret key in modular add while the ring-LWE decryption performed on real 8-bit devices. We also discuss the attack that uses a similarity measurement method for two vectors to reduce attack time.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.27 no.5
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• pp.1001-1011
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• 2017

A lattice-based cryptography is known as one of the post-quantum cryptographies. Ring-LWE problem is an algebraic variant of LWE, which operates over elements of polynomial rings instead of vectors. It is already known that post-quantum cryptography has side-channel analysis vulnerability. In 2016, Park et al. reported a SPA vulnerability of the public key cryptosystem, which is proposed by Roy et al., based on the ring-LWE problem. In 2015 and 2016, Reparaz et al. proposed DPA attack and countermeasures against Roy cryptosystem. In this paper, we show that the chosen ciphertext SPA attack is also possible for Lyubashevsky cryptosystem which does not use NTT. And then we propose a countermeasure against CCSPA(Chosen Ciphertext SPA) attack and we also show through experiment that our proposed countermeasure is secure.

• Journal of IKEEE
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.736-741
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• 2022

Lattice-based cryptography is the most practical post-quantum cryptography because it enjoys strong worst-case security, relatively efficient implementation, and simplicity. Ring learning with errors (R-LWE) is a public key encryption (PKE) method of lattice-based encryption (LBC), and the most important operation of R-LWE is the modular polynomial multiplication of rings. This paper proposes a method for optimizing modular multipliers based on approximate computing (AC) technology, targeting the medium-security parameter set of the R-LWE cryptosystem. First, as a simple way to implement complex logic, LUT is used to omit some of the approximate multiplication operations, and the 2's complement method is used to calculate the number of bits whose value is 1 when converting the value of the input data to binary. We propose a total of two methods to reduce the number of required adders by minimizing them. The proposed LUT-based modular multiplier reduced both speed and area by 9% compared to the existing R-LWE modular multiplier, and the modular multiplier using the 2's complement method reduced the area by 40% and improved the speed by 2%. appear. Finally, the area of the optimized modular multiplier with both of these methods applied was reduced by up to 43% compared to the previous one, and the speed was reduced by up to 10%.