• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.185-196
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• 1997

By considering the definition and application of resolution as well as the concept and theory of SAR, the essential contents of the SAR design and analysis are described. This paper is to compare and analyze the resolution performance capability of three techniques for achieving azimuth resolution such as the real aperture, the unfocused and the focused techniques, through the simulation. Simulation is performed to make the restricted conditions for the unfocused technique that can be implemented by the less commputing load of signal processingand the lower cost. Through the mission analysis, the use of SAR image can be applied for estimation of whole situation at the regional area in the field of military demands for tactical purpose as well as civilian demands for the damage of disaster. RPV and sall or medium aircraft are selected to carry the SAR for these purposes and the proper resolution turns ou 5~15 m. The trade-off study of variables through the simulations results in the proper conditions such that range is less 3, 000 m, Wavelength is 1~10 m, and the raw signals and results processed by three techniques for two point targets are exhibited undr such conditions. Therefore, at some points, the result of this paper si proposed for useful applications of unforcused technique in the restricted conditions except the identification of the small target at a long range re- quired for high resolution.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.51-67
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• 1996

There are three main rice-growing regions in the United States: the prairie region along the Mississippi River Valley in eastern Arkansas; the Gulf Coast prairie region in southwestern Louisiana and southeastern Texas; and the Central Valley of California. The Central Valley of California is producing about 23% of the US rice(Fig. 1). In California. most of the crop has been produced in the Colusa, Sutter, Butte, Glenn Counties of the Sacramento Valley since 1912, when rice was commercially grown for the first time in the state(Fig. 2). Roughly speaking, the average annual area sown to rice in California is about 300,000 acres to 400,000 acres during the last forty years(Fig. 3). California rice is grown under a Mediterranean climate characterized by warm, dry, clear days, and a long growing season favorable to high photosynthetic rates and high rice yields. The average rice yield per acre is probably higher in California than in any other rice-growing regions of the world(Fig. 4). A dependable supply of irrigation water must be available for a successful rice culture. Most of the irrigation water for California rice comes from the winter rain and snow-fed reservoir of the Sierra Nevada mountain ranges. Less than 10 percent of rice irrigation water is pumped from wells in areas where surface water is not sufficient. It is also essential to have good surface drainage if maximum yields are to be produced. Rice production in California is highly mechanized, requiring only about four hours of labor per acre. Mechanization of rice culture in California includes laser-leveler technology, large tractors, self-propelled combines for harvesting, and aircraft for seeding, pest control, and some fertilization. The principal varieties grown in California are medium-grain japonica types with origins from the cooler rice climates of the northern latitudes (Table 1). Long-grain varieties grown in the American South are not well adapted to California's cooler environment. Nearly all the rice grown recently in California are improved into semidwarf varieties. Choice of variety depends on environment, planting date, quality desired, marketing, and harvesting scheduling. The Rice Experiment Station at Biggs is owned, financed, and administered by the rice industry. The station was established in 1912, as a direct result of the foresight and effort of Charles Edward Chambliss of the United States Department of Agriculture. Now, The station's major effort is the development of improved rice varieties for California.