• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제47권2호
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• pp.157-164
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• 2015

Nuclear power plants have logical loop structures in their system configuration. This paper explains the method to solve a loop structure in reliability analysis. As examples of loop structured systems, the reactor core isolation cooling system and high-pressure core injection system of a boiling water reactor are considered and analyzed under a station blackout accident condition. The analysis results show the important role of loop structures under severe accidents. For the evaluation of the safety of nuclear power plants, it is necessary to accurately evaluate a loop structure's reliability.

• Journal of international Conference on Electrical Machines and Systems
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• 제2권4호
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• pp.460-465
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• 2013

Electrical equipments of nuclear power plant are divided into class 1E and non-class 1E. Electrical equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, are classified as class 1E. batteries of nuclear power plant are divided into four channels, which are physically and electrically separate and independent. The battery bank of class 1E DC power system of the nuclear power plant use lead-acid batteries in present. The lead acid battery, which has a high energy density, is the most popular form of energy storage. Kt factor of lead-acid battery is used to determine battery size and it is one of calculatiing coefficient for capacity. this paper analyzes Kt factor of lead-acid battery for the DC power system of nuclear power plant. In addition, correlation between Kt parameter and peukert's exponent of lead-acid battery for nuclear plant are discussed. The analytical results contribute to optimize of determining size Lead-acid battery bank.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제44권7호
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• pp.727-734
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• 2012

A new advanced safety feature of DVI+ (Direct Vessel Injection Plus) for the APR+ (Advanced Power Reactor Plus), to mitigate the ECC (Emergency Core Cooling) bypass fraction and to prevent switching an ECC outlet to a break flow inlet during a DVI line break, is presented for an advanced DVI system. In the current DVI system, the ECC water injected into the downcomer is easily shifted to the broken cold leg by a high steam cross flow which comes from the intact cold legs during the late reflood phase of a LBLOCA (Large Break Loss Of Coolant Accident)For the new DVI+ system, an ECBD (Emergency Core Barrel Duct) is installed on the outside of a core barrel cylinder. The ECBD has a gap (From the core barrel wall to the ECBD inner wall to the radial direction) of 3/25~7/25 of the downcomer annulus gap. The DVI nozzle and the ECBD are only connected by the ECC water jet, which is called a hydrodynamic water bridge, during the ECC injection period. Otherwise these two components are disconnected from each other without any pipes inside the downcomer. The ECBD is an ECC downward isolation flow sub-channel which protects the ECC water from the high speed steam crossflow in the downcomer annulus during a LOCA event. The injected ECC water flows downward into the lower downcomer through the ECBD without a strong entrainment to a steam cross flow. The outer downcomer annulus of the ECBD is the major steam flow zone coming from the intact cold leg during a LBLOCA. During a DVI line break, the separated DVI nozzle and ECBD have the effect of preventing the level of the cooling water from being lowered in the downcomer due to an inlet-outlet reverse phenomenon at the lowest position of the outlet of the ECBD.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제45권5호
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• pp.605-612
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• 2013

Removal of decay heat from an operating reactor during a prolonged station blackout condition is a big concern for reactor designers, especially after the recent Fukushima accident. In the case of a prolonged station blackout condition, heat removal is possible only by passive means since no pumps or active systems are available. Keeping this in mind, the AHWR has been designed with many passive safety features. One of them is a passive means of removing decay heat with the help of Isolation Condensers (ICs) which are submerged in a big water pool called the Gravity Driven Water Pool (GDWP). The ICs have many tubes in which the steam, generated by the reactor core due to the decay heat, flows and condenses by rejecting the heat into the water pool. After condensation, the condensate falls back into the steam drum of the reactor. The GDWP tank holds a large amount of water, about 8000 $m^3$, which is located at a higher elevation than the steam drum of the reactor in order to promote natural circulation. Due to the recent Fukushima type accidents, it has been a concern to understand and evaluate the capability of the ICs to remove decay heat for a prolonged period without escalating fuel sheath temperature. In view of this, an analysis has been performed for decay heat removal characteristics over several days of an AHWR by ICs. The computer code RELAP5/MOD3.2 was used for this purpose. Results indicate that the ICs can remove the decay heat for more than 10 days without causing any bulk boiling in the GDWP. After that, decay heat can be removed for more than 40 days by boiling off the pool inventory. The pressure inside the containment does not exceed the design pressure even after 10 days by condensation of steam generated from the GDWP on the walls of containment and on the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS) tubes. If venting is carried out after this period, the decay heat can be removed for more than 50 days without exceeding the design limits.