• ETRI Journal
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.989-992
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• 2011

Recently, Page and Vercauteren proposed a fault attack on pairing algorithms and two countermeasures against such an attack. The countermeasure uses either a random scalar or a random point to blind the input points. To defeat the countermeasure using a random point, we utilize the point addition formula on an elliptic curve. As a result, we successfully defeat the countermeasure using a random point.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.117-121
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• 2007

Most existing countermeasures against classical DPA are vulnerable to new DPA, e.g., refined power analysis attack (RPA), zero-value point attack (ZPA), and doubling attack. More recently, Mamiya et al proposed a new countermeasure (so-called BRIP) against RPA, ZPA, classical DPA and SPA. This countermeasure, however, also has a vulnerability of scalar multiplication computations by exploiting specially chosen input message. Therefore, to prevent various power analysis attacks like DPA and new SPA, we propose an enhanced countermeasure by developing a new random blinding technique.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea SP
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• v.47 no.1
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• pp.139-149
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• 2010

Random scalar countermeasures, which carry out the scalar multiplication by the ephemeral secret key, against the differential power analysis of ECIES and ECDH have been known to be secure against various power analyses. However, if an attacker can find this ephemeral key from the one power signal, these countermeasures can be analyzed. In this paper, we propose a new power attack method which can do this analysis. Proposed attack method can be accomplished while an attacker compares the elliptic curve doubling operations and we use the principle component analysis in order to ease this comparison. When we have actually carried out the proposed power analysis, we can perfectly eliminate the error of existing function for the comparison and find a private key from this elimination of the error.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.35-43
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• 2003

The randomization of scalar multiplication in ECC is one of the fundamental concepts in defense methods against side-channel attacks. This paper proposes a countermeasure against simple and differential power analysis attacks through randomizing the transformed m-ary method based on a random m-ary receding algorithm. The proposed method requires an additional computational load compared to the standard m-ary method, yet the power consumption is independent of the secret key. Accordingly, since computational tracks using random window width can resist against SPA and DPA, the proposed countermeasure can improve the security for smart cards.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.587-601
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• 2016

In this paper we suggest method for scalar recoding which is both secure against SPA and DPA. Suggested method is countermeasure to power analysis attack through scalar recoding using negative expression. Suggested method ensures safety of SPA by recoding the operation to apply same pattern to each digit. Also, by generating the random recoding output according to random number, safety of DPA is ensured. We also implement precomputation table and modified scalar addition algorithm for addition to protect against SPA that targets digit's sign. Since suggested method itself can ensure safety to both SPA and DPA, it is more effective and efficient. Through suggested method, compared to previous scalar recoding that ensures safety to SPA and DPA, operation efficiency is increased by 11%.

• Proceedings of the Korea Institutes of Information Security and Cryptology Conference
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• 2002.11a
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• pp.580-583
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• 2002

본 논문에서는 전력 공격에 대응하는 효과적인 타원곡선 상수배 알고리즘을 제안하고 기존의 여러 대응방법과 비교해 몇가지 장점을 제시하였다. 타원곡선 암호시스템에 대한 전력 공격의 대응방법으로 스칼라 정수의 랜덤 분할을 이용한 다중 상수배 알고리즘을 사용하였으며 이 방법의 계산량은 기존의 대응방법과 비교해 적은 연산량을 가지고 있다. 윈도우 크기가 4인 제안된 대응방법은 기존의 대응방법들과 비교해 약 46.6%∼83.6%가 향상되었다.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.362-369
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• 2010

While the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is getting more popular in securing numerous systems, implementations without consideration for side-channel attacks are susceptible to critical information leakage. This paper proposes new power attack countermeasures for ECC over Koblitz curves. Based on some special properties of Koblitz curves, the proposed methods randomize the involved elliptic curve points in a highly regular manner so the resulting scalar multiplication algorithms can defeat the simple power analysis attack and the differential power analysis attack simultaneously. Compared with the previous countermeasures, the new methods are also noticeable in terms of computational cost.