• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.40 no.4
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• pp.358-365
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• 2014

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of government investment in the deployment and technological development of three technological areas - wind power, photovoltaic and fuel cell - of renewable energy in Korea using the DEA (data envelopment analysis). The efficiencies of government investment in renewable energies are measured and compared among three kinds of technologies using the actual data during 2007~2009. In the present DEA model, R&D investment and government subsidies for renewable energy usage promotion are selected as input variables, and the number of patents, supply level, and the production cost as output variable. As a result, it is found that the wind power is the most efficient renewable energy in Korea in the perspective of the efficiency of government investment.

• 한국사회복지학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2004.06a
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• pp.3-50
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• 2004

${\cdot}$ Recent social policy and labour markets debates in Europe, responding to the difficulties faced by the traditional neo-Keynesian welfare state settlement, stress the value of positive investment alongside de-regulation and greater flexibility as a way of achieving both economic and social goals. ${\cdot}$ Patterns of policy reform are complex and reflect differing national circumstances. A general move towards deregulation, constraints on entitlement to passive benefits, programmes to enhance employment, particularly among high-risk groups such as single parents and young people, targeted subsidies for low earners and casemanagement may be identified. ${\cdot}$ In relation to investment in education, research and development and combined training and benefit programmes to enhance mobility between jobs the picture is less clear. Education standards continue to rise, but research and development spending stagnates and few countries have developed substantial ‘flexi-curity’ programmes to support job mobility. ${\cdot}$ The labour market tradition in much of Europe has been one of conflict between labour and employers. As labour grows weaker, new approaches develop. These tend to stress productivity agreements and greater flexibility in work practices within firms and reforms to passive social security systems more broadly, but movement to support the more challenging investment and flexi-curity policies is slow. ${\cdot}$ In general, social and labour market policies in Europe stress deregulation and negative activation more strongly than social investment and ‘flexi-curity’. The countries with high growth and employment achieve that goal by different routes: Sweden has a closely integrated social democratic corporatism with high spending on benefits and training programmes and the UK a more liberal market-oriented system, with lower spending, highly targeted benefits and less mobility support. ${\cdot}$ Europe has something to learn from Korea in achieving high investment in human capital and R and D, while Korea may have something to learn from Europe in social investment, particularly flexi-curity and equal opportunity policies.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.587-614
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• 2018

The Korean government is aiming to strengthen industrial and national competitiveness through the promotion of cooperation between universities, public research institutes and industry and vitalization of technology transfer. In 2013 and 2014, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy and Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning have announced policies to support SMEs by public research organizations. In addition, in 2015, the 'Korean Fraunhofer support system', which pay government subsidies according to the amounts of private R&D funds was adopted. However, there are some concern about the government's policies. There is yet disclosed how these policies affect technology transfer because industrial R&D funding has not been activated in Korea unlike German. Therefore this paper analyzes effects of relationship between universities, public research institutes and external organizations on performance of technology transfer based on the Triple Helix Model. Empirical results show that the relationship with the government has a significant impact on the resource security and the relationship with the industry has a significant effect on the diffusion of the performance. In addition, a public research institute was selected and case analysis was conducted to suggest policy implications for improving the technology transfer performance of universities and public research institutes.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.68-78
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• 2020

According to the new climate change agreement, technology development to reduce greenhouse gases is actively conducted worldwide, and research on energy efficiency improvement in the field of power generation and transmission and distribution is underway [1,2]. Economic analysis of the operation method of storing and supplying surplus electricity using energy storage devices, and using energy storage devices as a frequency adjustment reserve power in regional cogeneration plants has been reported as the most profitable operation method [3-7]. Therefore, this study conducted an economic analysis for the installation of energy storage devices in the combined heat and power plant in the Czech Republic. The most important factor in evaluating the economics of battery energy storage devices is the lifespan, and the warranty life is generally 10 to 15 years, based on charging and discharging once a day. For the simulation, the ratio of battery and PCS was designed as 1: 1 and 1: 2. In general, the primary frequency control is designed as 1: 4, but considering the characteristics of the cogeneration plant, it is set at a ratio of up to 1: 2, and the capacity is simulated at 1MW to 10MW and 2MWh to 20MWh according to each ratio. Therefore, life was evaluated based on the number of cycles per year. In the case of installing a battery energy storage system in a combined heat and power plant in the Czech Republic, the payback period of 3MW / 3MWh is more favorable than 5MW / 5MWh, considering the local infrastructure and power market. It is estimated to be about 3 years or 5 years from the simple payback period considering the estimated purchase price without subsidies. If you lower the purchase price by 50%, the purchase cost is an important part of the cost for the entire lifetime, so the payback period is about half as short. It can be, but it is impossible to secure profitability through the economy at the scale of 3MWh and 5MWh. If the price of the electricity market falls by 50%, the payback period will be three years longer in P1 mode and two years longer in P2 and P3 modes.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.3-21
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• 1992

By localizing the production of core parts and intermediate goods previously imported from Japan, Korean firms have been striving to increase their market share and profit in the final goods market in which Japanese firms are dominating. Korean producers' efforts, however, have often been thwarted by Japanese suppliers' "strategic" behavior. This competitive strategy involves Japanese exporters supplying parts and intermediate goods at very high prices until Korean firms must locally develop them, and then setting the prices far below the previous level so that the profitability of localization is dramatically reduced, or even means a loss for the Korean manufacturer. This paper intends to explain the strategic behavior of Japanese firms through the concepts of strategic interactions and joint economies. Strategic interactions can be aggressive or accommodating depending on whether competitors are dealing with strategic substitutes or complements. Joint economies exist in multi-stage competition when competition in the previous state favorably influences "profits" of the ensuing stage. Competiton between Korean and Japanese firms (a two-stage game involving production and technology rivalries) can be characterized by joint economies and strategic substitutes: joint economies since technological improvement results in more profits in the production stage; and strategic substitutes since an increase in marginal profits of one firm brings about a decrease in marginal profits of the other in a duopolitic production stage. This implies that the flood of "low price" Japense substitutes is an almost "natural" phenomenon in the context of the duopolistic market described in this paper. In the technology competition stage, on the other hand, technology development and technology transfer can be either strategic complements or substitutes. This implies that, in typical comparative static analyses, the effect of changes in exogenous variables cannot be expected a priori. Thus it becomes very difficult to determine the desirability of applying various policy measures such as countervailing duties, R&D subsidies, and creating demand for localized products. For these reasons, it is indeed likely that the measures suggested as means of circumventing the strategic behavior of Japanese firms (and enhancing technological development of Korean firms) may not work.