• Journal of agricultural medicine and community health
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• v.40 no.3
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• pp.115-125
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• 2015

Objectives: Colorectal cancer is one of the major cancers in South Korea. We described the time trends in colorectal cancer incidence in Daejeon, a metropolitan city, and Chungcheongnam-do (Chungnam), a rural province, South Korea. Methods: Using the databases from the Daejeon Cancer Registry (DCR) and the Chungnam Cancer Registry (CCR), age-standardized (to world standard population) rates for incidence (ASRW) were calculated. Average annual percent change (AAPC) was assessed as a trend indicator. The completeness (such as the mortality/incidence ratio) and validity (such as the death certificate only %, microscopic verification %, primary site uncertain %, and age unknown %) were analyzed to examine the data quality of DCR and CCR. Results: Incidence of colorectal cancer showed increasing trend in both sexes. Over the years 2000-2012 in Daejeon, ASRW was increased significantly from 37.2 to 51.7 per 100,000 person-years (AAPC, 3.9%) among men and from 17.1 to 28.4 (AAPC, 3.9%) among women, respectively. In Chungnam, ASRW was also increased from 29.8 to 50.1 per 100,000 person-years (AAPC, 5.1%) among men and from 15.9 to 26.6 (AAPC, 3.2%) among women, respectively. The AAPC for colon cancer was greater than rectal cancer in both Daejeon and Chungnam. The trend of rectal cancer incidence was differ by sex (AAPC in men vs women, 2.7% vs 1.7% in Daejeon; 3.5% vs 0.8% in Chungnam). Indices of completeness and validity showed that the quality control of DCR and CCR was adequate to describe the trends of ASRW. Conclusions: Both Daejeon and Chungnam have had a rapid increase in colorectal cancer incidence. Monitoring and intervention are required on the risk factors which may contribute to this trend.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.