• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.6
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• pp.323-329
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• 2021

Based on the research of the Public Welfare Games 'Mountaineering LightsUp', which is the main theme of helping the disadvantaged in society, this study uses the questionnaire method to obtain user data, and collects the data by using AMOS analysis for the effect of game interest elements on the experience of players. The results showed that the interesting elements (goal, obstacles, sense of belonging, atmosphere, story, information, and player to player communication) of the game were positively influenced by the experience of the game. And the questionnaire showed that the game still had problems such as playing simple, difficulty, lack of popularity, lack of feedback, and lack of storytelling. This paper also puts forward some proposals for these deficiencies. In future research, the research sample will be expanded, the research content will be improved, and the future Public Welfare Games will be designed and developed.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.67-78
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• 2021

The subjects of this study are Chinese players who have participated in public welfare games. SPSS24.0 and AMOS24.0 were used to analyze the data, including reliability analysis, validity analysis, correlation analysis, structural equation model verification and so on. The hypothesis results show that Trust-Aware is the most important motivation dimension that affects players' participation in public welfare games. Under the dimension of Performance Expectancy, the main influencing factors are players' needs for self-realization and concern for vulnerable groups. Perceived Risk and Social Influence are the motivational factors that influence players' participation in public welfare games.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

This study examines optimal emission taxes and welfares in mixed duopoly markets where public and private firms produce differentiated goods and emit pollutions. Both comparing quantity and price competitions and comparing simultaneous and simultaneous games provides the followings findings: First, irrespective of competition modes between quantity and price competitions or simultaneous and sequential games, the optimal emission tax is always lower than marginal environmental damage. Second, emission tax under private leadership is the highest in quantity competition while that under public leadership is the highest in price competition. Third, environmental damage under Cournot and private leadership is worsened in quantity competition while that under public leadership is worsened in price competition. Finally, welfare under Bertrand and public leadership is improved in price competition while that under private leadership is improved in quantity competition.

• Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing
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• v.48 no.2
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• pp.232-240
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• 2018

Purpose: The aim of this study is to identify the types of gambling among adolescents and provide basic prevention information regarding adolescents' gambling problems. Methods: Secondary data from representative national survey on 2015 Youth Gambling Problems of Korea Center on Gambling Problems were used. Using latent class analysis (LCA), 13 gambling types such as offline and online games of 14,011 adolescents were classified, and gambling experiences and characteristics were analyzed. Results: The subgroups of adolescent gambling were identified as four latent classes: a rare group (84.5% of the sample), a risk group (1.0%), an offline group (11.9%), and an expanded group (2.6%). The types and characteristics of gambling among the latent classes differed. In the risk group, adolescents participated in online illegal sports betting and internet casino, and gambling time, gambling expenses, and the number of gambling types were higher than other groups. Conclusion: Gambling frequently occur among adolescent, and the subtypes of gambling did not reveal homogeneous characteristics. In order to prevent adolescent gambling problems, it is a necessary to develop tailored prevention intervention in the nursing field, which is appropriate to the characteristics of adolescent gambling group and can help with early identification.

• Journal of Families and Better Life
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.131-143
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to understand the living culture of transnational married women and to analyze the out door play of children in their hometown. The data was collected through observation from 27th June to 7th July 2008 in Jian, Jilin Province China. The children's play and lifestyles were observed, and data pertaining to the culture of the people were collected by a teacher and staff. We also visited the residents for housing information. The results are given below. 1. They dressed in Korean clothes on festive days and the boys put on a hood. They had eating habits which included cooking for themselves or buying semi-manufactured goods but did not use, instant food. The housing habits involved a combination of cooking and heating by Korean floor heating system(Ondol). They utilized outdoor space to grow vegetables. Those with a fulltime job(teacher) preferred to live in an apartment but an apartment was too expensive. Public utility charges and traffic expenses were cheap. 2. The main festive days are the lunar New Year's Day and Chuseok. The children returned home and enjoyed the festive day with their parents. The language used are Korean language and Chinese. Some Korean words and phrases in Jian Joseonjok have different meanings as compared to how they are used in Korea. A capping ceremony did not to celebrate becoming an adult from an adolescent. Couples performed a wedding ceremony at a wedding hall attended by their parents and invited relatives from both families. The relatives gave the couple a wedding gift. They did not go on a wedding trip as it was not affordable but instead spent their wedding night at a hotel in this culture. When someone dies, they bury the body after cremation. They perform a memorial service for three years on the birthday of the departed. They have a banquet on the 60th birthdays with their relatives and neighbours and are typically presented with a carp for longevity. 3. They understand capitalism and therefore send their children to school to improve their social position. The Korean and Chinese languages are required subjects in school. The students choose a second language(English or Russian). They prefer English class but at the time of this study an English class was not offered at the school in Jian Joseonjok. Therefore the children entered a Chinese school. 4. The children play outdoor games such as Y$\acute{a}$o J$\grave{i}\bar{a}$(要家), X$\grave{i}$ang g$\grave{i}$(象棋), T$\grave{i}\grave{a}$o p$\acute{i}$ j$\grave{i}$n(r)(跳皮節), D$\grave{o}$uch ing g$\grave{u}$n 凍冷根, B$\bar{e}$i B$\bar{e}$i 背背, and soccer. They play games according to the season.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.127-148
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• 1990

A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility and the scope of limit pricing in general, noncooperative oligopolies. The model contains multiple incumbent firms facing a potential entrant and assumes an information asymmetry between incombents and the potential entrant about the market demand. There are two periods in the model. In period 1, n incumbent firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose quantities. At the end of period 1, the potential entrant observes the market price and makes an entry decision. In period 2, depending on the entry decision of the entrant, n' or (n+1) firms choose quantities again before the game terminates. Since the choice of incumbent firms in period 1 depends on their information about demand, the market price in period 1 conveys information about the market demand. Thus, there is a systematic link between the market price and the profitability of entry. Using Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we find that there exist some demand conditions under which incumbent firms will limit price. In symmetric equilibria, incumbent firms each produce an output that is greater than the Cournot output and induce a price that is below the Cournot price. In doing so, each incumbent firm refrains from maximizing short-run profit and supplies a public good that is entry deterrence. The reason that entry is deterred by such a reduced price is that it conveys information about the demand of the industry that is unfavorable to the entrant. This establishes the possibility of limit pricing by noncooperative oligopolists in a setting that is fully rational, and also generalizes the result of Milgrom and Roberts to general oligopolies, confirming Bain's intuition. Limit pricing by incumbents explained above can be interpreted as a form of credible collusion in which each firm voluntarily deviates from myopic optimization in order to deter entry using their superior information. This type of implicit collusion differs from Folk-theorem type collusions in many ways and suggests that a collusion can be a credible one even in finite games as long as there is information asymmetry. Another important result is that as the number of incumbent firms approaches infinity, or as the industry approaches a competitive one, the probability that limit pricing occurs converges to zero and the probability of entry converges to that under complete information. This limit result confirms the intuition that as the number of agents sharing the same private information increases, the value of the private information decreases, and the probability that the information gets revealed increases. This limit result also supports the conventional belief that there is no entry problem in a competitive market. Considering the fact that limit pricing is generally believed to occur at an early stage of an industry and the fact that many industries in Korea are oligopolies in their infant stages, the theoretical results of this paper suggest that we should pay attention to the possibility of implicit collusion by incumbent firms aimed at deterring new entry using superior information. The long-term loss to the Korean economy from limit pricing can be very large if the industry in question is a part of the world market and the domestic potential entrant whose entry is deterred could .have developed into a competitor in the world market. In this case, the long-term loss to the Korean economy should include the lost opportunity in the world market in addition to the domestic long-run welfare loss.