• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.217-241
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• 2015

Brandom upholds the anaphoric theory of reference. On this theory, reference is a relation of anaphoric dependence between linguistic items rather than a substantial relation between linguistic items and non-linguistic objects. In addition, 'refers' is a pronoun-forming operator, which is used to form anaphorically indirect descriptions such as 'the one referred to as "Leibniz"'. Recently, Arbid $B{\aa}ve$ raises three objections against this theory. First, the anaphoric theory distinguishes between ordinary descriptions and anaphorically indirect descriptions in terms of iterability. But this condition is not an adequate ground for asserting that anaphorically indirect descriptions form a distinctive semantic category. Second, sentences containing a pronoun such as 'he' and sentences containing an anaphorically indirect description such as 'the one referred to as "Leibniz"' have different modal statuses. Consequently, indirect descriptions are semantically different from paradigmatic anaphors. Third, on the anaphoric theory, expressions of the form 'a' and the corresponding indirect descriptions of the form 'the one referred to as "a"' are intersubstitutable. But we can make an equivalent claim by using the more general semantic concepts such as equivalence and intersubstitutability, instead of using notions such as 'anaphor' and 'antecedent'. So the anaphoric theory is explanatorily idle. In this paper I argue that these objections do not pose a serious problem for the anaphoric theory of reference. I argue thereby that the anaphoric theory of reference is a promising theory which provides us with the right understanding of the expression 'refers'.