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The Abuse and Invention of Tradition from Maintenance Process of Historic Site No.135 Buyeo Gungnamji Pond (사적 제135호 부여 궁남지의 정비과정으로 살펴본 전통의 남용과 발명)

  • Jung, Woo-Jin
    • Journal of the Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture
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    • v.35 no.2
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    • pp.26-44
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    • 2017
  • Regarded as Korea's traditional pond, Gungnamj Pond was surmised to be "Gungnamji" due to its geological positioning in the south of Hwajisan (花枝山) and relics of the Gwanbuk-ri (官北里) suspected of being components to the historical records of Muwang (武王)'s pond of The Chronicles of the Three States [三國史記] and Sabi Palace, respectively, yet was subjected to a restoration following a designation to national historic site. This study is focused on the distortion of authenticity identified in the course of the "Gungnamji Pond" restoration and the invention of tradition, whose summarized conclusions are as follows. 1. Once called Maraebangjuk (마래방죽), or Macheonji (馬川池) Pond, Gungnamji Pond was existent in the form of a low-level swamp of vast area encompassing 30,000 pyeong during the Japanese colonial period. Hong, Sa-jun, who played a leading role in the restoration of "Gungnamji Pond," said that even during the 1940s, the remains of the island and stone facilities suspected of being the relics of Gungnamji Pond of the Baekje period were found, and that the traces of forming a royal palace and garden were discovered on top of them. Hong, Sa-jun also expressed an opinion of establishing a parallel between "Gungnamji Pond" and "Maraebangjuk" in connection with a 'tale of Seodong [薯童說話]' in the aftermath of the detached palace of Hwajisan, which ultimately operated as a theoretical ground for the restoration of Gungnamj Pond. Assessing through Hong, Sa-jun's sketch, the form and scale of Maraebangjuk were visible, of which the form was in close proximity to that photographed during the Japanese colonial period. 2. The minimized restoration of Gungnamji Pond faced deterrence for the land redevelopment project implemented in the 1960s, and the remainder of the land size is an attestment. The fundamental problem manifest in the restoration of Gungnamji Pond numerously attempted from 1964 through 1967 was the failure of basing the restorative work in the archaeological facts yet in the perspective of the latest generations, ultimately yielding a replication of Hyangwonji Pond of Gyeongbok Palace. More specifically, the methodologies employed in setting an island and a pavilion within a pond, or bridging an island with a land evidenced as to how Gungnamji Pond was modeled after Hyangwonji Pond of Gyeongbok Palace. Furthermore, Chihyanggyo (醉香橋) Bridge referenced in the designing of the bridge was hardly conceived as a form indigenous to the Joseon Dynasty, whose motivation and idea of the misguided restoration design at the time all the more devaluated Gungnamji Pond. Such an utterly pure replication of the design widely known as an ingredient for the traditional landscape was purposive towards the aesthetic symbolism and preference retained by Gyeongbok Palace, which was intended to entitle Gungnamji Pond to a physical status of the value in par with that of Gyeongbok Palace. 3. For its detachment to the authenticity as a historical site since its origin, Gungnamji Pond represented distortions of the landscape beauty and tradition even through the restorative process. The restorative process for such a historical monument, devoid of constructive use and certain of distortion, maintains extreme intimacy with the nationalistic cultural policy promoted by the Park, Jeong-hee regime through the 1960s and 1970s. In the context of the "manipulated discussions of tradition," the Park's cultural policy transformed the citizens' recollection into an idealized form of the past, further magnifying it at best. Consequently, many of the historical sites emerged as fancy and grand as they possibly could beyond their status quo across the nation, and "Gungnamji Pond" was a victim to this monopolistic government-led cultural policy incrementally sweeping away with new buildings and structures instituted regardless of their original space, and hence, their value.

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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