• Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.37-46
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• 2009

The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced in May 2008 that U.S. retail e-commerce sales for 2006 reached $ 107 billion, up from $ 87 billion in 2005 - an increase of 22 percent. From 2001 to 2006, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 25.4 percent. The explosive growth of E-Commerce has caused profound changes in marketing channel relationships and structures in many industries. Despite the great potential implications for both academicians and practitioners, there still exists a great deal of uncertainty about the impact of the Internet channel introduction on distribution channel management. The purpose of this study is to investigate how the ownership of the new Internet channel affects the existing channel members and consumers. To explore the above research questions, this study conducts well-controlled mathematical experiments to isolate the impact of the Internet channel by comparing before and after the Internet channel entry. The model consists of a monopolist manufacturer selling its product through a channel system including one independent physical store before the entry of an Internet store. The addition of the Internet store to this channel system results in a mixed channel comprised of two different types of channels. The new Internet store can be launched by the independent physical store such as Bestbuy. In this case, the physical retailer coordinates the two types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the two stores. The Internet store also can be introduced by an independent Internet retailer such as Amazon. In this case, a retail level competition occurs between the two types of stores. Although the manufacturer sells only one product, consumers view each product-outlet pair as a unique offering. Thus, the introduction of the Internet channel provides two product offerings for consumers. The channel structures analyzed in this study are illustrated in Fig.1. It is assumed that the manufacturer plays as a Stackelberg leader maximizing its own profits with the foresight of the independent retailer's optimal responses as typically assumed in previous analytical channel studies. As a Stackelberg follower, the independent physical retailer or independent Internet retailer maximizes its own profits, conditional on the manufacturer's wholesale price. The price competition between two the independent retailers is assumed to be a Bertrand Nash game. For simplicity, the marginal cost is set at zero, as typically assumed in this type of study. In order to explore the research questions above, this study develops a game theoretic model that possesses the following three key characteristics. First, the model explicitly captures the fact that an Internet channel and a physical store exist in two independent dimensions (one in physical space and the other in cyber space). This enables this model to demonstrate that the effect of adding an Internet store is different from that of adding another physical store. Second, the model reflects the fact that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for using a physical store and for using an Internet channel. Third, the model captures the vertical strategic interactions between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer, making it possible to analyze the channel structure issues discussed in this paper. Although numerous previous models capture this vertical dimension of marketing channels, none simultaneously incorporates the three characteristics reflected in this model. The analysis results are summarized in Table 1. When the new Internet channel is introduced by the existing physical retailer and the retailer coordinates both types of stores to maximize the joint profits from the both stores, retail prices increase due to a combination of the coordination of the retail prices and the wider market coverage. The quantity sold does not significantly increase despite the wider market coverage, because the excessively high retail prices alleviate the market coverage effect to a degree. Interestingly, the coordinated total retail profits are lower than the combined retail profits of two competing independent retailers. This implies that when a physical retailer opens an Internet channel, the retailers could be better off managing the two channels separately rather than coordinating them, unless they have the foresight of the manufacturer's pricing behavior. It is also found that the introduction of an Internet channel affects the power balance of the channel. The retail competition is strong when an independent Internet store joins a channel with an independent physical retailer. This implies that each retailer in this structure has weak channel power. Due to intense retail competition, the manufacturer uses its channel power to increase its wholesale price to extract more profits from the total channel profit. However, the retailers cannot increase retail prices accordingly because of the intense retail level competition, leading to lower channel power. In this case, consumer welfare increases due to the wider market coverage and lower retail prices caused by the retail competition. The model employed for this study is not designed to capture all the characteristics of the Internet channel. The theoretical model in this study can also be applied for any stores that are not geographically constrained such as TV home shopping or catalog sales via mail. The reasons the model in this study is names as "Internet" are as follows: first, the most representative example of the stores that are not geographically constrained is the Internet. Second, catalog sales usually determine the target markets using the pre-specified mailing lists. In this aspect, the model used in this study is closer to the Internet than catalog sales. However, it would be a desirable future research direction to mathematically and theoretically distinguish the core differences among the stores that are not geographically constrained. The model is simplified by a set of assumptions to obtain mathematical traceability. First, this study assumes the price is the only strategic tool for competition. In the real world, however, various marketing variables can be used for competition. Therefore, a more realistic model can be designed if a model incorporates other various marketing variables such as service levels or operation costs. Second, this study assumes the market with one monopoly manufacturer. Therefore, the results from this study should be carefully interpreted considering this limitation. Future research could extend this limitation by introducing manufacturer level competition. Finally, some of the results are drawn from the assumption that the monopoly manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader. Although this is a standard assumption among game theoretic studies of this kind, we could gain deeper understanding and generalize our findings beyond this assumption if the model is analyzed by different game rules.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.75-90
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• 2003

When we think of fundamental problems of the aquaculture industry, there are several strict conditions, and consequently the aquaculture industry is forced to change. Fish aquaculture has a structural supply surplus in production, aggravation of fishing grounds, stagnant low price due to recent recession, and drastic change of distribution circumstances. It is requested for us to initiate discussion on such issue as “how fish aquaculture establishes its status in the coastal fishery\ulcorner, will fish aquaculture grow in the future\ulcorner, and if so “how it will be restructured\ulcorner” The above issues can be observed in the mariculture of yellow tail, sea scallop and eel. But there have not been studied concerning seabream even though the production is over 30% of the total production of fish aquaculture in resent and it occupied an important status in the fish aquaculture. The objectives of this study is to forecast the future movement of sea bream aquaculture. The first goal of the study is to contribute to managerial and economic studies on the aquaculture industry. The second goal is to identify the factors influencing the competition between production areas and to identify the mechanisms involved. This study will examine the competitive power in individual producing area, its behavior, and its compulsory factors based on case study. Producing areas will be categorized according to following parameters : distance to market and availability of transportation, natural environment, the time of formation of producing areas (leaderㆍfollower), major production items, scale of business and producing areas, degree of organization in production and sales. As a factor in shaping the production area of sea bream aquaculture, natural conditions especially the water temperature is very important. Sea bream shows more active feeding and faster growth in areas located where the water temperature does not go below 13∼14$^{\circ}C$ during the winter. Also fish aquaculture is constrained by the transporting distance. Aquacultured yellowtail is a mass-produced and a mass-distributed item. It is sold a unit of cage and transported by ship. On the other hand, sea bream is sold in small amount in markets and transported by truck; so, the transportation cost is higher than yellow tail. Aquacultured sea bream has different product characteristics due to transport distance. We need to study live fish and fresh fish markets separately. Live fish was the original product form of aquacultured sea bream. Transportation of live fish has more constraints than the transportation of fresh fish. Death rate and distance are highly correlated. In addition, loading capacity of live fish is less than fresh fish. In the case of a 10 ton truck, live fish can only be loaded up to 1.5 tons. But, fresh fish which can be placed in a box can be loaded up to 5 to 6 tons. Because of this characteristics, live fish requires closer location to consumption area than fresh fish. In the consumption markets, the size of fresh fish is mainly 0.8 to 2kg.Live fish usually goes through auction, and quality is graded. Main purchaser comes from many small-sized restaurants, so a relatively small farmer and distributer can sell it. Aquacultured sea bream has been transacted as a fresh fish in GMS ,since 1993 when the price plummeted. Economies of scale works in case of fresh fish. The characteristics of fresh fish is as follows : As a large scale demander, General Merchandise Stores are the main purchasers of sea bream and the size of the fish is around 1.3kg. It mainly goes through negotiation. Aquacultured sea bream has been established as a representative food in General Merchandise Stores. GMS require stable and mass supply, consistent size, and low price. And Distribution of fresh fish is undertook by the large scale distributers, which can satisfy requirements of GMS. The market share in Tokyo Central Wholesale Market shows Mie Pref. is dominating in live fish. And Ehime Pref. is dominating in fresh fish. Ehime Pref. showed remarkable growth in 1990s. At present, the dealings of live fish is decreasing. However, the dealings of fresh fish is increasing in Tokyo Central Wholesale Market. The price of live fish is decreasing more than one of fresh fish. Even though Ehime Pref. has an ideal natural environment for sea bream aquaculture, its entry into sea bream aquaculture was late, because it was located at a further distance to consumers than the competing producing areas. However, Ehime Pref. became the number one producing areas through the sales of fresh fish in the 1990s. The production volume is almost 3 times the production volume of Mie Pref. which is the number two production area. More conversion from yellow tail aquaculture to sea bream aquaculture is taking place in Ehime Pref., because Kagosima Pref. has a better natural environment for yellow tail aquaculture. Transportation is worse than Mie Pref., but this region as a far-flung producing area makes up by increasing the business scale. Ehime Pref. increases the market share for fresh fish by creating demand from GMS. Ehime Pref. has developed market strategies such as a quick return at a small profit, a stable and mass supply and standardization in size. Ehime Pref. increases the market power by the capital of a large scale commission agent. Secondly Mie Pref. is close to markets and composed of small scale farmers. Mie Pref. switched to sea bream aquaculture early, because of the price decrease in aquacultured yellou tail and natural environmental problems. Mie Pref. had not changed until 1993 when the price of the sea bream plummeted. Because it had better natural environment and transportation. Mie Pref. has a suitable water temperature range required for sea bream aquaculture. However, the price of live sea bream continued to decline due to excessive production and economic recession. As a consequence, small scale farmers are faced with a market price below the average production cost in 1993. In such kind of situation, the small-sized and inefficient manager in Mie Pref. was obliged to withdraw from sea bream aquaculture. Kumamoto Pref. is located further from market sites and has an unsuitable nature environmental condition required for sea bream aquaculture. Although Kumamoto Pref. is trying to convert to the puffer fish aquaculture which requires different rearing techniques, aquaculture technique for puffer fish is not established yet.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.80 no.1
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• pp.72-81
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• 1991

This study was carried out to provide necessary information for improving quarrying industry management in Korea. The results of the study are summarized as follows : 1. In aggregate and building-stone quarrying firms the managers over 40 years of age are 97% and 89.1%, the ones above education level of high school are 90% and 85% and the ones not more than 10 years of quarrying experience are 70% and 52%, respectively. Accordingly it can be pointed out that most of the managers of two types of firms are relatively old, have high educational background, while quarrying experiences of building-stone firm managers are longer than that of aggregate firm managers. 2. Most of the management forms are social corporation(60%) for aggregate quarry firms and private management(76%) for building-stone firms. Average areas of permitted stone-pits of aggregate and building-stone quarries are about 2.86ha and 1.66ha respectively. That is, aggregate quarrying firms are carried on a larger scale than building-stone quarrying firms. 3. The yearly average product of aggregate quarrying firms has increased steadily from $88.961m^3$ in 1985 to $144.028m^3$ in 1988, while, in case of building-stone quarry firms, it has significantly increased from $4.155m^3$ to $19.462m^3$ from 1985 to 1987, but reduced to $13.400m^3$ in 1988. Unstable production activities of building-stone quarrying firms may require continuous government support. 4. Major cost items are equipment rental, depreciation, salaries, repair, maintenance for aggregate quarrying firms, and salaries, depreciation, fuel, tax for building-stone quarrying firms. The yearly average rate of return is about 9.7% for aggregate quarry firms and 2.6% for building-stone quarry firms. It can be pointed out that aggregate quarrying firms is better managed than building-stone quarrying firms. 5. The production elasticity of salary for aggregate quarrying firms is 0.495, that of employees is 0.559, and that of capital service is 0.513. The sum of the elasticities is 1.257>1. Fur building-stone quarrying firms, that of employees is 0.492, that of variable costs is 0.192, and that of capital service is 0.498. The sum of elasticities is 1.172>1, thus denotes the increasing returns to scale for both types quarrying firms. 6. The ratio of marginal value product to opportunity cost of empolyees is 2.54, that of variable costs is 3.62, and that of capital service is 1.45, in aggregate quarrying firms. That of employees is 2.47, that is variable costs was 2.34, and that of capital service is 19.67 in building-stone quarrying firms. Therefore the critical factors for more expansion of management scale in aggregate quarrying firms are variable cost and employees, and are capital service in building-stone quarry ing firms. 7. The break-even points of stone sales are about 0.587 billion won and 0.22 billion won in aggregate and building-stone quarrying firms respectively. The optimum sales Level for profit maximization are about 2.0 billion and 0.5 billion in aggregate and building-stone quarry firms respectively.