• 한국식품조리과학회지
• /
• 제23권6호
• /
• pp.930-939
• /
• 2007

The purpose of this study was to suggest ways for practical food coordination, by examining restaurant-visitor' expectation factors for food coordination in restaurants. Statistical analyses were carried out based on the statistical data collected via survey from the restaurant. visitors. For the data analysis, factor analysis, reliability analysis, frequency analysis, t-test, and ANOVA were applied, using the SAS 9.1(ver.) program. In the results for the general perception of food coordination, the degree of recognition by restaurant visitors for food coordination is not high. However, necessity for food coordination is highly recognized and a 70% of the respondents were positive in their response about an expropriation price. Fitty percent of the respondents indicated a positive response regarding the relationship between the visual effect of the food and a re-visit to the restaurant. Therefore, most restaurant visitors believe food coordination is necessary in restaurants, and expect to pay for it in price.

• 한국수소및신에너지학회논문집
• /
• 제33권6호
• /
• pp.616-622
• /
• 2022

At the present time, interest in hydrogen is increasingly growing worldwide to tackle climate change. Korea also takes an action by announcing the first hydrogen economy implementation basic plan with the import targets of 22.9 million tons of hydrogen from oversea in 2050. To achieve this plan, it is very essential to establish an overseas hydrogen supply chain. In this paper, the study estimates the import price for hydrogen into basic scenario and comprehensive scenario, and also analyses economic feasibility considering price of the each technology.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• 제8권4호
• /
• pp.213-220
• /
• 2009

A revenue sharing contract is one of the mechanisms that coordinate decision makers in a decentralized supply chain toward the consensual goal. The transfer prices between different echelons in the supply chain influence the total supply chain profits. The study aims to explore various transfer pricing heuristics on the supply chain coordination in terms of the supply chain profits and their interactions with the revenue sharing rate. A model is proposed for formulating the collaborative production and distribution planning in a decentralized supply chain with the revenue sharing mechanism. Experiment results indicate that the transfer price and the revenue sharing rate affect significantly the coordination. Among the studied pricing heuristics, the variable-cost pricing method led to the best SC profits. Raising the revenue sharing rate reduced the SC profits no matter what heuristics were employed. Furthermore, the experiments provide us clues for finding the optimal transfer price for the supply chain.

• 한국전자거래학회지
• /
• 제19권3호
• /
• pp.143-158
• /
• 2014

경쟁이 치열한 온라인 마켓에서의 가격결정은 판매자에게 있어서 매우 중요한 업무이다. 가격비교 사이트의 등장으로 동일한 상품에 대한 소비자들의 가격 민감도가 더 높아졌기 때문에 가격조정의 중요성은 점점 커지고 있다. 본 연구는 온라인마켓에서 시간의 흐름에 따른 판매자들 간의 가격조정 패턴을 분석하고자 하였다. 연구를 위하여 가격비교사이트에 올라온 컴퓨터 주변기기에 대한 가격 데이터를 수집하였다. 그리고 몬테카를로 시뮬레이션을 개발하고 판매자들 간의 가격조정 타이밍이 비슷한지를 분석하여 가격담합의 가능성을 탐색하였다. 분석결과는 판매자들 간의 가격조정 타이밍이 비슷하게 나타나는 가격담합현상을 보였으며, 판매자들 간의 가격의존도가 주 단위가 아닌 일 단위가 더 높다는 것이 발견되었다.

• 품질경영학회지
• /
• 제46권4호
• /
• pp.959-972
• /
• 2018

Purpose: This study developed a simulation model that incorporates the uncertainty of demand and yield to obtain optimized results for supply chain coordination within environmental constraints. The objective of this study is to examine whether yield management for perishable products can achieve the goal of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier under a variety of environmental conditions. Methods: We investigated the efficiency of a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale price contract by considering demand and yield uncertainty, profit maximizing ratio, and success ratio. The implications for environmental variation were derived through a comparative analysis between the wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to give us the results of an optimized supply chain within the environments defined by the experimental factors and parameters. Results: We found that a revised revenue-sharing contracting model was more efficient than the wholesale price contract model and allowed all members of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. First, as the demand variation (${\sigma}$) increased, the profit of the total supply chain increased. Second, as the revenue-sharing ratio (${\Phi}$) increased, the profits of the manufacturer gradually decreased, while the profits of the retailer gradually increased, and this change was linear. Third, as the quality of yield increased, the profits of suppliers appear to increased. At last, success rate was expressed as the profit increased in the revenue-sharing contract compared to the profit increase in the wholesale price contract. Conclusion: The managerial implications of the simulation findings are: (1) a strategic approach to demand and yield uncertainty helps in efficient resource utilization and improved supply chain performance, (2) a revenue-sharing contract amplifies the effect of yield uncertainty, and (3) revised revenue-sharing contracts fetch more profits for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.

• Asia Marketing Journal
• /
• 제14권3호
• /
• pp.49-68
• /
• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• 대한산업공학회지
• /
• 제41권3호
• /
• pp.243-252
• /
• 2015

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer under the cap-and-trade emissions regulation and a permit supplier. We study joint production quantity and investment in reducing permit production cost decisions for centralized and decentralized supply chains. We formulate two supply chain contracts with aims to coordinate the decentralized supply chain; wholesale price contract and cost-sharing contract. Under the cost-sharing contract, the manufacturer shares a part of the investment in reducing permit production cost and then is allowed to purchase emission permit at a lower price. We analytically find that the proposed cost-sharing contract with reasonable parameters can coordinate the supply chain whereas the wholesale price contract is not desirable to achieve the system-wide profit. Numerical example is followed to support the analysis.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 대한산업공학회/한국경영과학회 2006년도 춘계공동학술대회 논문집
• /
• pp.187-192
• /
• 2006

In the absence of a clear command and control structure, a key challenge in supply chain management is the coordination and alignment of the supply chain members who pursue divergent and often conflicting goals. The newsvendor model is typically used as a framework to quantify the cost of misalignment and to assess the impact of coordination initiatives. This paper considers a fuzzy approach for the newsvendor problem which includes a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We use several fuzzy parameters in the model such as the demand, the wholesale price, and the market sales price. We apply a coordination policy, referred to as buyback, to solve the fuzzy newsvendor problem. Based on the buyback policy, the optimal order quantity of the retailer can be computed, and the possible profits of the members in the supply chain can be calculated with minimum sharing of private information. Focusing on the fuzzy model with buyback policy for the newsvendor problem, we illustrate exemplary fuzzy models. We also illustrate an integration model, which extends a single-manufacturer-single-retailer model to the single-manufacturer-multiple-retailer setting. In the extended model, we consider three coordination policies including quantity discount, profit sharing, and buyback, as well as non-coordination case.

• 한국유통학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국유통학회 2000년도 추계학술대회 발표논문집
• /
• pp.91-105
• /
• 2000

Results of a study of the coordination effect in stocking and promotional markdown policies for a supply chain consisting of a retailer and a discount outlet (DCO) are reported here. We assume that the products are sold in two consecutive periods: Normal Sales Period (NSP) and subsequent Promotional Sales Period (PSP). When managers in the two periods coordinate, they share information on the demand forecast and jointly decide the stocking quantity, markdown time schedule, and markdown price to maximize mutual profit. In the absence of coordination, decisions are decentralized to optimize the individual party's objective function. Optimal coordination policy for the retailer/DCO problem setting is analyzed, and the coordination policy is compared with the uncoordinated policy to explore factors that make coordination an effective approach.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• 제9권2호
• /
• pp.97-106
• /
• 2010

Can eBay.com's fee structure coordinate the channel? It's a critical strategic problem in e-commerce operations and an interesting research hypothesis as well. eBay's fees include three parts: monthly subscription fee, insertion fee, and final value fee (i.e., a revenue sharing portion), which represent a generic form of revenue sharing fee structure between the retailer and the vendor in a supply chain. This research deals with such a channel consisting of a price-setting vendor who sells products through eBay's marketplace exclusively to the end customers. The up- and down-stream channel relationship is consignment-based revenue sharing. We use a game-theoretic approach with assumption of the retailer (i.e., eBay.com) being a Stackelberg-leader and the vendor being a follower. The Stackelberg-leader decides on the terms of revenue sharing contract (i.e., fee structure), and the follower (vendor) decides on how many units to sell and the items' selling price. This study formulates several profit-maximization models by considering the effects of the retail price on the demand function. Under such settings, we show that eBay's fee structure can improve the channel efficiency; yet it cannot coordinate the channel optimally.