• Title/Summary/Keyword: Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis

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Study of Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Analysis of a CANDU Main Control Room based on NEI 00-01 Methodology (NEI 방법론을 적용한 중수로 주제어실의 화재안전정지분석에 관한 연구)

  • Kim, In-Hwan;Lim, Heok-Soon;Bae, Yeon-Kyoung
    • Fire Science and Engineering
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    • v.30 no.4
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    • pp.20-26
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    • 2016
  • When the fire takes place in Nuclear Powr Plants(NPPs), the reactor should achieve and maintain safe shut-down conditions and minimize the radioactive material released to the environment. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued numerous generic communications related to fire protection over the past 20 years, after it issued its requirements in the Fire Protection Rule set forth in Title 10, Section 50.48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.48) and Appendix R to the 10 CFR 50. The and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has developed a Methodology for Risk Informed Fire Safe-Shutdown Analysis, which is related to the Deterministic Method for Multiple Spurious Operations solutions. The aim of this study was to identify, achieve, and maintain Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown of the Main Control Room (MCR) of the CANDU reactor, even though one train of the multiple Safety Structures, Systems, and Components (SCCs) fail by the technical specification and analysis method.

Study on Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis using an Imaginary Plant for Training (교육용 가상원전을 이용한 화재안전정지분석에 관한 연구)

  • Lee, Jaiho;Kim, Jin Hong
    • Fire Science and Engineering
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    • v.32 no.1
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    • pp.57-65
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    • 2018
  • In this study, a post-fire safe shutdown analysis (PFSSA) including multiple spurious operation (MSO) treatments for cables was conducted with an imaginary nuclear power plant for training using a deterministic fire analysis code. The imaginary nuclear power plant for the training consisted of a reactor containment building and an auxiliary building, including a total of 22 fire areas. The equipment including valves, pumps, emergency diesel generators, switch gears, motor control centers, and logic controllers were located in each fire area of the imaginary plant. It was assumed that each equipment is connected with two cables and that each cable passes through the fire areas along the cable trays. A database containing the information on the equipment and cables for the imaginary plant was constructed for the fire area analysis. The fire area analysis was performed for several assumed MSO scenarios, equipment logics, and cable logics. A mitigation measure using a three hour rated wrap was applied to the failed cables and cable trays after the fire area analysis.