• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.241-263
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• 2008

Since the outsourcing logistics business has been an emerging opportunities for many new service providers entering into such an ever-changing technology, knowledge and logistics market, it has resulted into a price-sensitive and high competition industry. In order to sharpen the global competitive power of the information-contents business in this severe environment, this research is engaged in meeting the following purposes: 1. well position the outsourcing logistics services in the logistics business industry 2. articulate the business model to compete in the outsourcing logistics services market, Information-contents industry. 3. propose a competitive strategy for a outsourcing logistics services provider to grow the information-contents business. This research report could also serve as a framework for the other logistics and the outsourcing services companies to plan out their competitive strategies of information-contents industry. For new comers to join the same market, it will be also helpful in positioning their services and making business decisions in a holistic view.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.45-79
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• 1980

The aim of this paper is to analyze the mechanics of price formation in the tramp shipping. For the purpose of this study, the main characteristics of tramp freight rates and the market is examined, and a brief examination of the nature ofthe costs of operation is given which are essential for the understanding of the functioning of shipping firms as well as for the understanding of developments in the tramp freight market. The demand and supply relationships in the market is also analysed in detail. Tramp shipping is an industry that has a market which functions under conditions that are not dissimilar to the theoretical model of perfect competition. However, it does notmean that tramp shipping market is a perfectly competitive market. It is apparent that this realworld competitive system has its imperfections, which means that the market for tramp shipping is near to being a perfectly competitive market on an internaitonal scale and it is freight are therefore subjext to the laws of supply and demand. In theory, the minimum freight rate in the short term is that at which the lowest cost vessels will lay-up in preference to operating, and is equal to the variable costs minus lay-up costs; and this would imply that in all times except those of full employment for ships there is a tendency for newer low-cost, and, probably, faster vessels to be driving the older high-cost vessels in the breaker's yards. In this case, shipowners may be reluctant to lay-up their ships becasue of obligations to crews, or because they would lose credibility with shippers or financiers, or simply because of lost prestige. Mainly, however, the decision is made on strictly economic grounds. When, for example, the total operating costs minus the likely freight earnings are greater than the cost of taking the ship out of service, maintaining it, and recommissioning it, then a ship may be considered for laying-up; shipowners will, in other words, run the ships at freight earnings below operating costs by as much as the cost of laying them up. As described above, the freight rates fixed on the tramp shipping market are subject to the laws of supply and demand. In other words, the basic properties of supply and demand are of significance so far as price or rate fluctuations in the tramp freight market are concerned. In connection with the same of the demand for tramp shipping services, the following points should be brone in mind: (a) That the magnitude of demand for sea transport of dry cargoes in general and for tramp shipping services in particular is increasing in the long run. (b) That owning to external factors, the demand for tramp shipping services is capable of varying sharphy at a given going of time. (c) The demad for the industry's services tends to be price inelastic in the short run. On the other hand the demand for the services offered by the individual shipping firm tends as a rule to be infinitely price elastic. In the meantime, the properties of the supply of the tramp shipping facilities are that it cannot expand or contract in the short run. Also, that in the long run there is a time-lag between entrepreneurs' decision to expand their fleets and the actual time of delivery of the new vessels. Thus, supply is inelastic and not capable of responding to demand and price changes at a given period of time. In conclusion, it can be safely stated that short-run changes in freight rates are a direct result of variations in the magnitude of demand for tramp shipping facilities, whilest the average level of freight rates is brought down to relatively low levels over prolonged periods of time.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.93-110
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• 1990

The basic purpose behind the Korean government's policy toward the Korean deep sea fishing industry is to limit growth of the industry. Therefore, the regulations on the industry are generally restrictive and interventionist. The policy is intended to maintain high domestic fish prices in order to protect the domestic coastal fishing industry. Some regulations have also been introduced to maintain "industrial order." Each fishing vessel must obtain a government permit for operation. The permit specifies the kind of fish it can catch, the area of sea in which it can operate, and the port at which it can unload its catches. The number of permits government issues each year is based on the estimates of the demand increase calculated by government officials, and the government traditionally has been fairly conservative in its estimation, reflecting its concern for fish price stabilization, which actually implies a gradual increase of the prices. There is also a restriction on importing vessels from abroad. This regulation is intended to protect the domestic shipbuilding industry. However, this regulation has resulted in an unusually high average age of Korean fishing vessels, causing fishing costs to rise. These regulations and the inflexible response of the regulators to changing circumstances have resulted in many problems: i) high domestic fish prices, which are, to some extent deliberately, inflated to three or four times the level of international prices, resulting in huge consumer welfare losses; ii) over-exploitation of coastal fish resources; iii) provision of a hospitable environment for inefficient firms to survive, which is especially evident from the fact that, despite the high fish prices in Korea, most of the firms in the industry do not enjoy high profitability. It also must be pointed out that the actual beneficiaries of the high fish prices are the large operators, who are protected from competition and provide most of the fish for domestic consumption, rather than the low-income fishing households and small coastal operators whom the policy was originally designed to help. This study proposes a set of regulatory reforms and policy changes which could Promote competition and equity within the industry and allow firms to reduce costs and increase productivity. Such changes can make the industry more efficient and internationally competitive. Major proposals are, among others: minimization of bureaucratic discretion in issuing fishing permits and maintaining transparency in the governments' decision-making processes; reduction of the government permit specifications and simplification of the operational categories within the industry; and removal of the restrictions on importing foreign fishing vessels.