• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.118
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• pp.25-51
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• 2017

The purpose of this article is to elucidate Plotinus' concept of freedom. Particular attention is paid to two terms, 'what is self-determined' (to autexousion) and 'what is up to us' (to $eph^{\prime}h{\hat{e}}min$), which Plotinus employs in order to articulate the meaning of freedom. It is shown that freedom in Plotinus consists in the power of doing whatever one wills while willing the good. We first situate Plotinus' concept of freedom in the Socratic tradition. Next we investigate how Plotinus and Alexander of Aphrodisias conceptualize freedom in terms of self-determination in the context of criticizing determinism. It is shown that Alexander tries to secure the psychological grounds for human moral responsibility by introducing a causally undetermined power of choice between alternatives. In contrast, Plotinus is interested in psychological conditions that allow humans to do the right thing. For this purpose, he establishes the concept of will ($boul{\hat{e}}sis$) as the power of wanting and choosing the best. We then try to clarify his claim that free will cannot choose otherwise by appealing to his concept of divine freedom, which idealizes the power of doing one's best and being oneself at one's best. Finally, we discuss Plotinus' view of the limitations and possibilities of human freedom and indicate its practical implications. In conclusion we claim that Plotinus pleads for an active way of living which spreads inner freedom out into the world, rather than living in seclusion so as to protect an inner freedom which is pure.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.125
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• pp.63-89
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• 2019

The aim of this paper is to examine the so-called theory of automatic action attributed to Plotinus, according to which the sage can act automatically without deliberation or reasoning. Concerns were raised that such a theory runs the risk of turning the agent into an automaton by reducing action to mechanical reflexes to external stimuli. I attempt to show that Plotinus does not hold a theory of automatic action by arguing that the Plotinian sage's non-deliberative action is not automatic at all. For this purpose, I first draw attention to the non-deliberative action of the World-Reason (i.e. the reason of the World-Soul), which is supposed to present an ideal model of action. Indeed, Plotinus mentions that the World-Reason rules the world "as if automatically". This is, however, meant to indicate the spontaneous and natural manner in which the World-Reason rules. In this respect, the way the World-Reason works is compared to the way nature (i.e. the productive power of the World-Soul) works. But Plotinus points out that the World-Reason knows what to do, whereas nature works without knowing. In this connection, Plotinus makes it clear that the World-Reason does not calculate or deliberate about what to do because it already knows it. To clarify this point, I turn to Plotinus' analogy of practical wisdom (phronêsis) and skill, according to which the World-Reason is compared to an accomplished craftsman or artist, who confidently works without any doubt, hesitation or difficulty, thereby expressing her intelligence, unmediated by deliberation. From this perspective, non-deliberative action according to practical wisdom turns out to be superior to deliberative action. Plotinus admits that there are difficult circumstances in which even the skilled craftsman, unlike the World-Reason who always controls the whole situation, needs to deliberate or calculate, but he is nevertheless confident that the craftsman easily finds the solution. This suggests that the sage, who possesses practical wisdom, can act normally like a great master or virtuoso without deliberation, but in an emergency situation he also employs deliberation, but resourcefully and creatively responds to challenge. The attempt is made to elucidate the Plotinian model of sage's action with the help of Csikzentmihalyi's concept of 'flow' and Annas' application of it to the analogy of virtue and skill. Finally, it is shown that the sage's virtuous action, in spite of being a habituated action, is not a passive, routinized, automatic action, but an active, flexible, intelligent action.

• The Journal of Art Theory & Practice
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• no.1
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• pp.7-22
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• 2003

What is 'Art Theory'? In the western sense, the term poses a vague ambiguity, and in the eastern, it is rather an abstract and metaphysical concept. As for etymology, theory is derived from theoria and theoria from theoros. It refers to an act of viewing or seeing, of course not in a metaphysical sense. Plato understood it as 'eide'. During the time of Plotinus, theoria encompassed gazing at every possible reality, and this gazing, that is theoria, is closely related to reality as aunit that theoriacan perceive. However, we tend to distinguish, as other scientists of dualism have done, studio art from theory since a pre-modern approach to art has been particularly tuned to studio practice, set apart from theory. Therefore, in studio classes, students are expected to learn the subject based on the foundational curriculum methods such as medium, genre, technique:, rather than bringing out their own interpretations and discussing theories. As a result, students have become artists, who are not able to understand their own art. Art professors who conduct class in studio are required to proceed with specific 'theories' as well as 'intellectual reflections'. In this respect, this thesis presents poiesis and an idea of 'acting out'. Although art history and aesthetic theory tend to view art as a finished product, actual art-making and related theories should not only be acknowledged as 'completion' (finition) but also be accompanied by theoretic interpretations of the act itself and process. Accordingly, it is to accept and appreciate art as finished result in view of current theory and aesthetics thus boils down to aisthesis. Likewise, poietics starts from a point where an artist is related to studio and examines the 'work process' that extends as far as to the exact end of work. Through the study of such relationship, it is possible that theory understands 'studio' and 'process', and an artist can grant an independent meaning to studio where s/he pours her/his heart out creating a work of art. Theory is a study on artistic discovery thus should be equipped with functions that can accommodate fortuity, imitation, thinking, culture, and surrounding.