• Journal of Korean Tunnelling and Underground Space Association
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.31-48
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• 2019

The artificial ground freezing (AGF) method is a groundwater cutoff and/or ground reinforcement method suitable for constructing underground structures in soft ground and urban areas. The AGF method conducts a freezing process by employing a refrigerant circulating through a set of embedded freezing pipes to form frozen walls serving as excavation supports and/or cutoff walls. However, thermal expansion of the pore water during freezing may cause excessive deformation of the ground. On the other hand, as the frozen soil is thawed after completion of the construction, mechanical characteristics of the thawed soil are changed due to the plastic deformation of the ground and the rearrangement of soil fabric. This paper performed a field experiment to evaluate the freezing rate of marine clay in the application of the AGF method. The field experiment was carried out by circulating liquid nitrogen, which is a cryogenic refrigerant, through one freezing pipe installed at a depth of 3.2 m in the ground. Also, a piezo-cone penetration test (CPTu) and a lateral load test (LLT) were performed on the marine clay before and after application of the AGF method to evaluate a change in strength and stiffness of it, which was induced by freezing-thawing. The experimental results indicate that about 11.9 tons of liquid nitrogen were consumed for 3.5 days to form a cylindrical frozen body with a volume of about $2.12m^3$. In addition, the strength and stiffness of the ground were reduced by 48.5% and 22.7%, respectively, after a freezing-thawing cycle.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.53 no.4
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• pp.188-197
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• 2020

Termites play an important role as decomposers of the forest ecosystem, while simultaneously causing enormous damage to wooden structures. Currently, two species of subterranean termites have been reported in Korea, and termite damage to historical wooden buildings is occurring nationwide due to climate change, forest fertility, and the locational characteristics of historical wooden buildings. Subterranean termites make their nests underground or inside timber. Termites move underground and access wooden structures through the lower parts of the buildings, adjacent to the ground. Once termites attack the wooden structures, it not only spoils the authenticity of cultural heritage structure, but also hampers structural stability due to the decrease in the strength of the material. Therefore, it is important to prevent termite damage before it occurs. Chemical treatments are mainly used in Korea to control and prevent the damage. In foreign countries, physical barriers are also used to prevent entry to wooden buildings, along with chemical treatments. Physical barriers involve installing nets or particles that termites cannot pass through in the lower part of the building, around the pipes, and between the edges of the building or exterior walls and interior materials. Advantages of a physical barrier are that it is an eco-friendly method, maintains long-term effect after installation, and does not require the use of chemical treatments. Prior to applying physical barriers, studies into the characteristics of termite species must be undertaken. In this study, we evaluated the minimum passage size that each caste of Reticulitermes speratus kyushuensis can move through. We found that workers, soldiers, and secondary reproductive termites were able to pass through diameters of 0.7mm, 0.9mm, and 1.1mm respectively. Head height of termites was an important factor in determining the minimum passing size. Results from the current study will be used as a basis to design the mesh size for physical barriers to prevent damage by termites in historical wooden buildings in Korea.

• Journal of the Korea Organic Resources Recycling Association
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.35-45
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• 2023

In this study, the sludge formation in the wastewater drain from the advanced packaging process mechanisms are revealed as well as the key factors, materials, and sludge prevention methods using surfactant. Compared with that of conventional packaging process, advanced packaging process employ similar process to the semiconductor fabrication process, and thus many processes may generate wastewater. In specific, a large amount of wastewater may generate during the carrier wafer bonding, photo, development, and carrier wafer debonding processes. In order to identify the key factors for the formation of sludge during the advanced packaging process, six types of chemicals including bonding glue, HMDS, photoresist (PR), PR developer, debonding cleaner, and water are utilized and mixing evaluation is assessed. As a result, it is confirmed that the black solid sludge is formed, which is originated by the sludge seed formation by hydrolysis/dehydration reaction of HMDS and sludge growth via hydrophobic-hydrophobic binding with sludge seed and PR. For the sludge prevention investigation, three surfactants of CTAB, PEG, and shampoo are mixed with the key materials of sludge, and it is confirmed that the sludge formations are successfully suppressed. The underlying mechanism behind the sludge formation is that the carbon tails of the surfactant bind to PR with hydrophobic-hydrophobic interaction and inhibit the reaction with HMDS-based slurry seeds to prevent the sludge formation. In this regard, it is expected that various problems like clogging in drains and pipes during the advanced packaging process may effectively solve by the injection of surfactants into the drains.

• Journal of the Korean GEO-environmental Society
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• v.24 no.12
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• pp.61-67
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• 2023

Heat pipes located underground in urban areas and operated under high temperature and pressure conditions can cause large-scale human and economic damage if damaged. In order to predict damage in advance, damage and construction information of heat pipe are analyzed to derive independent variables that have a correlation with frequency of damage, and a simple regression analysis modified model using each variable is applied to the field. However, as the correlation between independent variables applied to the model increases, the independence between variables is harmed and the reliability of the model decreases. In this study, the independence of the pipe diameter, burial depth, insulation level of monitoring system, and disconnection or short circuit of the detection line, which are judged to be interrelated, was tested to derive a method for combining variables and setting categories necessary to apply to the frequency of damage estimation model. For the test of independence, the continuous variables pipe diameter and burial depth were each converted into three categories, insulation level of monitoring system was converted into two categories, and the categorical variable disconnection or short circuit of the detection line status was kept as two categories. As a result of the test of independence, p-value between pipe diameter and burial depth, level of monitoring system and disconnection or short circuit of the detection line was lower than the significance level (α = 0.05), indicating a large correlation between them. Therefore, the pipe diameter and burial depth were combined into one variable, and the categories of the combined variable were set to 9 considering the previously set categories. The insulation level of monitoring system and the disconnection or short circuit of the detection line were also combined into one variable. Since the insulation level is unreliable when the detection line status is disconnection or short circuit, the categories of the combined variable were set to 3.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.57 no.3
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• pp.116-137
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• 2024

This study quantitatively explored the interrelationship between water features and surrounding waterscape elements through a literature review and observational study targeting nine waterscapes of Suzhou Classical Garden in Jiangsu Province, China, which is designated as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The purpose was to understand the objective characteristics of classical Chinese gardens and seek a basis for their differences from Korean gardens. The average area of water space in Suzhou gardens was 1,680.7㎡, which accounted for 21.3% of the total garden area, showing large variation by garden. Most of the Suzhou Gardens use springs and wells as their water sources. The Surging Waves Pavillion uses surface water, and Retreat & Reflection Garden uses seasonal water as its water source. The water pipes in Suzhou Garden are divided into a water outlet and a water outlet(water holes). Of these, the water outlet is a water outlet that imitates the water outlet just to induce a visual effect, and focuses on the meaning of the water system. It is judged to have been combined with the trend of Suzhou gardens. In addition, it was confirmed that, semantically, the arrangement of the water polo in Suzhou Garden is based on the traditional 'Gamyeo(堪輿) theory'. Meanwhile, there are five types of methods for bringing water to Suzhou Garden: Jiginbeop(直引法), Myeonggeobeop(明渠法), Invasionbeop(滲透法), Gwandobeop(管道法), and Chakjeongbeop(鑿井法). Suzhou Classical Garden mainly applies the infiltration method and the irrigation method as a method of securing water in the garden, which can be classified and defined as the water catchment method(集水法) and the water pulling method(引水法) in the domestic classification method. Among the watering techniques in Korean traditional gardens, watering methods such as 'suspension waterfall(懸瀑)', 'flying waterfall(飛瀑)' and water eluted(湧出), have not been found, and it is believed that they mainly 'rely on hide with dignity(姿逸)' and 'submerged current(潛流)' techniques. As for the watering technique, no watering technique was found that uses a Muneomi, which is applied in traditional Korean gardens. As this was applied, the seal method, penetration method, and Gwandobeop were also used in water extraction techniques. And at the inlet and outlet of Suzhou Garden, the main static water bodies were lakes, swamps, and dams. While the eastern water bodies are classified into streams, waterfalls, and springs, the water spaces in the three gardens reflect the centrifugal distributed arrangement, and the water spaces in the six places reflect the water landscape effect due to the centripetal concentrated arrangement. And as a water space landscape design technique, the techniques of 'Gyeok(隔)' and 'Pa(破)' were mainly applied at the inlet, and the techniques of 'Eom(隔)' and 'Pa(破)' were mainly applied at the outlet. For example, most bridges were built around the inlet, and sa(榭), heon(軒), gak(閣), pavilion(亭), and corridor(廊) were built, and the outlet was concealed with a stone wall. Therefore, it is understood to have embodied Suzhou Garden's idea of water(理水), which says, "Although it was created by humans, it is as if the sky is mine(雖由人作，宛自天開)."A trend was detected. Lastly, as a result of analyzing the degree of concealment and exposure in the visual composition of the inlet and outlet, it was confirmed that the water outlet was exposed only at the Eobijeong and Mountain Villa with Embracing Beauty view points of The Surging Waves Pavillion and the water outlet was hidden at other view points. Looking at these results, the 'Hyang-Hyang-Ba-Mi-Bob(向向發微法)' from the perspective of left-orientation theory of Feng Shui, which is applied in Korean traditional gardens in classical Chinese garden water management, "makes water visible as it comes in, but invisible as it goes out." It is judged that the technique was barely matched.