• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.243-264
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• 2015

Roger White raised an objection, one based on Bayesianism, to the dogmatist view of perceptual justification. In his paper, "Perceptual Dogmatism and Bayesian Favoring", Ilho Park tries to show, contra Roger White, that there is no real conflict between Perceptual dogmatism and Bayesianian theory of confirmation. For this purpose, Park brings in the notions of the degree of confirmation and the favoring relation and argues that Bayesian theory, when properly understood, can yield results that are quite favorable to dogmatism. I don't think, however, that the devices that he employes actually deliver what he promises. The conflict is yet to be resolved. Probably, Bayesian theorists may be better off if they, instead of trying to resolve the conflict, consider the option of simply rejecting dogmatism.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.399-424
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• 2014

The main objective of this paper is to examine critically White's claim that there is a conflict between Perceptual Dogmatism and Bayesian Theory of Confirmation. For this purpose, this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I will introduce White's argument. Section 3 is dedicated to explaining some elements of Bayesian Theory of Confirmation. In particular, I will provide an explanation of confirmation measures and Bayesian Favoring. Using these two conceptual apparatuses, it will be shown that, contrary to what White has thought, there is a way of supporting Perceptual Dogmatism by means of Bayesian Theory of Confirmation - in particular, Bayesian Theory of Favoring.