• Ocean and Polar Research
• /
• v.36 no.3
• /
• pp.255-276
• /
• 2014

The dispute between China and Japan regarding $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is believed to be quite similar to the controversy surrounding Dokdo in terms of historical and post-war processes except for the point that the phenomena of occupation is different with regard to Dokdo. China's claim to $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is based on historical title and continuous use while the basis of Japan's claim is summarized as preoccupancy of ownerless land. Even though Japan acknowledges that China discovered $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, Japan claims that the act to establish sovereignty over the island from the standpoint of International Law was not taken by China. However, at that time, effective occupation was not an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of a territory. That is to say, from a legal perspective, the legal right for an area could be established based on the discovery of the land, and so it is thought that Japan is applying the current criteria of International Law in a manner that is inappropriate. When we review the post-war process, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not directly mention $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. But based on the said treaty, we can note that Japan gave up all rights for the southern area that is north of the boundary line that equates to latitude $29^{\circ}$ and that includes the Ryuku Islands and $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. Of course, the provisions for the territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its disposal are not the final factor for the judgment regarding dominium of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. However, it seems clear that Japan's attitude and interpretation regarding the issues of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, the Kuril Islands and Dokdo is problematic.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
• /
• v.24 no.3
• /
• pp.55-83
• /
• 2018

This paper is written to identify the opportunities and risks of the declaration of the end of the Korean War with North Korea. The declaration has been seriously discussed in the course of negotiation for the denuclearization of North Korea especially in 2018. For this purpose, this paper revisits the concepts of related terms such as peace, peace regime, peace agreement and declaration of the end of war. It assesses the background and intention of North Korean request for the declaration. Then, it analyzes opportunities and risks regarding South Korea, if it agrees on the declaration. As a result, this paper found that declaration of the end of the Korean War could provide South Korea with opportunities such as a progress on the North Korean denuclearization, contribution to the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and improvement on South Korea and North Korea relations. At the same time, the declaration could bring risks such as the dismantlement of the United Nations Command, demands of the withdrawal of US forces in Korea, a possible stop of North Korean denuclearization process and the weakening of South Korean peoples' awareness on North Korean threats. South Korea need to heed more on the risks than the opportunities, because the national security should be handled with caution.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.32 no.2
• /
• pp.219-246
• /
• 2017

Nuclear issue is a good example showing globalization of the international regime. The history showed nuclear weapons may cause the extinction of human races when the first nuclear bombs fell down to Japan in August, 1945 and people became increasingly eager to achieve peace. Military buildup for national security is a matter of existence in the international society. However, disarmament or arms control to secure international peace and safety which is also the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations may be the most important task for us to realize peace of the mankind. Today, disarmament, together with amicable settlement of international conflicts and collective security system, is an important means to maintain and promote international peace and safety. It might be our permanent task to realize complete disarmament but, as the Preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) expressed general and complete disarmament, the international society has clarified its effort for complete disarmament. Thus, taking a look into the international regime on the nuclear issue and progress related to the nuclear issue in North Korea, the study was intended to introduce the globalization of the nuclear issue, review the international effort for nuclear disarmament based on the concept of the 'common heritage of the mankind' and with respect to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and controls over nuclear weapons, and then evaluate the North Korean nuclear issue, which is in direct relation with South Korea and international laws, in terms of the space law and disarmament acts. The collective security system along with policies to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons should also be emphasized and implemented to cope with the North Korean nuclear issue.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.164-189
• /
• 2013

Last December, the Abe government came back, and it is critical core of Northeast Asia. They visited to Yasukuni Shrine, denied to Korea's invasion and they are denying all of their invasion history. I'm afraid they want to take Dokdo. Dokdo is Korean territory, but Japan politics assert it belongs to them. To make matters worse, they are waiting an opportunity to invade. Ministry of Foreign Affair blue paper and Ministry of Defense white paper have claimed Dokdo as Japanese territory, and many right wing politicians are taking part in the Cabinet. Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is becoming more right wing politicians than before by Japan Restoration Party, and the others also have more right wing ideologies. It can't control Japan right wing political parties. They finally aim to take Dokdo. In this situation, we have to defend Dokdo. Japan must be very important partner for our nation's development. But it is necessary to trust between two countries. Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea. It is the best way how to keep Dokdo. During Dokdo is effective controlled by Korea, the Japanese Government has limited Dokdo's ownership. Now we don't have any way to keep Dokdo except more effective control. We have strategies about Japanese claim of Dokdo's ownership as follows. First, we can overpower Japan right wing politics as Japan conscientious force's ideology. Second, Japan politics say to Dokdo's ownership is based on The San Francisco Treaty. But it is not right. Third, we have to exchange a lot of local government and civic society in Japan. Finally, we must prepare thoroughly to bring the matter to the International Court of Justice.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.22 no.1
• /
• pp.55-74
• /
• 2007

When the People's Republic of China destroyed one of its own defunct meteorological satellites, the Fengyun-1C, at an altitude of some 865 km above the earth's surface, the PRC was accused of initiating, or at the very least risking an(other) arms race in outer space also. The test also gave rise to a few legal questions as to the permissibility of this test, and the broader permissibility of using space for military and other weapon-touting activities, Whilst the test cannot be considered to constitute a direct threat to international peace and security so as to invoke relevant legal principles and consequences in terms of the UN Charter for example, it highlights the importance of such clauses in international space law as requiring international cooperation and consultation, due regard for the interests of all other countries both on earth and in outer space, and the further development of general regimes of registration and space debris-prevention. From that perspective, the PRC violated international outer space law not so much by the test itself but by the accompanying lack of information, consultation and due regard for other states', and indeed mankind's, interests.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• no.spc
• /
• pp.181-199
• /
• 2007

When the People's Republic of China destroyed one of its own defunct meteorological satellites, the Fengyun-1C, at an altitude of some 865 km above the earth's surface, the PRC was accused of initiating, or at the very least risking an(other) arms race in outer space also. The test also gave rise to a few legal questions as to the permissibility of this test, and the broader permissibility of using space for military and other weapon-touting activities, Whilst the test cannot be considered to constitute a direct threat to international peace and security so as to invoke relevant legal principles and consequences in terms of the UN Charter for example, it highlights the importance of such clauses in international space law as requiring international cooperation and consultation, due regard for the interests of all other countries both on earth and in outer space, and the further development of general regimes of registration and space debris-prevention. From that perspective, the PRC violated international outer space law not so much by the test itself but by the accompanying lack of information, consultation and due regard for other states', and indeed mankind's, interests.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
• /
• v.16 no.1
• /
• pp.110-123
• /
• 2004

Five Islands in the West Sea of Korea (Baekryeong-do, Daecheong-do, Socheong-do, Yeonpyeong-do, and Woo-do) are located very close to the North Korea's coast and all of them are under the jurisdiction of South Korea. The North and South Korean naval vessels clashed twice in the West Sea of Korea on June 15, 1999 and on June 29, 2002. These incidents were resulted from conflicts over the validity of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) and the appropriate maritime boundary between the two Koreas. From the viewpoint of South Korea, the North Limit Line is a lawful Maritime Military Demarcation Line under the Korean Military Armistice Agreement and it must be maintained as a maritime boundary between two Koreas until being substituted by a peace treaty. In conclusion, the maritime boundary between two Koreas cannot be settled easily by the principles of the International Law of the Sea at present.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.27-56
• /
• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.33 no.2
• /
• pp.443-469
• /
• 2018

In the sixty year since the first launch of Sputnik 1, it has become impossible to consider economic, political, or scientific human life in the communication field without reference to outer space. But, there is a growing groundswell of public opinion aimed at preventing arms race in space. Therefore it is necessary to establish some institution or mechanism such a code of conduct, international law. But every nation has a different posture on the grounds of national interest, or different levels of space development, the conditions required for the successful negotiation of a comprehensive treaty are not yet ripe. It is hoped that by beginning with soft measures (TCBM, Code of Conduct) for which it is easier to secure voluntary participation it may be possible to build up to a comprehensive treaty. The participation of the Space powers (US, Russia, China) in a dialogue of mutual exchange and shared information would contribute to international peace and give a long term benefit to humankind. It is also necessary to promote partnership through regional and bilateral cooperation. We should guide and shape opinion so that more nations ratify and sign existing international legal covenants in order to contribute to the efficency of Space law. International law needs to enforce PAROS and Space Security.

• Korea and Global Affairs
• /
• v.3 no.2
• /
• pp.87-130
• /
• 2019

This paper aims to analyze the recent progress(current situation) and tasks of arms control in North and South Korea. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; recent progress(current situation) of arms control in South and North Korea; constraints and tasks of arms control on the Korean peninsula; and conclusion. One of the most important tasks for the establishment of a peace structure for the coexistence of the Korean people in the 21st century is the realization of military control in order to resolve the acute military confrontation situation and mutual threats. With the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, the North-South summit and the subsequent talks for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the North Korea-US summit, and subsequent talks are creating conditions for trust building and arms control between the two Koreas. The military trust between the two Koreas and operational arms control are being achieved through the declaration of the April 27 Panmunjom and the 'Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration.' However, since there are constraints on the control of arms control, such as the persistence of hostility and distrust of the two Koreas, the defense treaty between the two Koreas and neighboring countries, the competition of neighboring countries and the complex interests of the Korean peninsula, Trust Building is important. We should resolve the issue of arms control between the two Koreas, taking into account the trend of international arms control over the internal and external dynamics of the Korean peninsula gradually and carefully, with a vision of long-term unification security.