• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.63-92
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• 2019

What motivates split-ticket voting in mixed electoral systems, where voters choose one party in district races and another party on the party list ballot? While much of the literature assumes strategic intent, three aspects commonly are overlooked: the competitiveness of district races, the presence of a district candidate from one's preferred party, and whether voters know the electoral threshold for party list seats. Furthermore, few studies disaggregate types of split-ticket voting (e.g. not voting for one's preferred party in a district vs. party list). Taiwan provides an intriguing case study for analysis, not only as a relatively new adopter of a mixed system, but also the presence of additional conditions that would encourage at least the consideration of a split ticket. Using survey data from the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) after the Taiwan's 2016 Legislative Yuan election, this analysis finds that knowing the threshold, the winner's margin, and the placement of a district candidate from one's preferred party all influence split-ticket voting among those with a partisan preference. However, closer inspection identifies a distinction between defecting from the district versus the party list. Evidence shows that district competitiveness and candidate placement influences defection from the district candidate, while the electoral threshold influences defection from the party list. The results add to our understanding of strategic and non-strategic incentives in mixed systems.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.69-101
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• 2019

The purpose of this study is to verify that voting behavior of congressmen can vary depending on the different candidate selection methods of political parties. Specifically, this paper examines whether congressmen elected through a primary tend to deviate from the party line vote in the floor voting, compared to those who did not. As a result, it was founded that congressmen who went through competition of the primary are more likely to defect from the party line vote than who did not. This empirical evidence suggests that if the introduction of the open primary system is further expanded in the future, it may lead to weakening of party cohesion and reinforcing lawmakers' autonomy.