• 한국화재소방학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국화재소방학회 2011년도 추계학술논문발표회 논문집
• /
• pp.253-257
• /
• 2011

본 논문에서는 설계중인 스마트원전에 대한 화재 PSA 방법과 결과 그리고 민감도분석 결과를 기술하였다. 기존 국내 원전 화재 PSA에서는 EPRI의 fire PRA implementation guide에 따라 수행해왔었다. RG 1.189에 따르면 NFPA 805를 채택하는 원전이나 신규원전은 NUREG/CR-6850 방법에 따라 화재 PSA를 수행해야만 한다. 스마트는 설계단계의 원전이기에 화재 PSA 수행위한 충분한 설계정보가 없고 스마트의 선행호기도 없다. 따라서 NUREG/CR-6850 방법을 스마트에 모두 적용할 수 없어 EPRI fire PRA implementation guid와 NUREG/CR-6850 방법을 사용하여 스마트 원전에 대한 화재 PSA를 수행하였다. 화재 PSA 결과에 중요한 영향을 미치는 요인들에 대해 민감도분석을 수행하였다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제44권5호
• /
• pp.471-482
• /
• 2012

To assess the risk of nuclear power plant operation and to determine the risk impact of digital systems, there is a need to quantitatively assess the reliability of the digital systems in a justifiable manner. The Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) is a tool which can reveal shortcomings of the NPP design in general and PRA analysts have not had sufficient guiding principles in modelling particular digital components malfunctions. Currently digital I&C systems are mostly analyzed simply and conventionally in PRA, based on failure mode and effects analysis and fault tree modelling. More dynamic approaches are still in the trial stage and can be difficult to apply in full scale PRA-models. As basic events CPU failures, application software failures and common cause failures (CCF) between identical components are modelled.The primary goal is to model dependencies. However, it is not clear which failure modes or system parts CCF:s should be postulated for. A clear distinction can be made between the treatment of protection and control systems. There is a general consensus that protection systems shall be included in PRA, while control systems can be treated in a limited manner. OECD/NEA CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) has set up a task group, called DIGREL, to develop taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PRA. The taxonomy is aimed to be the basis of future modelling and quantification efforts. It will also help to define a structure for data collection and to review PRA studies.

• 한국안전학회지
• /
• 제18권2호
• /
• pp.98-103
• /
• 2003

Based on ASME probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and NEI PRA peer review guidance, we evaluate a human reliability analysis (HRA) in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for Korea standard nuclear power plants, Ulchin Unit 3&4, to improve it performed at under design. The HRA for Ulchin Unit 3&4 is assessed as higher than Grade I based on ASME PRA standard and as higher than Grade 2 based on NEI PRA peer review guidance. The major items to be improved identified through the evaluation process are the documentation, the systematic human reliability analysis, the participitation of operators in the works and review of HRA. We suggest the guidance on the identification and qualitative screening analysis for pre-accident human errors and solve some items to be improved using the suggested guidance.

• 한국원자력학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 한국원자력학회 2005년도 추계학술발표회
• /
• pp.638-639
• /
• 2005

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제44권5호
• /
• pp.437-452
• /
• 2012

The Tohoku earthquake (Mw9.0) occurred on March 11, 2011 and caused a large tsunami. The Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP (F1-NPP) were overwhelmed by the tsunami and core damage occurred. This paper describes the overview of F1-NPP accident and the usability of tsunami PRA at Tohoku earthquake. The paper makes reference to the following current issues: influence on seismic hazard of gigantic aftershocks and triggered earthquakes, concepts for evaluating core damage frequency considering common cause failure with correlation coefficient against seismic event at multi units and sites, and concepts of "seismic-tsunami PSA" considering a combination of seismic motion and tsunami effects.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제54권3호
• /
• pp.896-908
• /
• 2022

As a part of probabilistic risk (or safety) assessment (PRA or PSA) of nuclear power plants (NPPs), the primary role of human reliability analysis (HRA) is to provide credible estimations of the human error probabilities (HEPs) of safety-critical tasks. In this regard, it is vital to provide credible HEPs based on firm technical underpinnings including (but not limited to): (1) how to collect HRA data from available sources of information, and (2) how to inform HRA practitioners with the collected HRA data. Because of these necessities, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute independently developed two dedicated HRA data collection systems, SACADA (Scenario Authoring, Characterization, And Debriefing Application) and HuREX (Human Reliability data EXtraction), respectively. These systems provide unique frameworks that can be used to secure HRA data from full-scope training simulators of NPPs (i.e., simulator data). In order to investigate the applicability of these two systems, two papers have been prepared with distinct purposes. The first paper, entitled "SACADA and HuREX: Part 1. The Use of SACADA and HuREX Systems to Collect Human Reliability Data", deals with technical issues pertaining to the collection of HRA data. This second paper explains how the two systems are able to inform HRA practitioners. To this end, the process of estimating HEPs is demonstrated based on feed-and-bleed operations using HRA data from the two systems.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제54권5호
• /
• pp.1686-1697
• /
• 2022

As a part of probabilistic risk (or safety) assessment (PRA or PSA) of nuclear power plants (NPPs), the primary role of human reliability analysis (HRA) is to provide credible estimations of the human error probabilities (HEPs) of safety-critical tasks. Accordingly, HRA community has emphasized the accumulation of HRA data to support HRA practitioners for many decades. To this end, it is critical to resolve practical problems including (but not limited to): (1) how to collect HRA data from available information sources, and (2) how to inform HRA practitioners with the collected HRA data. In this regard, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) independently initiated two large projects to accumulate HRA data by using full-scale simulators (i.e., simulator data). In terms of resolving the first practical problem, the NRC and KAERI developed two dedicated HRA data collection systems, SACADA (Scenario Authoring, Characterization, And Debriefing Application) and HuREX (Human Reliability data EXtraction), respectively. In addition, to inform HRA practitioners, the NRC and KAERI proposed several ideas to extract useful information from simulator data. This paper is the first of two papers to discuss the technical underpinnings of the development of the SACADA and HuREX systems.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제49권2호
• /
• pp.286-294
• /
• 2017

The events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011 point out, among other matters, that concurrent accidents at multiple units of a site can occur in reality. Although site risk has been deterministically considered to some extent in nuclear power plant siting and design, potential occurrence of multi-unit accident sequences at a site was not investigated in sufficient detail thus far in the nuclear power community. Therefore, there is considerable worldwide interest and research effort directed toward multi-unit site risk assessment, especially in the countries with high-density nuclear-power-plant sites such as Korea. As the technique of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) has been successfully applied to evaluate the risk associated with operation of nuclear power plants in the past several decades, the PSA having primarily focused on single-unit risks is now being extended to the multi-unit PSA. In this paper we first characterize the site risk with explicit consideration of the risk associated with spent fuel pools as well as the reactor risks. The status of multi-unit risk assessment is discussed next, followed by a description of the emerging issues relevant to the multi-unit risk evaluation from a practical standpoint.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제50권5호
• /
• pp.627-638
• /
• 2018

This article describes an integrated Level 1-Level 2 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology to evaluate the radiological risk during postulated accident scenarios initiated during the decommissioning phase of a typical Mark I containment boiling water reactor. The fuel damage scenarios include those initiated while the reactor is permanently shut down, defueled, and the spent fuel is located into the spent fuel storage pool. This article focuses on the integrated Level 1-Level 2 PRA aspects of the analysis, from the beginning of the accident to the radiological release into the environment. The integrated Level 1-Level 2 decommissioning PRA uses event trees and fault trees that assess the accident progression until and after fuel damage. Detailed deterministic severe accident analyses are performed to support the fault tree/event tree development and to provide source term information for the various pieces of the Level 1-Level 2 model. Source terms information is collected from accidents occurring in both the reactor pressure vessel and the spent fuel pool, including simultaneous accidents. The Level 1-Level 2 PRA model evaluates the temporal and physical changes in plant conditions including consideration of major uncertainties. The goal of this article is to provide a methodology framework to perform a decommissioning Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), and an application to a real case study is provided to show the use of the methodology. Results will be derived from the integrated Level 1-Level 2 decommissioning PSA event tree in terms of fuel damage frequency, large release frequency, and large early release frequency, including uncertainties.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• 제53권2호
• /
• pp.386-392
• /
• 2021

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System), WinMACCS, and MelMACCS now facilitate a multi-unit consequence analysis. MACCS evaluates the consequences of an atmospheric release of radioactive gases and aerosols into the atmosphere and is most commonly used to perform probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) and related consequence analyses for nuclear power plants (NPPs). WinMACCS is a user-friendly preprocessor for MACCS. MelMACCS extracts source-term information from a MELCOR plot file. The current development can combine an arbitrary number of source terms, representing simultaneous releases from a multi-unit facility, into a single consequence analysis. The development supports different release signatures, fission product inventories, and accident initiation times for each unit. The treatment is completely general except that the model is currently limited to collocated units. A major practical consideration for performing a multi-unit PSA is that a comprehensive treatment for more than two units may involve an intractable number of combinations of source terms. This paper proposes and evaluates an approach for reducing the number of calculations to be tractable, even for sites with eight or ten units. The approximation error introduced by the approach is acceptable and is considerably less than other errors and uncertainties inherent in a Level 3 PSA.