• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.102-109
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• 2012

One of key success factors in PPI(Public Private Investment) is the structure of risk sharing between the public and the private, and the determination mechanism of fair return to private participants relative to the risk that private participants undertake. In Korea, two basic types of PPI exist. One is BTO and the other is BTL. In BTO, most risks are taken by the private whereas the opposite is the case in BTL. No intermediate form exists. As a result, BTO type projects had difficulty in attracting private participants because of the excessive risks. In this study, one intermediate form is studied where demand risk is shared between the public and the private. In the setting where the public authority takes all the project revenues and then pays ladder type payments to private participants depending upon the level of project revenues, appropriate level of fixed payments is endogenously derived using the real option pricing model. From the fixed payments, expected investment returns are calculated based upon a certain distributional assumption. The results of this study is expected to help introducing diverse forms of PPI in Korea.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.121-131
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• 2009

This study will estimate the fair return on private participants' investments on BTO type PPI (Private Public Infrastructure) projects using the data from past BTO projects in Korea. In the past, the real returns of $6%\sim9%$ were provided to private participants. The results of this study show that those returns were too high compared with the estimated fair returns, especially for projects with the minimum revenue guarantee (MRG) by the government. Moreover, the excess portion of the return over the fair return becomes even larger when there is a demand forecast bias. In reality, most of the BTO projects have far lower actual revenues than the initial forecasted revenue in concession agreements. This phenomenon implies that BTO projects have a tendency of overly forecasting revenues. If so, the value of the minimum revenue guarantee becomes larger, and therefore, the fair return to private participants should decrease. It is hoped that this study helps future BTO projects' concession agreements between the government and private participants to become more fair from the perspectives of risk and return profiles.