• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.41
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• pp.367-399
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• 2011

This Article examines the regulation of outsider trading under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (the "Capital Markets Act"). Outsider trading occurs when a market participant who is not a traditional corporate insider trades securities based on either "inside" or "outside" nonpublic information. Unlike "inside" information, "outside" information is referred to as information not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer. "Outside" information includes both "corporate" and "market" information. "Corporate information" is information about events or circumstances which affect the company's assets or earning power. "Outside corporate information" is information about the company's assets or earning power not derived directly or indirectly from the issuer. "Market information" is information about events or circumstances which affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning power. The Capital Markets Act prohibits both "temporary insiders" from using "corporate" information in trading securities and "outsiders" from using "market" information, such as (i) information regarding the initiation or discontinuance of a tender offer; or (ii) information regarding acquisition or disposition of stocks in bulk. However, the Act does not encompass circumstances (i) where an outsider trades securities based on confidential corporate information obtained through certain types of wrongful conduct; (ii) where an outsider trades securities based on corporate information obtained through eavesdropping; and (iii) where an outsider trades securities based on either outside corporate information or market information created by the outsider himself. In order to plug a few of the gaps left open in the law of outsider trading under the Capital Markets Act, this Article suggests that regulators adopt a relatively broad reading of the scope of ${\S}$ 178(1) of the Act, which is similar to SEC Rule 10b-5, to include outsiders with no relationship to the corporation that had issued the securities. Since ${\S}$ 178(1) of the Act does not require "deception" for liability, it would seem to evade the limitations imposed by the U.S. misappropriation theory. Key Words : Outsider Trading, Insider Trading, Material Nonpublic Information, the Capital Markets Act, Misappropriation Theory, Fiduciary Theory.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.139-153
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• 1991

This paper examines the pecuniary effects stemming from insider trading in the equities of firms targeted for acquisition. Illegal exchanges by those having advantageous information are found to result in excessive returns to stockholders of the sought firms. However, unusual market activities are not typical immediately subsequent to the illegal trading date, suggesting that nonpublic information is synthesized by market mechanisms with sufficient speed so that others cannot profit by imitating the better informed traders. The obtained evidence does not support the contention that insider trading on nonpublic information harms the outsider stockholders of involved firms.