• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.195-210
• /
• 2002

In this paper, we present a nonrenewable resource model including environmental pollution stock as a state variable to analyze the dynamic structure of environmental tax. Based on the optimality conditions of our model, we showed that the optimal time path of the shadow cost for environmental pollution stock is the same as that of the costate variable for environmental pollution stock. We did this by applying the theorem, Continuous Dependence on Initial Conditions (Coddington and Levinston, 1985, pp. 22~27), to the optimal control problem. Thus, this result provides a theoretical basis to determine the magnitude of environmental tax to be imposed over time. In addition, we also identified that the costate variable for environmental pollution stock is solely due to the disutility effect.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.12 no.3
• /
• pp.397-425
• /
• 2003

This paper develops a simple theoretical model that is consistent with the empirical evidence of an inverted U-shpated relationship between pollution and per capita income, which is so-called environmental Kuznets curve in this literature. Also, by incorporating the issue of environmental externality into an endogenous growth model, I investigate the circumstances under which growth can be sustained with the optimal control of pollution, and hence the sustainable development can be achieved. In order to study the problem of implementing the social optimum in a market economy, I examine the optimality of three different kinds of environmental policy instruments; pollution tax, pollution-permit trading system (pollution voucher), and direct regulation. This paper shows that the optimum can be implemented with a pollution tax or with a voucher system. Also, it is shown that the socially optimal rate of pollution tax should increase proportionally to the growth rate of consumption.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.11 no.4
• /
• pp.689-706
• /
• 2002

This paper makes some contributions on optimal environmental taxes in the generalized utilitarian social welfare function. It is not to suggest as to appropriate environmental tax rates but to contribute the direction of environmental tax policy. The tax rates depend on parameters of individual utility function (CES utility function) and social welfare function and income tax rate. The major findings are that, as the elasticity of substitution between labor and leisure and the concavity of social welfare function increase, both the optimal tax rates and the government demogrants rise. And, as the parameter of environmental pollution in the individual utility function increases, the optimal tax rates also increase. For the future study, this model involves the income tax and the capital tax as endogenous variables and the wage changes due to international trade.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.133-160
• /
• 2004

This paper analyzes the long-run effects of an environmental tax levied on motor vehicles. If the government charges their consumers the tax as much as the monetary value of the external damage due to the pollutants emitted from motor vehicles, the operation of vehicles is reduced to the socially optimal level, alike to ordinary Pigouvian taxes. Thus, air pollution abatement is realized in the short run. Moreover, in the long run, the tax leads the consumers to prefer cleaner vehicles owing to the tax burden, and so the firms produce the motor vehicles with less pollutants emitted to meet the change of demand. Therefore, the tax has the additional effect on air pollution abatement. This result is obtained from the simulation in the oligopoly model which has an interior solution when the vehicles are horizontally and vertically differentiated.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.36 no.1
• /
• pp.1-11
• /
• 2011

This article examines the impact of electronic commerce on environmental welfare. In particular, we analyze a game model of price competition between offline and online firms when consumption taxes are imposed on both offline and online transactions that produce environmental pollution. We investigate the properties of optimal taxation between offline and online markets and demonstrate that there is an optimal difference between the two taxes, depending upon not only the transaction cost between offline and online consumption, but also the environmental damage cost. We also investigate the effect of tax-free online transactions on tax revenues, and the financial feasibility of the optimal taxation.

• Journal of Environmental Impact Assessment
• /
• v.5 no.2
• /
• pp.49-57
• /
• 1996

On the basis of sustainable long-term water resources planning, the development of ground water resources should be interlocked with the surface water development In considering the intertemporal equity, overpumping of groundwater may diminish or eliminate the groundwater resources stock of post-generations. Regulatory landuse zoning for groundwater resources recharge area is indispensable measures to prevent groundwater pollution. Adequate treatment of polluted water from various sources such as municipal sewage, industrial wastewater, landfill site leachate, and abandoned boring wells, is also necessary for groundwater protection. To preserve groundwater resources as common property goods, groundwater use tax should be imposed upon the large scale groundwater use. Finally, the establishment of groundwater development license system is recommended to achieve the social optimal production and to avoid external diseconomy.

• Environmental Engineering Research
• /
• v.18 no.3
• /
• pp.199-208
• /
• 2013

This study intended to develop an integrated governance model and find measures to manage nonpoint source (NPS) pollutions in watershed management. To reach this goal, this study has analyzed NPS pollution management policies in Korea and has employed statistical methods such as expert Delphi survey, analysis of variance, and factor analysis. As a result, this study has found that the favored basic organization form was a private-public cooperative council. The necessary governance-based NPS pollution management measures determined through this study are as follows: to build collaboration mechanisms including those related to motivation provision, trust building, capacity building, and making optimal regulations; to employ financial resources based on principles such as 'polluter-pays', 'recipient-pays', and 'general-tax-source'; and to develop several programs, including system improvement, pilot and management projects, and publicity.