• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.277-293
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• 2015

Mutual Savings Banks generally have weaker governance structure than other financial institutions, so the possibility of earnings management by owner-largest or managements of mutual savings banks is higher than other financial institutions. This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and quality of internal control of financial reporting. If the expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis holds, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the weaker the internal control system by more likely the opportunistic earnings management by bank managers. On the other hand, under the convergence of interest hypothesis, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the stronger the internal control system by reduction in agency costs as owner-manager's holdings increases, and there a negative relationship is expected between internal control weakness and the holdings of the owner-largest shareholder. We find that mutual savings banks with higher owner-largest shareholder equity has significant positive relations with their internal control of financial reporting material weakness. This result suggests that the greater owner-largest shareholder equity, the more likely the opportunistic earnings management, so that decrease quality of internal control. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions corporate governance to verify whether governance system, especially, owner-largest and quality of internal control has significant positive relations.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.11
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• pp.267-274
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• 2018

This study examines the effect of managerial ability on managers' opportunistic reporting discretion in recognizing the goodwill impairment losses after the adoption of K-IFRS. Cross-sectional regression results show that goodwill impairment losses are not recognized timely at the time of the goodwill impairment symptom, but rather managers make bad use of goodwill impairment losses as tools of income smoothing and big-bath. Managerial ability is not directly related to the recognition of goodwill impairment losses, but firms with more able managers recognize timely goodwill impairment losses when the symptom of goodwill impairment exists, and they use less income smoothing when the firms' expected pre-impairment earnings are abnormally high. This study is the first research to consider the relationship between managerial ability and manager' earnings management in goodwill impairment accounting.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.187-207
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• 2018

This study examines the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation and examines whether their relationship increases as managerial incentive compensation intensity increases. For this purpose, a total of 2,755 company-years were selected for the analysis of the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from December 2012 to 2016 as the final sample. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between accounting conservatism and manager overpayment. This implies that managers' incentives to distort future cash flow estimates by over booking assets or accounting profits in order to maximize their compensation when manager compensation is linked to firm performance. In this sense, accounting conservatism can reduce opportunistic behavior by restricting managerial accounting choices, which can be interpreted as a reduction in overpayment to managers. Second, we found that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation increases with the incentive compensation for accounting performance. The higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity of accounting performance is, the more likely it is that the manager has the incentive to make earnings adjustments. Therefore, the high level of incentive compensation for accounting performance means that the ex post settling up problem due to over-compensation can become serious. In this case, the higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity for accounting performance, the greater the role and utility of conservatism in manager compensation contracts. This study is based on the fact that it presents empirical evidence on the usefulness of accounting conservatism in managerial compensation contracts theoretically presented by Watts (2003) and the additional basis that conservatism can be used as a useful tool for investment decision.