• 한국지능시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국퍼지및지능시스템학회 1993년도 Fifth International Fuzzy Systems Association World Congress 93
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• 지능정보연구
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• 제20권4호
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• pp.89-105
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• 2014

Web2.0의 등장과 함께 급속히 발전해온 온라인 포럼, 블로그, 트위터, 페이스북과 같은 소셜 미디어 서비스는 소비자와 소비자간의 의사소통을 넘어 이제 기업과 소비자 사이의 새로운 커뮤니케이션 매체로도 인식되고 있다. 때문에 기업뿐만 아니라 수많은 기관, 조직 등에서도 소셜미디어를 활용하여 소비자와 적극적인 의사소통을 전개하고 있으며, 나아가 소셜 미디어 콘텐츠에 담겨있는 소비자 고객들의 의견, 관심, 불만, 평판 등을 분석하고 이해하며 비즈니스에 적용하기 위해 이를 적극 분석하는 단계로 진화하고 있다. 이러한 연구의 한 분야로서 비정형 텍스트 콘텐츠와 같은 빅 데이터에서 저자의 감성이나 의견 등을 추출하는 오피니언 마이닝과 감성분석 기법이 소셜미디어 콘텐츠 분석에도 활발히 이용되고 있으며, 이미 여러 연구에서 이를 위한 방법론, 테크닉, 툴 등을 제시하고 있다. 그러나 아직 대량의 소셜미디어 데이터를 수집하여 언어처리를 거치고 의미를 해석하여 비즈니스 인사이트를 도출하는 전반의 과정을 제시한 연구가 많지 않으며, 그 결과를 의사결정자들이 쉽게 이해할 수 있는 시각화 기법으로 풀어내는 것 또한 드문 실정이다. 그러므로 본 연구에서는 소셜미디어 콘텐츠의 오피니언 마이닝을 위한 실무적인 분석방법을 제시하고 이를 통해 기업의사결정을 지원할 수 있는 시각화된 결과물을 제시하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 한국 인스턴트 식품 1위 기업의 대표 상품인 N-라면을 사례 연구의 대상으로 실제 블로그 데이터와 뉴스를 수집/분석하고 결과를 도출하였다. 또한 이런 과정에서 프리웨어 오픈 소스 R을 이용함으로써 비용부담 없이 어떤 조직에서도 적용할 수 있는 레퍼런스를 구현하였다. 그러므로 저자들은 본 연구의 분석방법과 결과물들이 식품산업뿐만 아니라 타 산업에서도 바로 적용 가능한 실용적 가이드와 참조자료가 될 것으로 기대한다.