• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.12 no.7
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• pp.37-47
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• 2014

This study applies Policy Streams and Expert Group Standing Change Framework (PSECF) proposed by SangJung Park and Chan KOH to analyze the Roh's Participatory government's decision making process on the wartime Operational Control (OPCON) transition. PSECF case study's results are as follows: Strong commitments of the former president Roh Moohyun and the progressive National Security Committee (NSC) were primary drivers in the policy developing process. But military expert groups such as the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS) were thoroughly excluded due to their passive role against the wartime OPCON transition. After the policy resolution, the standing of expert groups changed: the standing of advocate effects, the former progressive NSC who led the wartime OPCON transition in the Roh's Participatory government, went down but the conservatives such as ROK MND and JCS improve their standing because the conservative government kicks off 8 months later from the policy decision. In conclusion, the proposed PSECF through the Roh's Participatory government's case-study is worthy as an explanatory framework for high level national policies.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.10 no.11
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• pp.47-58
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• 2012

This study selects political and military decision factors of Participatory Government's Wartime Operational Control(OPCON) Transition and analyzes, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the effects and relations between those factors. Previous research utilizing the Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP) selected their decision factors based on academic data and field experience, requiring more objective analysis of the factors. For this study, we conducted a survey among security subject matter experts(SME) both online and offline. The results show that OPCON transition's decision factors were to 'recover military sovereignty', 'set the conditions for peaceful reunification' and 'improve ROK image through enhancing national power' which differs little from the previous AHP method studies. It also showed that 'recover military sovereignty' and 'set the conditions for peaceful reunification' had no relationship to each other and that the key factor that decided the OPCON Transition was actually 'recover military sovereignty' which represents the interest of the liberal party in ROK. This study finds its meaning by analyzing the decision factors of Participartory Government's OPCON Transition thorugh Delphi and DEMATEL method.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.13 no.5
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• pp.67-75
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• 2013

South Korea suggest that the United States government should delay the date to hand over wartime operational control (OPCON). It is fixed on December 1, 2015. Typically the president's position as head of the executive authority is coming from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Now we should know the commander-in-chief of the nation's forces and the meaning of OPCON. The relationship between sovereignty and the commander-in-chief of the nation's forces is a little different. This is one of the efforts to enlarge the efficiency of Armed Forces. Of course, operational control is little control of the sovereign personnel, logistics, administration, discipline, organizing, training, etc. It does not control all matters. The current ROK Combined Forces Command itself is made with reference to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). If we insist our own sovereignty is infringed because of OPCON, that claim is coated in irreparable damage to the national interest.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.153-163
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• 2011

This study analyzes the military and political factors that influenced the Participatory Government's resolution in Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transition. The research on key factors in OPCON transition firstly implemented literature research and then increased feasibility through additional use of AHP. The analysis results showed that there was a negative effect for Korean Peninsular Defense in the 'ROK-US Alliance Asymmetry' area, a positive effect to increase ROK-led Capability of Theater Operation in the 'ROK and U.S. Alliance Interdependence' area and a positive effect for Invocation of ROK Self-Defense Power in the 'Interests of Participatory Government's Liberal Regime' area respectively. After applying AHP, "ROK exercise of Self-defense" in the 'Interests of Participatory Government's Liberal Regime' area received the highest assessment, while the "Increasement of North Korea's Threat" in the 'ROK-US Alliance Asymmetry' area received the lowest assessment. This study is meaningful in that it analyzed the key military and political factors in the Participatory Government's resolution of Wartime OPCON Transition using AHP.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.498-506
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• 2018

Recently, the US commanded a wargame simulation system of a combined ROK-US exercise with single federation. However, after the OPCON transfer, many limitations to the single federation have been cited such as security policies and information protection. We suggest a hierarchical federation as a way to overcome these problems. Regarding HLA rules, the participants use the same FOM and RTI in single federation. There are limitations to implement CI in applying heterogeneous FOMs and RTIs in current single federation. Therefore, we propose implementing CI with heterogeneous FOMs and RTIs in a hierarchical federation. This system overcomes the weaknesses of the system structure, which is a disadvantage of the single federation. In the federation test, we can apply heterogeneous FOMs and RTIs and achieve similar performance to the current combined exercise simulation. In conclusion, ROK should lead the simulation system of combined exercises using the CI after the OPCON transfer.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.291-295
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• 2022

The transition to wartime operational control during the term of office, which was the promise of the Moon Jae Inn administration, fell through. More than 70 years after it was transferred during the Korean War in 1950, the policy of converting wartime operational control has been repeatedly decided and reversed several times. This conversion of wartime operational control is a national policy directly related to our security, and it is most important to understand the determinants of the administration's conversion to wartime operational control. This paper selects two cases of adjustment of wartime operational control policy during the Lee Myung Bak administration in 2006 and 2010 during the Roh Moo Hyun administration as the subject of the study and expects to gain not only policy predictive power but also successful policy execution at the time of the two administration' policy changes.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.