• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.46 no.6
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• pp.837-846
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• 2014

A lead slowing down spectrometer (LSDS) is under development for analysis of isotopic fissile material contents in pyro-processed material, or spent fuel. Many current commercial fissile assay technologies have a limitation in accurate and direct assay of fissile content. However, LSDS is very sensitive in distinguishing fissile fission signals from each isotope. A neutron spectrum analysis was conducted in the spectrometer and the energy resolution was investigated from 0.1eV to 100keV. The spectrum was well shaped in the slowing down energy. The resolution was enough to obtain each fissile from 0.2eV to 1keV. The detector existence in the lead will disturb the source neutron spectrum. It causes a change in resolution and peak amplitude. The intense source neutron production was designed for ~E12 n's/sec to overcome spent fuel background. The detection sensitivity of U238 and Th232 fission chamber was investigated. The first and second layer detectors increase detection efficiency. Thorium also has a threshold property to detect the fast fission neutrons from fissile fission. However, the detection of Th232 is about 76% of that of U238. A linear detection model was set up over the slowing down neutron energy to obtain each fissile material content. The isotopic fissile assay using LSDS is applicable for the optimum design of spent fuel storage to maximize burnup credit and quality assurance of the recycled nuclear material for safety and economics. LSDS technology will contribute to the transparency and credibility of pyro-process using spent fuel, as internationally demanded.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.45 no.6
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• pp.803-810
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• 2013

The U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Technologies R&D program under the Office of Nuclear Energy is working to advance technologies to enhance both the existing and future fuel cycles. One thrust area is in developing enabling technologies for next generation nuclear materials management under the Materials Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Campaign where advanced instrumentation, analysis and assessment methods, and security approaches are being developed under a framework of Safeguards and Security by Design. An overview of the MPACT campaign's activities and recent accomplishments is presented along with future plans.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.53 no.12
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• pp.4072-4079
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• 2021

This article presents a study on the state-of-the-art methods for automated radioactive material detection and identification, using gamma-ray spectra and modern machine learning methods. The recent developments inspired this in deep learning algorithms, and the proposed method provided better performance than the current state-of-the-art models. Machine learning models such as: fully connected, recurrent, convolutional, and gradient boosted decision trees, are applied under a wide variety of testing conditions, and their advantage and disadvantage are discussed. Furthermore, a hybrid model is developed by combining the fully-connected and convolutional neural network, which shows the best performance among the different machine learning models. These improvements are represented by the model's test performance metric (i.e., F1 score) of 93.33% with an improvement of 2%-12% than the state-of-the-art model at various conditions. The experimental results show that fusion of classical neural networks and modern deep learning architecture is a suitable choice for interpreting gamma spectra data where real-time and remote detection is necessary.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.11
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• pp.3925-3934
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• 2023

The importance of fast neutron detection for nuclear safeguards purposes has increased due to its potential advantages such as reasonable cost and higher precision for larger sample masses of nuclear materials. Pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) is inevitably used to discriminate neutron- and gamma-ray- induced signals from organic scintillators of very high gamma sensitivity. The light output (LO) threshold corresponding to several MeV of recoiled proton energy could be necessary to achieve fine PSD performance. However, this leads to neutron count losses and possible distortion of results obtained by neutron multiplicity counting (NMC)-based nuclear material accountancy (NMA). Moreover, conventional PSD techniques are not effective for counting of neutrons in a high-gamma-ray environment, even under a sufficiently high LO threshold. In the present work, PSD performance (figure-of-merit, FOM) according to LO bands was confirmed using a conventional charge comparison method (CCM) and compared with results obtained by convolution neural network (CNN)-based PSD algorithms. Also, it was attempted, for the first time ever, to reject fake neutron signals from distorted PSD regions where neutron-induced signals are normally detected. The overall results indicated that higher neutron detection efficiency with better accuracy could be achieved via CNN-based PSD algorithms.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.54 no.12
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• pp.4481-4490
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• 2022

In this study, a new rupture disk corrosion test (RDCT) method was developed for real-time detection of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) initiation of Alloy 600 in a primary water environment of pressurized water reactors. In the RDCT method, one side of a disk specimen was exposed to a simulated primary water at high temperature and pressure while the other side was maintained at ambient pressure, inducing a dome-shaped deformation and tensile stress on the specimen. When SCC occurs in the primary water environment, it leads to the specimen rupture or water leakage through the specimen, which can be detected in real-time using a pressure gauge. The tensile stress applied to the disk specimen was calculated using a finite element analysis. The tensile stress was calculated to increase as the specimen thickness decreased. The SCC initiation time of the specimen was evaluated by the RDCT method, from which result it was found that the crack initiation time decreased with the decrease of specimen thickness owing to the increase of applied stress. After the SCC initiation test, many cracks were observed on the specimen surface in an intergranular fracture mode, which is a typical characteristic of SCC in the primary water environment.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.53 no.12
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• pp.4093-4097
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• 2021

This study presents a new dead-time measurement method using the gamma attenuation law and generalized dead-time models for nuclear gamma-ray detectors. The dead-time of the NaI(Tl) detection system was obtained to validate the new dead-time determination method using very thin lead and polyethylene absorbers. Non-paralyzing dead-time was found to be 8.39 ㎲, and paralyzing dead-time was found to be 8.35 ㎲ using lead absorber for NaI(Tl) scintillator detection system. These dead-time values are consistent with the previously reported dead-time values for scintillator detection systems. The gamma build-up factor's contribution to the dead-time was neglected because a very thin material was used.

• Analytical Science and Technology
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.69-81
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• 2022

The method of measuring and classifying the energy category of neutrons directly using raw data acquired through a CZT detector is not satisfactory, in terms of accuracy and efficiency, because of its poor energy resolution and low measurement efficiency. Moreover, this method of measuring and analyzing the characteristics of low-energy or low-activity gamma-ray sources might be not accurate and efficient in the case of neutrons because of various factors, such as the noise of the CZT detector itself and the influence of environmental radiation. We have therefore developed an efficient method of analyzing radiation characteristics using a neutron and gamma-ray analysis algorithm for the rapid and clear identification of the type, energy, and radioactivity of gamma-ray sources as well as the detection and classification of the energy category (fast or thermal neutrons) of neutron sources, employing raw data acquired through a CZT detector. The neutron analysis algorithm is based on the fact that in the energy-spectrum channel of 558.6 keV emitted in the nuclear reaction ¹¹³Cd + ¹n → ¹¹⁴Cd + in the CZT detector, there is a notable difference in detection information between a CZT detector without a PE modulator and a CZT detector with a PE modulator, but there is no significant difference between the two detectors in other energy-spectrum channels. In addition, the gamma-ray analysis algorithm uses the difference in the detection information of the CZT detector between the unique characteristic energy-spectrum channel of a gamma-ray source and other channels. This efficient method of analyzing radiation characteristics is expected to be useful for the rapid radiation detection and accurate information collection on radiation sources, which are required to minimize radiation damage and manage accidents in national disaster situations, such as large-scale radioactivity leak accidents at nuclear power plants or nuclear material handling facilities.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Nondestructive Testing
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• v.29 no.3
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• pp.248-255
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• 2009

After several damages by PWSCC were found in the world, USNRC and PNNL(Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) started the research on PWSCC under the project name of PINC. The aim of the project was 1) to fabricate representative NDE mock-ups with flaws to simulate PWSCCs, 2) to identify and quantitatively assess NDE methods for accurately detecting, sizing and characterizing PWSCCs, 3) to document the range of locations and morphologies of PWSCCs and 4) to incorporate results with other results of ongoing PWSCC research programs, as appropriate. Korea nuclear industries have also been participating in the project. Thermally and mechanically cracked-four mockups were prepared and phased array and manual ultrasonic testing(UT) techniques were applied. The results and lessons learned from the preliminary RRT are summarized as follows: 1) Korea RRT teams performed the RRT successfully. 2) Crack detection probability of the participating organizations was an average 87%, 80% and 80% respectively. 3) RMS error of the crack sizing showed comparatively good results. 4) The lessons learned may be helpful to perform the PINC RRT and PSI /ISI in Korea in the future.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Pressure Vessels and Piping
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.20-27
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• 2010

In order to prevent the corrosion of component contacted primary water designed alloy 600 material in the nuclear power plant. But the primary water stress corrosion cracking(PWSCC) of alloy 600 and weld area occurs continuously due to the residual stress. The leakage accident resulted from PWSCC in the drain nozzle of the steam generator of domestic power plants. Heater sleeves of the pressurizer are welded with alloy 600 weld material and therefore exposed to the primary water environment. PWSCC occurred in heater sleeve material and weld area of many foreign power plants. The current issue of domestic nuclear power plants are consequently concentrated to PWSCC of similar material. In order to improve the detection and the sizing of the PWSCC in the welding sleeve of the pressurizer, the automatic UT system and multi-directions probe sets have been developed. The experimental studies have been performed using the mock-up block containing artificial reflectors(ID connected EDM notch) and semi-artificial cracks made from thermal fatigue. The automatic UT System is applied in the detection and the length sizing of the ID/OD on the tube and the J-groove weld area of the artificial reflectors and results of the detection and the sizing are compared respectively. Also, the developed automatic UT system is successfully accomplished to inspect the heater sleeve and the J-groove weld area on the pressurizer for the detection of PWSCC.