• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Corrosion Science and Technology
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• v.4 no.5
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• pp.211-216
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• 2005

Failure analysis of the latch ram ball and the C-ram ball with the trade name AFBMA Gr. 50 Colmonoy No. 6, has been performed to identify the root cause of the failure. The study required the extraction of the both failed and normal balls from the nuclear fuel exchanger. Microstructures of both balls were examined after polishing and etching. Breaking tests of both the ball revealed similarity in cleavage surfaces. Fracture surfaces of both failed ball and normal ball after breaking test were examined with SEM and EDX. Microstructure of the ball revealed an austenite phase with coarse Cr rich precipitate. Indented marks observed on the surface of the failed ball are believed to be produced by overloading. In the light of the afore mentioned observations and studies, the failure mechanism of the ball in nuclear fuel exchanger seem to be caused by impact or mechanical overloading on ball.

• 대한방사선방어학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2010.04a
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• pp.70-71
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• 2010

• Proceedings of the Safety Management and Science Conference
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• 2011.11a
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• pp.85-91
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• 2011

Safety in the nuclear facility has been a growing interest due to recent recurrences of the fatal accidents such as Fukushima accident and Chernobyl accident. It is not easy to determine the extent to what technical requirements of nuclear facility such as nuclear power plant are be likely applicable to the laboratory for use of nuclear material. All of workers in nuclear shall be recognized for the generic features of safety according to the related laws. This study surveys a status of safety control laws to enhance safety in laboratory for use of nuclear material.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.229-230
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• 2005

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.7
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• pp.2483-2488
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• 2023

Differential die-away analysis (DDAA) technology is a special nuclear material (SNM) active detection analysis technology. Be a nuclear material shielded or not, the technology can reveal the existence of nuclear materials by inducing fission from an external pulsed neutron source. In this paper, a detection model based on DDAA analysis technology was established by geant4 Monte Carlo simulation software, and the optimal sensitivity of the detection system is achieved by optimizing different configurations. After the geant4 simulation and optimization, a prototype was established, and experimental research was carried out. The result shows that the prototype can detect 200 g of ²³⁵U in a steel cylinder shield that's of 1.5 cm in inner diameter, 10 cm in thickness and 280 kg in weight.

• Journal of Korean Vacuum Science & Technology
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.55-57
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• 2002

Metal-vapor-vacuum-arc ion source is an ideal source for both high current metal ion implanter and high current plasma thin-film deposition systems. It uses the direct evaporation of metal from surface of cathode by vacuum arc to produce a very high flux of ion plasmas. The MEVVA ion source, the high-current metal-ion implanter and high-current magnetic-field-filtered plasma thin-film deposition systems developed in Beijing Normal University are introduced in this paper.

• Nano
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• v.13 no.12
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• pp.1850145.1-1850145.8
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• 2018

In this study, a double-solvent radiation method is proposed to prepare silver nanoparticles in the pores of metal-organic framework MIL-101(Cr). The results reveal that well-dispersed silver nanoparticles with a diameter of about 2 nm were successfully fabricated in the cages of monodisperse octahedral MIL-101(Cr) with a particle size of about 400 nm. The structure of MIL-101(Cr) was not destroyed during the chemical treatment and irradiation. The resulting Ag/MIL-101 exhibits excellent catalytic performance for the reduction of 4-nitrophenol. This method can be extended to prepare other single or bimetallic components inside porous materials.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.52 no.5
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• pp.1022-1028
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• 2020

One of the possible options for spent-fuel management in Korea is pyroprocessing, which is a process for electrochemical recycling of spent nuclear fuel. Nuclear material accountancy is considered to be a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, for the purposes of which, the amount of nuclear material in the input and output materials should be measured as accurately as possible by means of chemical analysis and/or non-destructive assay. In the present study, a neutron measurement system based on the fast-neutron energy multiplication (FNEM) and passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) techniques was designed for nuclear material accountancy of a spent-fuel assembly (i.e., the input accountancy of a pyroprocessing facility). Various parameters including inter-detector distance, source-to-detector distance, neutron-reflector material, the structure of a cadmium sleeve around the close detectors, and an air cavity in the moderator were investigated by MCNP6 Monte Carlo simulations in order to maximize its performance. Then, the detector responses with the optimized geometry were estimated for the fresh-fuel assemblies with different ²³⁵U enrichments and a spent-fuel assembly. It was found that the measurement technique investigated here has the potential to measure changes in neutron multiplication and, in turn, amount of fissile material.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.53 no.5
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• pp.1652-1657
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• 2021

Nuclear materials can be utilized not only for peaceful uses, but also for military purposes; hence, the international community has devoted itself to the control, management and safeguarding of nuclear materials. Nuclear materials are of varying degrees of usability for development of nuclear weapons. Thus, several methods for assessing the attractiveness of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons purposes have been proposed. When these methods are applied to unirradiated depleted, natural, and low-enriched uranium (DU, NU, and LEU), they are certainly classified as non-attractive nuclear materials. However, when nuclear material attractiveness is to be evaluated for potential radiological dispersal device (RDD) uses, it is required to develop a different method for the different aspects and factors. In the present study, we derived a novel method for evaluating nuclear material attractiveness for use in RDD development. To this end, the specific activity and dose coefficient were identified as the two sub-factors, and, in consideration of those, the mass causing detrimental health effects was determined to be the main factor impacting on nuclear materials attractiveness. Based on this factor, the attractiveness of unirradiated DU, NU, and LEU for RDD use was qualitatively compared with that of ¹³⁷Cs.