• Strategy21
• /
• s.31
• /
• pp.85-119
• /
• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.9 no.3
• /
• pp.299-304
• /
• 2023

Recently, drones have been used as a major means of attack drones in major wars around the world, and it seems likely that they will evolve into game changers in the future. Recently, drones have been used as a major means of attack drones in major wars around the world, and it seems likely that they will evolve into game changers in the future. In the major wars of the 21century, attack drones are used for precision fire-guided or self-destruct attacks, For the purpose of cognitive warfare, its territory is expanding not only to land and air, but also to sea and water. These attack drones will perform multi-domain operations, and for this purpose, the level of autonomy will be improved and High-Low Mix We will continue to develop by strengthening concept-based scalability. North Korea has also been making considerable efforts to operate attack drones for a long time, and activities such as third-country-level self-explosive drones, artificial intelligence-based clustered self-explosive drones, and self-destructive stealth unmanned semi-submersible are expected. In addition to North Korea's provocations and attacks, it is hoped that there will be a need for active follow-up research on our military's countermeasures and utilization plans.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.42
• /
• pp.205-227
• /
• 2015

The Korean Peninsula is put in a position to carry out a highly strategic game vis-a-vis nK, which is asserting itself as a nuclear power amongst Northeast Asia's complex dynamics. While the international community recognizes nK's possession of nuclear weapons as released secret based on nK's three nuclear tests, shrewd strategic thinking is needed by ROK to secure itself as a non-nuclear nation in order to assume a responsible role to the international community, while simultaneously being ready to respond at all times for nK's military provocations. ROK must continue with its twofold strategy, by firm response to military confrontation with nK and maintaining flexible policy of tolerance in the areas of economy and ethnicity. Various strategic options to overcome nK's nuclear threats have been presented to ROK, whose possession of nuclear weapons have been difficult, and nK's nuclear capability is a real threat to ROK's national security. We must be able to respond to nK's nuclear threats strictly from ROK's national security perspective. This thesis aims to propose a response policy for nK's nuclear capability and nK's nuclear attack based on analysis of such nuclear damage, ROK Government's response posture against nK's nuclear threats, centered around ROK Government's non-military response posture.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
• /
• v.16 no.5
• /
• pp.889-898
• /
• 2021

Currently, due to the demographic cliff phenomenon in Republic of Korea, A serious defense vacuum could occur due to the lack of South Korean military's personal strength. As a result, The South Korean military has a possibility to implement the polices the prepare for military provocations and preemptive strikes by the North Korean military while resolving the South Korean defense vacuum caused by the shrinking population. It seems like that the only way for the South Korean military to solve the shortage of personal strength due to the population decline is to reduce the number of Mechanized Units(MU) other than, infantry and automate, and autonomous driving the weapons system of the Mechanized Units(MU). In this paper, we propose the use of the virtual autonomous driving of the self propelled artillery K-9's in self selection of the position and occupation of position and self positioning in the position. At the same time in this paper, the self propelled artillery K-9 model robot is used to simulate and the explain about the operation method, necessity and feasibility in the self propelled artillery K-9. In addition, this paper predicted the problems that would arise if the South Korean military deployed autonomous driving self propelled K-9, in real combat.

• Strategy21
• /
• s.40
• /
• pp.216-234
• /
• 2016

본 논문은 자위권 사용과 군사력 사용 간의 관계를 분석하고 이를 한반도 서해에서의 한국과 북한 간 해상긴장 상황에 적용시킨 이슈를 다룬다. 국가가 행사하는 자위권(self-defense: 自衛權)은 기본적으로 전쟁 방지를 위한 기본적 원칙이다. 그러나 이는 군사력 사용(Use of Forces: 軍事力 使用) 또는 무력행사(武力行事)이라는 측면에서 칼의 양날과 같은 결과를 낳는다. 즉 자위권 행사로 전쟁의 확산을 방지하는 반면에 자위권 행사로 상대방에 대한 적성(敵性)을 인정해 주는 경우이다. 반면 북한의 군사도발은 전방향적이며, 1953년 한반도 정전협정 위반이다. 1953년 정전협정 체결 이후 양국은 서해 북방한계선(NLL)에서의 군사적 충돌을 거쳤으며, 이는 과연 한국이 자위권 차원에서의 방어태세와 군사력 사용 측면에서의 대응태세 간에 괴리가 존재하고 있다는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 당연히 피해를 받는 곳은 한국이며, 이는 서해 북방한계선에서의 남북한 해군 간 대결국면에서 나타나고 있다. 이에 본 논문은 자위권을 국가 차원 행사하는 수준과 작전에 투입된 현장 작전 지휘관 차원에서 행사하는 수준으로 구분하여 다룬다. 서해 북방한계선 부근 수역에서의 북한의 해상 군사도발에 대해 현장 작전 지휘관이 행사하는 자위권은 대한민국 정부 차원에서의 자위권 행사와는 다르면, 이 문제를 국제법을 중심으로 분석하기에는 너무나 많은 제한점이 있다. 현행 국제법상 국가 자위권 문제는 군사력을 동반하는 문제로서 그 행사요건이 매우 애매모호하고 까다롭다. 그러나 현장 작전지휘관의 자위권 행사는 단호해야 하며, 이는 군사력 운용으로 나타나야 한다. 실제 서해에서의 남북한 대결국면에서의 대한민국 해군의 자위권 행사는 정전협정에 의거 제한되고 있으며, 이는 2010년 북한의 천안함 침몰과 연평도 폭격도발 시 대한 민국 해군과 해병대의 대응에서 증명되었다. 현재 대한민국 국방부는 현장 작전 지휘관에서 소위 '선제적 자위권 행사' 부여 필요성에 대한 논의를 진행 중으로 알려져 있다. 이에 따라 선제적 자위권 행사를 위한 조치들을 제도화하는 움직임을 보이고 있다. 예를 들면 2013년 발표된 대한민국 합참과 유엔사령부/한미 연합사령부/주한미군사령부 북한 군사 도발에 대한 대응계획(ROK JCS and UNC/CFC/USFK Counter-Provocation Plan)이 이를 간접적으로 증명하고 있다. 선제적 자위권은 행사에 있어 몇 가지 원칙을 요구하고 있으며, 이에 대한 합법성 문제는 아직 해결되고 있지 않다. 따라서 이 문제와 북한 군사도발 시에 대한 대한민국의 선제적 자위권 행사 간 연관성 문제를 어떻게 해석할 수 있는가에 대한 연구가 필요한 실정이다. 평시 군사력 사용에 따른 무력행사의 적법성은 그 인정이 대단히 어려운 것이 현실이며, 이에 따라 북한의 군사도발에 대한 가장 효율적 방안이 선제적 자위권이라면, 이에 대한 법적 대응이 무엇인가에 대한 제도적 근거를 필요로 할 것이다.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.13
• /
• pp.687-738
• /
• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.