• Title/Summary/Keyword: North Korea's Nuclear Strategy

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Strategy for Countermeasures the NK's Nuclear Issue Using Offset Strategy and the 4th Industrial Revolution Technologies (상쇄전략과 4차 산업혁명 기술혁신을 적용한 북핵 대응방안)

  • Park, Jae-wan
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.3 no.1
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    • pp.77-106
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    • 2019
  • The purpose of this paper is to propose measures to respond to NK's nuclear threat by applying the concept of offset strategy in the US and the fourth industrial revolution technology innovation. Through this study, the concept, technology, and organization were examined to find measures to counter the NK's nuclear threat. The concept was to review the US offset strategy and consider the strategy of paralyzing the enemy's center as an operational concept. And the technologies that can support the 4th Industrial revolution and the 3rd US offset strategy. The organization analyzed the implications for the reform of the National Defense Reform 2.0 and the reorganization of the acquisition of the US DoD. Through the US offset strategy review, it is necessary to reconcile the strategic concepts of Korea and the US, and the interoperability of technologies and the cooperation fields of the ROK-US alliance. In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the capability of responding to NK's nuclear threat in connection with the 4th Industrial Revolution and the National Defense Reform 2.0 promotion. It is necessary to develop the concept of operational performance applying the new paradigm for the NK's nuclear issue and to apply advanced science and technology. And that it is necessary to organize effectively in conjunction with the National Defense Reform 2.0.

An Analysis on the Conditions for Successful Economic Sanctions on North Korea : Focusing on the Maritime Aspects of Economic Sanctions (대북경제제재의 효과성과 미래 발전 방향에 대한 고찰: 해상대북제재를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Sang-Hoon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.46
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    • pp.239-276
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    • 2020
  • The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

Method's to introduce ROKN Nuclear Propulsion Submarines (한국형 원자력 추진 잠수함 도입방안)

  • Jang, Jun-Seop
    • Strategy21
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    • s.42
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    • pp.5-52
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    • 2017
  • Debates about introducing nuclear submarines have been a main issue in Korea. The highest officials and the government has started to think seriously about the issue. Yet there were no certain decision to this issue or any agreements with US but it is still necessary to review about introducing nuclear submarines, the technologies and about the business. The reason for such issues are the highest officials of Korea to build nuclear submarine, nK's nuclear development and SLBM launching. ROKN's nuclear submarine's necessity will be to attack(capacity to revenge), defend(anti-SSBN Operation) and to respond against neighboring nation's threat(Russia, Japan, China). Among these nations, US, Russia (Soviet Union), Britain, France had built their submarines in a short term of time due to their industrial foundation regarding with nuclear propulsion submarines. However China and India have started their business without their industrial foundation prepared and took a long time to build their submarines. Current technology level of Korea have reached almost up to US, Russia, Britain and France when they first built their nuclear propulsion submarines since we have almost completed the business for the Changbogo-I,II and almost up to complete building the Changbogo-III which Korea have self designed/developed. Furthermore Korea have reached the level where we can self design large nuclear reactors and the integrated SMART reactor which we can call ourselves a nation with worldwide technologies. If introducing the nuclear submarine to the Korea gets decided, first of all we would have to review the technological problems and also introduce the foreign technologies when needed. The methods for the introduction will be developments after loans from the foreign, productions with technological cooperations, and individual production. The most significant thing will be that changes are continuous and new instances are keep showing up so that it is important to only have a simple reference to a current instances and have a review on every methods with many possibilities. Also developing all of the technologies for the nuclear propulsion submarines may be not possible and give financial damages so there may be a need to partially introduce foreign technologies. For the introduction of nuclear propulsion submarines, there must be a resolution of the international regulations together with the international/domestics resistances and the technological problems to work out for. Also there may be problem for the requirement fees to solve for and other tough problems to solve for. However nuclear submarines are powerful weapon system to risk everything above. This is an international/domestically a serious agenda. Therefore rather than having debates based on false facts, there must be a need to have an investigations and debates regarding the nation's benefits and national security.

A preparation and Strategy against Chemical and Biological Terrorism (화생방 테러의 양상과 예방대책)

  • Kim, Kyung-Hoe
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.5
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    • pp.19-40
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    • 2002
  • For front, aspect of terror may have to prepare indeed even chemical terror or rocket and small size missile and radioactivity terror because is predicted to become various. Furthermore, when see motion of every countries about nuclear engineerses' bringing round and illicit sale of plutonium, our country may have to prepare in terrorism which is expected thus. So that can finish international event successfully because the United States of America supports great manpower and budget since New York's World Trade Center terror and when see that is considering terror prevention countermeasure, we operate temporarily bursting tube state complete charge team such as terror by each field specialist such as a concern interested including special CBR complete charge moving team among 2002 World Cups soccer game period ahead of international event, must consider safety countermeasure. Specially, biology weapon of chemical weapon and cholera etc. 13 kinds of 5000ton that North Korea plans CBR terror society confusion that North Korea that to terror support nation as well as nuclear weapons development suspicion is defending South Korea communization strategy as real condition that is amplified as well as is saving production brand gets imprinted uses CBR terror at normal times, when see that is planing powerlessness communization unity using CBR weapon at time of war, must operate until bias 2002 World Cups international event finishes cooperation safety countermeasure utensil safely under closer talk between the South Korea ${\cdot}$ Japan ${\cdot}$ North Korea. As for us which must serve 2002 World Cup successfully to accomplish perfectly preparedness of CBR terror firstly, all inhabitants knows well CBR protection trick, and secondly, CBR existing formation that solidify realignment CBR complete charge moving team which of course is consisted of CBR specialist compose and keeping immediate going out attitude operating, by third, that expand CBR individual protection equipment and CBR evacuation equipment and establish individual and group protection attitude naturally, supplement as there is main room that actualize CBR pollution patient's slogan countermeasure by fourth, and develop standard model for CBR terror provision by fifthBecause constructing infra of CBR safety establishing CBR preparedness that utilize it, must minimize damage and contribute inhabitants' life and property protection.

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Research on direction of future Korean military force establishment -focus on North Korea's nuclear threat and neighboring countries' counter military threat operation- (미래 한국군 군사력 건설방향에 대한 연구 - 북한 핵위협과 주변국 위협대비를 중심으로 -)

  • Kim, Yeon Jun
    • Convergence Security Journal
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    • v.14 no.1
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    • pp.11-21
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    • 2014
  • South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.

The Construction Direction of the ROK NAVY for the Protection of Marine Sovereignty (국가의 해양주권 수호를 위한 한국해군의 전력건설 방향)

  • Shin, In-Kyun
    • Strategy21
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    • s.30
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    • pp.99-142
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    • 2012
  • Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

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Xi Jinping's Visit to South Korea and Its Implications (시진핑(習近平) 국가주석의 방한과 한·중 미래 전략적 협력 동반자 관계)

  • Shin, Jung-Seung
    • Strategy21
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    • s.34
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    • pp.5-25
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    • 2014
  • On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

Naval Arms Race in Northeast Asia (동북아 해군력 군비경쟁)

  • Kim, Duk-ki
    • Strategy21
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    • s.43
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    • pp.125-174
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this paper is to analyze the status of naval arms race in Northeast Asia. To this end, the scope of the research was limited to national security strategies, maritime strategies and naval strengthening of the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The major powers' active maritime strategies and naval arms race give some strategic implications to the Republic of Korea Navy as follows. First, China and Japan, unlike the past, are actively using submarines in offshore waters including the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the ROK Navy must successfully promote the Jangbogo-III-class submarine, which is currently constructed, and get a nuclear-powered submarine and P-8 MPA capable of long-range and long-time operations to enhance ASW capability. Second, North Korea's current building submarines capable of loading SLBMs and SLBMs are a new threat to the ROK Navy. The current building KAMD, which focuses on terminal phase defense, cannot effectively respond to North Korea's SLBMs and should be converted to a multi-layered defense system including SM-3 at a mid-course phase. Third, as China militarizes the South China Sea, the instability of the South China Sea is growing. Therefore, the ROK Navy should strengthen its maritime cooperation with the regional countries such as Japan and ASEAN navies to protect SLOC. In conclusion, the ROK Navy needs to build a strong naval power to keep in mind that the 21st century naval rivalry in Northeast Asia is accelerating. The navy must do one's best to protect national strategic and vital interests by strengthening cooperation with regional countries. South Korea is also accelerating its defense reforms in accordance with the pattern of future warfare and the ROK Navy do one's best to have a balanced naval capability capable of actively operating in the offshore waters.

Maritime Security of the Republic of Korea: year 1998 and year 2018 (한국의 해양안보: 1998년과 2018년)

  • Jung, Ho-Sub
    • Strategy21
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    • s.43
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    • pp.57-88
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    • 2018
  • Security situations are fundamentally and rapidly changing on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, as North Korea(NK) is heightening its nuclear and missile capabilities, Republic of Korea(ROK) is facing an existential threat. At the same time, as China's economic, diplomatic and military power is quickly rising, the balance of power is shifting and strategic competition between the Unite States(US) and China is accelerating in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the pressure of development of these situations, ROK seems to face allegedly the most serious crisis in its national security since the end of the Korean War. In the current grim geopolitical situation, maritime security may become the most difficult security challenge for ROK in the years to come. The purpose of this paper is to compare major changes in maritime security affairs of the ROK during last twenty years from 1998 until now(2018). 1998 was when this journal 『Strategy 21』 was published for the first time by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy. Then, this paper tries to identify challenges and risks with which this country has to deal for its survival and prosperity, and to propose some recommendations for the government, the Navy, and the Coast Guard as they are responsible for the maritime security of the country. The recommendations of this paper are as follows: strengthen ROK-US alliance and expand security cooperation with regional powers in support of the maintenance of the current security order in the region; building-up of maritime security capacity in preparation for crisis on the maritime domain with the navy targeting to acquire 'a non-nuclear, balance-of-terror capability, to improve interoperability with the Coast Guard based on 'a national fleet,' and to actively pursue innovation in naval science and technology. Finally, this paper proposes that naval capability the country needs in another twenty years depends on how effectively and rigorously the navy put its utmost efforts towards building 'a strongest navy' today.

USN's Efforts to Rebuild its Combat Power in an Era of Great Power Competition (강대국 간의 경쟁시대와 미 해군의 증강 노력)

  • Jung, Ho-Sub
    • Strategy21
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    • s.44
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    • pp.5-27
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this paper is to look at USN's efforts to rebuild its combat power in the face of a reemergence of great powers competition, and to propose some recommendations for the ROKN. In addition to the plan to augment its fleet towards a 355-ships capacity, the USN is pursuing to improve exponentially combat lethality(quality) of its existing fleet by means of innovative science and technology. In other words, the USN is putting its utmost efforts to improve readiness of current forces, to modernize maintenance facilities such as naval shipyards, and simultaneously to invest in innovative weapons system R&D for the future. After all, the USN seems to pursue innovations in advanced military Science & Technology as the best way to ensure continued supremacy in the coming strategic competition between great powers. However, it is to be seen whether the USN can smoothly continue these efforts to rebuild combat strength vis-a-vis its new competition peers, namely China and Russian navy, due to the stringent fiscal constraints, originating, among others, from the 2011 Budget Control Act effective yet. Then, it seems to be China's unilateral and assertive behaviors to expand its maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea that drives the USN's rebuild-up efforts of the future. Now, some changes began to be perceived in the basic framework of the hitherto regional maritime security, in the name of declining sea control of the USN as well as withering maritime order based on international law and norms. However, the ROK-US alliance system is the most excellent security mechanism upon which the ROK, as a trading power, depends for its survival and prosperity. In addition, as denuclearization of North Korea seems to take significant time and efforts to accomplish in the years to come, nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence by the US is still noting but indispensible for the security of the ROK. In this connection, the naval cooperation between ROKN and USN should be seen and strengthened as the most important deterrents to North Korean nuclear and missile threats, as well as to potential maritime provocation by neighboring countries. Based on these observations, this paper argues that the ROK Navy should try to expand its own deterrent capability by pursuing selective technological innovation in order to prevent this country's destiny from being dictated by other powers. In doing so, however, it may be too risky for the ROK to pursue the emerging, disruptive innovative technologies such as rail gun, hypersonic weapon... etc., due to enormous budget, time, and very thin chance of success. This paper recommends, therefore, to carefully select and extensively invest on the most cost-effective technological innovations, suitable in the operational environments of the ROK. In particular, this paper stresses the following six areas as most potential naval innovations for the ROK Navy: long range precision strike; air and missile defense at sea; ASW with various unmanned maritime system (UMS) such as USV, UUV based on advanced hydraulic acoustic sensor (Sonar) technology; network; digitalization for the use of AI and big data; and nuclear-powered attack submarines as a strategic deterrent.