• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.863-873
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• 2021

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of family share ownership on the value of family companies and differences in the value of the firm - a family firm managed by family members and a family firm managed by non-family members. This research is also related to agency problems, namely share ownership and professional management can increase company value. This research uses the firm value as the dependent variable that is measured using Tobin's Q. Meanwhile the independent variable in this research is family ownership, and firm size is the control variable. The purposive sampling method was used to determine the sample for this research. The object of this research is 78 family companies listing on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2017. The hypothesis is tested by using multiple linear regression analysis which meets the analysis requirements test or classic assumption test. The results show that majority family ownership does not affect the value of the firm and there is no difference in the firm value of family firm led by family members and the firm value of family firm managed by non-family members.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.179-196
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• 2013

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.25-39
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• 2021

Purpose - This study aims to examine whether family firm governance is related to long-term corporate survival. To find out whether and why family firms have higher chances of long-term survival compared to non family firms, this study analyzes the relationship between some governance characteristics that are prevalent in family firms and corporate long-term viability. Design/methodology/approach - This study utilizes a sample of 285 family firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) to probe the influence of governance characteristics on corporate survival. This study conducts Cox proportional hazard regression analysis to estimate the influences on the survival duration. Findings - The results indicate that firms with particular governance characteristics show higher long-term survivability. Specifically, the probability of firm's long-term survival is increased when the CEO is the largest shareholder, which may be related to CEO's stewardship attitudes. Research implications or Originality - This study has significance in that it examines the direct causal variables that enhance long-term corporate viability through a large scale empirical examination. Also, the study findings provide some clues as to why certain family firms outlive non-family firms.

• Journal of Family Resource Management and Policy Review
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.161-182
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• 2017

This qualitative case study explored seven non-certified firms' family-friendly cultures and their responses to the family-friendly certification through interviews with the human resources managers. The results from the data analysis revealed within firm's differences and a gap among those firms. In addition, their responses to the family-friendly certification were classified into three categories: a positive group, indifference group, and negative group. From the results of the firms' various family-friendly cultures and the firms' various responses to the family-friendly certification, we suggested several issues on the family-friendly certification system's improvement and the government's management and supervision of the legal requirement to ensure workers' work-life balance and the firm's autonomy plan for its' own family-friendly culture.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.123-133
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• 2008

We investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. For this paper, we use the 'donation' figure from the income statement of each firm as a measure of firm Performance lather than short-term financial measure that has been wifely used by previous studies. Our results are consistent with the idea that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial in Korea. More importantly, however, non-family firms are found to give more donations than family firms. This suggests that non-family firms more readily recognize the significance of corporate social responsibility and play an active role in philanthropy.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.159-167
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• 2021

The objective of this study is to examine the effect of family ownership and family CEO on the dividend policy of family firms by using the demographic characteristics of the CEO as a moderator. Dividend policy is a decision taken by the firm in determining whether the profits earned by the firm will be distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends or will be reinvested in the company as retained earnings for future internal resources. Using samples from non-financial family firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2013-2017, 93 firms were selected based on adequate data. We also used logit regressions to provide robustness. The results show that family ownership and family CEO have a positive effect on the dividend payout ratio. This finding supports the family income hypothesis. Among CEO demographic characters, CEO age significantly strengthens the positive effect of family CEO on dividend payout ratio. While CEO tenure does not significantly strengthen the positive effect of family CEOs on dividend payout ratios. Meanwhile, leverage, ROA, and firm size significantly affect the dividend payout ratio, but firm age does not significantly affect the dividend payout ratio.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.63-73
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• 2022

In today's financial economics literature, the impact of innovative family ownership and management on firm performance is a prominent concern. In this study, the existence of family firms in the listed sector of Pakistan's economy is investigated. The objective of this study is to examine the performance-oriented relationship of family ownership and active involvement of family member at the CEO position. The theoretical perspectives that underpin this research are agency and stewardship. This analysis used a sample of 315 publicly traded companies from 2009 to 2019. The study's primary independent variables include family influence on ownership and family CEO. Financial performance is the dependent variable that is divided into accounting and market measures. The proxy for accounting measure is return on asset and proxy for market measure is Tobin's Q. This study employs univariate and balanced panel data analysis. For robustness of the analysis random-effects GLS regression is carried out. The empirical results show that that Family Firms outperform Non-Family Firms both in terms of accounting and market measures. In the later part family CEOs firms outperform the firms that have either insider or outsider non-family CEOs. This superior performance is subjected to the positive and statistically significant association between family ownership, management, and financial performance.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.101-108
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• 2013

In this paper, we examine the impact of family ownership mechanism on the firm's debt policy. Our results show that family firms tend to have a lower debt level, compared with non-family firms. Foreign investors are found to lead to a reduction in the firm's debt level through their monitoring incentives for dominating large shareholders. The firm's profitablily is related to a lower level of debt, whereas higher tangible assets and firm size are positively associated with high debt ratios due to the possibility of large collateral assets. Some implications are that foreign investors can reduce the agency costs of dominating large shareholders in family firms through monitoring activities, thus enhancing the efficiency of business decision-makings.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.9
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• pp.61-73
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• 2022

The article examines the ownership structure and dividend payout behavior of India-listed firms using a panel regression approach. It focuses on family ownership and examines why dividend payouts of family firms differ from non-family firms. The study finds that family firms dominate and have concentrated ownership using data from the NSE-listed regular dividend-paying firms. Although family ownership concentration is high among Indian firms, these firms are not concerned about distributing cash as dividends. Instead, these firms focus on retaining and passing on control from one generation to the next. The evidence shows that family firms pay low dividends and have higher leverage than non-family counterparts. The results support the entrenchment of minority shareholders and the proposition that a high payout signals a reduction in the information asymmetry and level of risk. The study further illustrates that cash dividends tend to reduce the level of risk perceived; however, (cash dividend) leads to the deterioration firm's liquidity and aid in the shrinking of cash among emerging market firms. The originality of the paper lies in factoring ownership concentration while explaining the dividend behaviour from an emerging markets perspective, characterized by high private benefits and weak protection for external minority shareholders.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.1101-1111
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• 2021

The current study aims to investigate the influence of different categories of ownership held by different types of board members on bank performance. The study uses a sample of Saudi listed banks for the period from 2011 to 2018. The results of the panel data analysis using firm fixed-effects regression model indicate that bank performance is significantly and positively affected by the chairman ownership and the CEO ownership. However, board independent members' ownership has a negative influence on bank performance. While non-executive board members' ownership and family board members have an insignificant impact on bank performance. Control variables, including board size, non-executive board members, government ownership, leverage, and bank size are significantly associated with bank performance. Overall, the results indicate that Saudi bank performance is higher in smaller banks that have smaller boards with lower non-executive members, lower portion of shares held by independent board members, higher portion of shares held by the chairman, CEO, and government, and higher leverage. The results of this study provide important implications for regulatory authorities and market participants in Saudi Arabia and countries with ownership concentration to understand the actual role of different categories of board ownership on firm performance in addition to optimize board ownership.