• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.53-94
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• 2017

Thai political regime is said to have returned to bureaucratic polity or semi-democracy. However this kind of perspective do not find the political interference of Privy Council which is a body of Monarch of Thailand. Therefore this paper tries to discover the unique traits of Thai way of constitutional monarchy which can be defined as the modern form of absolute monarchy. In short Thai way of constitutional monarchy based on network politics is contradictary to the normal constitutional monarchy whose norm is "the king reigns, but does not rule." This means Thai king is in politics not above politics in reality. Thai monarchy has interfered in diversive way in terms of mediating political conflicts and protecting the monarchy as a institution. In this process the king has been worshiped as demigod who practises the Buddhist doctrine and the centre of national integration. Even after the 6 Ocober 1976 massacre which the palace involved King Bhumibol Adulyadej's sacred position was not challenged. Rather $l{\grave{e}}se-majest{\acute{e}}$ law became more draconian for status quo. Since then $l{\grave{e}}se-majest{\acute{e}}$ was cited as one of the major rationale for the military coup. The 2006 coup which was triggered by the clash between network Monarchy and bourgeois polity based on Thakin network marked a surge of the $l{\grave{e}}se-majest{\acute{e}}$ cases. The 2014 coup had consecutively increased the number of $l{\grave{e}}se-majest{\acute{e}}$ prisoners. It can be said that the modern form of absolute monarchy in Thailand including bureaucratic polity, semi-democracy and democracy is bounded by $l{\grave{e}}se-majest{\acute{e}}$ law which network monarchy players such as military, intellectuals, Democrat Party and even some civil society groups support.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.45-87
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• 2013

This paper aims to study Thai democratic deepening and the constitutional engineering with the analytical concepts of 'power sharing' and 'accountability' focusing on the 1997 and 2007 Constitution. With regard to power sharing, the 1997 Constitution had the characteristics of majoritarian principle including a two-party system, strengthening of prime minister and the executive's power etc. It enhanced significantly the aspects of accountability compared with the previous constitutions. The institutions such as Constitutional Court, Commission on Election, Administration Court, Commission on Human Right, Ombudsman, Commission on Anti-corruption, and the Measure for Anti-money Laundering were established by the 1997 Constitution. However, such empowered accountability system were often abused by the political power groups in the political process. The 2007 Constitution has the characteristics of consensual principle including a multiparty system, proportional representation system, weakened prime minister's power, balancing of cabinet and parliament's power, pushing ahead with decentralization. However, the consensual principle of the 2007 Constitution came, in part, from the factional interests. It is similar to the 1997 Constitution in terms of accountability system, which enhanced in law but abused often in practice. One of the critical reasons for the failure of the 1997 and 2007 constitutions to consolidate democratic system was the political game played around the so-called network for the monarchy composed by the military, the civilian bureaucracy, Constitutional Court and the privileged classes. The future of the Thai democratic deepening depends on the constitutional engineering in which the factional interests should be excluded, and the rules of power sharing and accountability which traditionally played around the network for the monarchy should be effectively institutionalized.