• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.91-114
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• 2007

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm(DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki(2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADS pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.43 no.1
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• pp.17-30
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• 2021

At present, multiple input multiple output radars offer accurate target detection and better target parameter estimation with higher resolution in high-speed wireless communication systems. This study focuses primarily on power allocation to improve the performance of radars owing to the sparsity of targets in the spatial velocity domain. First, the radars are clustered using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. Next, cooperative and noncooperative clusters are extracted based on the distance measured using the kernel fuzzy C-means algorithm. The power is allocated to cooperative clusters using the Pareto optimality particle swarm optimization algorithm. In addition, the Nash equilibrium particle swarm optimization algorithm is used for allocating power in the noncooperative clusters. The process of allocating power to cooperative and noncooperative clusters reduces the overall transmission power of the radars. In the experimental section, the proposed method obtained the power consumption of 0.014 to 0.0119 at K = 2, M = 3 and K = 2, M = 3, which is better compared to the existing methodologies-generalized Nash game and cooperative and noncooperative game theory.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.89-91
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• 2009

This letter considers the problem of resource sharing among a relay and multiple user nodes in cooperative transmission networks. We formulate this problem as a sellers' market competition and use a noncooperative game to jointly consider the benefits of the relay and the users. We also develop a distributed algorithm to search the Nash equilibrium, the solution of the game. The convergence of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can stimulate cooperative diversity among the selfish user nodes and coordinate resource allocation among the user nodes effectively.

• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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• v.46 no.5
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• pp.36-47
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• 2009

There exists RFID reader-to reader frequency which can not recognize tag in dense reader nude because the interference causes low SIR. To solve this frequency, the many algorithms based on TDM have been proposed. But the most of existing algorithms not obtain the optimal time allocation but propose heuristic scheduling algorithm. In this paper, we apply game theory which deals with interest between players of game to RFID reader-to reader interference and analyze the time allocation problem of reader based on TDM in terms of cooperative game which the players bind agreements using Nash Bargaining Solution(NBS) and non-cooperative game which the players do not bind agreements using Nash Equilibrium(NE). The applied results show that in dense reader mode, NBS of cooperative game is superior to NE of non-cooperative game and present optimal time allocation in dense reader mode.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.36 no.2
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• pp.280-285
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• 2014

In this paper, the optimal power control problem in a cooperative relay network is investigated and a new power control scheme is proposed based on a non-cooperative differential game. Optimal power allocated to each node for a relay is formulated using the Nash equilibrium in this paper, considering both the throughput and energy efficiency together. It is proved that the non-cooperative differential game algorithm is applicable and the optimal power level can be achieved.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.25-31
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• 2018

In this paper, we consider the game theoretic approach to investigate the transmit power optimization problem where D2D users share the uplink of the cellular system. Especially, we formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. In the user wide sense, each user may try to select its transmit power level so as to maximize its utility in a selfish way. In the system wide, the transmit power levels of all users eventually converge to the unique point, called Nash Equilibrium. We first formulate the transmit power optimization problem as a non cooperative power control game. Next, we examine the existence of Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we present the numerical example that shows the convergence to the unique transmit power level.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.2281-2301
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• 2014

In wireless ad hoc networks the nodes focus on achieving the maximum SINR for efficient data transmission. In order to achieve maximum SINR the nodes culminate in exhausting the battery power for successful transmissions. This in turn affects the successful transmission of the other nodes as the maximum transmission power opted by each node serves as a source of interference for the other nodes in the network. This paper models the choice of power for each node as a non cooperative game where the throughput of the network with respect to the consumption of power is formulated as a utility function. We propose an adaptive pricing scheme that encourages the nodes to use minimum transmission power to achieve target SINR at the Nash equilibrium and improve their net utility in multiuser scenario.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.5
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• pp.2286-2309
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• 2016

Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.11
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• pp.3674-3710
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• 2014

In this tutorial, we integrate the concept of cognitive radio technology into game theory and supermarket game theory to address the problem of resource allocation in multiuser multicarrier cognitive radio networks. In addition, multiuser multicarrier transmission technique is chosen as a candidate to study the resource allocation problem via game and supermarket game theory. This tutorial also includes various definitions, scenarios and examples related to (i) game theory (including both non-cooperative and cooperative games), (ii) supermarket game theory (including pricing, auction theory and oligopoly markets), and (iii) resource allocation in multicarrier techniques. Thus, interested readers can better understand the main tools that allow them to model the resource allocation problem in multicarrier networks via game and supermarket game theory. In this tutorial article, we first review the most fundamental concepts and architectures of CRNs and subsequently introduce the concepts of game theory, supermarket game theory and common solution to game models such as the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, a list of related studies is highlighted and compared in this tutorial.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.1
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.