• 한국시뮬레이션학회논문지
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.197-202
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• 2014

다수의 임무를 다중의 무인기로 효과적으로 수행하기 위해서는 전체 임무를 수행하는데 필요한 총 이동거리를 최소화로 하는 알고리즘이 필요하다. 본 논문에서는 다수의 무인기 운용에 적합하게 적용할 수 있는 수정된 합의 기반 경매 알고리즘(Modified Consensus Based Auction Algorithm)을 제안한다. 제안하는 알고리즘의 핵심 아이디어는 기존의 합의 기반 경매 알고리즘을 기초로 하여 에이전트들의 위치와 임무까지의 거리의 합을 최소화하는 것이다. 3개의 UAV 에이전트로 다수의 임무를 수행하는 시뮬레이션을 진행하였고 전체 임무 완수 시간과 전체 이동 거리 측면에서 효율적임을 보였다.

• 한국전자파학회지:전자파기술
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• 제17권3호
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• pp.63-73
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• 2006

경매는 자원을 가장 필요로 하는 이용자에게 합리적으로 배분하도록 고안된 제도이며, 여러 국가에서는 최근 주파수 자원의 배분에 도입하고 있다. 본 고에서는 주파수 경매가 가장 활발한 미국의 경우에 대해 설명한다. 미국의 경우, 여러 주파수 면허를 동시에 다중 라운드로 경매함으로써 경쟁자가 이전 라운드에 입찰한 가격에 대한 정보를 얻을 수 있게 하는 제도인 '동시 다중 라운드 경매'를 특징으로 한다. 이 제도하의 입찰 참여자는 이전 라운드의 정보를 기초로 유연하게 전략수정이 가능하며, 여러 주파수 면허들 간에 치적의 시너지 가치를 입찰자 각자가 결정할 수 있다. 이러한 제도적 특징으로 입찰이 활성화될 수 있었고 담합은 최소한으로 억제될 수 있었다. 이러한 동시 다중 라운드 방식은 미국의 성공을 기반으로 유럽의 3G 주파수 경매에서도 보편적으로 사용되어 가장 일반화된 주파수 경매 방식으로 받아들여지고 있다.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제13권1호
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• pp.31-38
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• 1987

This paper is concerned with the multiple unit auction under the following assumptions: 1) multiple identical objects are to be sold to the highest bidders, but a bidder may obtain at most one, 2) each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws his reservation value independently in the same distribution, 3) The greater a bidder's reservation value is, the more a bidder will bid for the object, and 4) a bidder will bid when his expected profit is more than zero. The purpose of this paper is to design the optimal auctions, in terms of the reserve price and entry fee, that can be applied in any types of multiple unit auctions under the above assumptions. Further, auctioneer's expected revenue and profit, and all the winners' expected profit are analyzed.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제33권1호
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• pp.19-33
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• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제20권3호
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• pp.33-49
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• 2010

We empirically examine the impact of online auction knowledge and category-specific knowledge on the final price of online auctions. Specifically, we question how the relationship between buying and selling experiences affects the final prices of online auctions. Related to the trust between buyers and sellers, we examine the multiple interactions between a buyer-seller pairand aim to identify how these repeated transactions influence the final price. To contrast these effects with other product related factors, we focus on so called 'common value' auctions of vintage stamps on eBay, in which the ex-post value of the product is the same among participating agents’ perceived value. Online auction of stamps provides a representative setting to examine the relationship between market experience and the auction participation behavior in the common value auction, as it provides the book value of stamp as well as price variation across individual buyers with different expertise levels. Our analysis of over 3000 stamps auctions on eBay indicates a significantly high frequency of buyer-seller (pair) interactions, thus suggesting a 'relationship view' of auctions. The work validates five hypotheses derived from the existing theory in economics, marketing, and information systems. Through the common-value auction data, we find that seller's online auction experience and category-specific experience favor sellers by increasing the final price. However, buyer's online auction experience does not affect the final price, but buyer's category-specific experience favors buyers by decreasing the final price. We find that the trust between two trading parties increases the final price.

• 한국지능정보시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국지능정보시스템학회 2007년도 추계학술대회
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• pp.592-601
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• 2007

In the conventional double auction approaches, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, these assumptions are unrealisitc. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. We propose a double auction mechanism with resource allocation based on nonlinear utility functions, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where each participant can express a diverse utility function on the price and quantity. In order to optimize the total market utility consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, our study proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through several simulation experiments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권6호
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• pp.2811-2830
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• 2017

In this paper, we study the problem of mobile data offloading for a network that contains multiple mobile network operators (MNOs), multiple WiFi or femtocell access points (APs) and multiple mobile users (MUs). MNOs offload their subscribed MUs' data traffic by leasing the unused Internet connection bandwidth of third party APs. We propose a combinatorial auction-based two-stage matching mechanism comprised of MU-AP matching and AP-MNO matching. The MU-AP matching is designed to match the MUs to APs in order to maximize the total offloading data traffic and achieve better MU satisfaction. Conversely, for AP-MNO matching, MNOs compete for APs' service using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and the Vickrey auction theories and, in turn, APs will receive monetary compensation. We demonstrated that the proposed mechanism converges to a distributed stable matching result. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm well capture the tradeoff among the total data traffic, social welfare and the QoS of MUs compared to other schemes. Moreover, the proposed mechanism can considerably offload the total data traffic and improve the network social welfare with less computation complexity and communication overhead.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.23-43
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• 2010

본 연구는 탄소배출권거래시 할당과 관련한 방법론 중 경매할당에 관한 연구로, 실험경제 방식을 이용하여, 가격결정방식간의 효율성을 비교하였다. 가격결정방식 중 단일가격 결정방식과 복수가격 결정방식에 대한 효율성을 비교하기에 앞서 무상할당, 일률배분 할당, 경매할당에 대한 배출권 가격분포를 분석함으로써, 경매할당이 불완전경쟁 체제하에서 시장수렴면에서 우월함을 입증하였다. Buckley et al.(2004) 연구에서 적용한 실험방식을 활용하여 거래상황을 설계하였으며, 실험결과, 단일가격 결정방식이 효율성 면에서 우월한 것으로 나타났다. 특히, 단일가격 결정방식은 시장참여자들이 승자의 저주(winner's curse)를 회피할 수 있기 때문에 시장참여자들이 보다 과감하게 입찰에 응함으로써, 배출권거래 운영자에게 한계저감비용에 대한 정보를 쉽게 노출시킨다는 점에서 거래운영을 용이하게 하는 이점이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 그러나, 경매수익 면에서는 단일가격 결정방식이 복수가격 결정방식보다 우월하다는 결론을 내리기에는 통계적 유의성이 확보되지 않았다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권12호
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
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• 제17권3호
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• pp.795-804
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• 2006

Most internet auction sites open to users the bid history with the ascending order of bid amounts. Whereas eBay.com presents second bid prices, auction.co.kr provides highest bid prices. In this paper, the bidhistory is arranged according to the passage of tim, which can help to understand the situations and trends of bid prices, especially for multiple auctions. This manipulated data can be visualized by using profile plots. The successful bid prices could be estimated based on some prediction models with appropriate prior informations. Both sellers and bidders can be provided useful informations with these statistical analyses, and then fair online auctions in Korea will grow actively and rapidly.