• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
• /
• v.23 no.4
• /
• pp.197-202
• /
• 2014

In order to operate multiple UAVs for multiple tasks efficiently, we need a task allocation algorithm with minimum cost, i.e.,total moving distance required to accomplish the whole mission. In this paper, we have proposed the MCBAA (Modified Consensus Based Auction Algorithm) which can be suitably applied to the operation of multiple UAVs. The key idea of proposed algorithm is to minimize sum of distance from current location of agents to location of tasks based on the conventional CBAA. Several simulation test performed on three UAV agents with multiple tasks demonstrates the overall efficiency both in time and total distance.

• The Proceeding of the Korean Institute of Electromagnetic Engineering and Science
• /
• v.17 no.3 s.59
• /
• pp.63-73
• /
• 2006

Auctions have been traditionally used to find the current price of goods when little is known about their true value. A special auction methodology, called a 'simultaneous multiple round auction', is available to auction radiofrequency spectrum where all lots are simultaneously on of for over multiple rounds of bidding. This type of auction is especially useful when there are lots that are of essentially equal value and substitutable, except that different bidders may prefer different combinations of lots. By using multiple rounds, a bidder has the opportunity to gather information concerning the value of individual lots and can change strategy by shifting the bidding to another preferred combination if one combination becomes too expensive. Information is released in three main ways during an auction: Bidder Status; High Bids; and Bandwidth Value.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.31-38
• /
• 1987

This paper is concerned with the multiple unit auction under the following assumptions: 1) multiple identical objects are to be sold to the highest bidders, but a bidder may obtain at most one, 2) each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws his reservation value independently in the same distribution, 3) The greater a bidder's reservation value is, the more a bidder will bid for the object, and 4) a bidder will bid when his expected profit is more than zero. The purpose of this paper is to design the optimal auctions, in terms of the reserve price and entry fee, that can be applied in any types of multiple unit auctions under the above assumptions. Further, auctioneer's expected revenue and profit, and all the winners' expected profit are analyzed.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.33 no.1
• /
• pp.19-33
• /
• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
• /
• v.20 no.3
• /
• pp.33-49
• /
• 2010

We empirically examine the impact of online auction knowledge and category-specific knowledge on the final price of online auctions. Specifically, we question how the relationship between buying and selling experiences affects the final prices of online auctions. Related to the trust between buyers and sellers, we examine the multiple interactions between a buyer-seller pairand aim to identify how these repeated transactions influence the final price. To contrast these effects with other product related factors, we focus on so called 'common value' auctions of vintage stamps on eBay, in which the ex-post value of the product is the same among participating agents’ perceived value. Online auction of stamps provides a representative setting to examine the relationship between market experience and the auction participation behavior in the common value auction, as it provides the book value of stamp as well as price variation across individual buyers with different expertise levels. Our analysis of over 3000 stamps auctions on eBay indicates a significantly high frequency of buyer-seller (pair) interactions, thus suggesting a 'relationship view' of auctions. The work validates five hypotheses derived from the existing theory in economics, marketing, and information systems. Through the common-value auction data, we find that seller's online auction experience and category-specific experience favor sellers by increasing the final price. However, buyer's online auction experience does not affect the final price, but buyer's category-specific experience favors buyers by decreasing the final price. We find that the trust between two trading parties increases the final price.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
• /
• 2007.11a
• /
• pp.592-601
• /
• 2007

In the conventional double auction approaches, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, these assumptions are unrealisitc. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. We propose a double auction mechanism with resource allocation based on nonlinear utility functions, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where each participant can express a diverse utility function on the price and quantity. In order to optimize the total market utility consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, our study proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through several simulation experiments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.11 no.6
• /
• pp.2811-2830
• /
• 2017

In this paper, we study the problem of mobile data offloading for a network that contains multiple mobile network operators (MNOs), multiple WiFi or femtocell access points (APs) and multiple mobile users (MUs). MNOs offload their subscribed MUs' data traffic by leasing the unused Internet connection bandwidth of third party APs. We propose a combinatorial auction-based two-stage matching mechanism comprised of MU-AP matching and AP-MNO matching. The MU-AP matching is designed to match the MUs to APs in order to maximize the total offloading data traffic and achieve better MU satisfaction. Conversely, for AP-MNO matching, MNOs compete for APs' service using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and the Vickrey auction theories and, in turn, APs will receive monetary compensation. We demonstrated that the proposed mechanism converges to a distributed stable matching result. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm well capture the tradeoff among the total data traffic, social welfare and the QoS of MUs compared to other schemes. Moreover, the proposed mechanism can considerably offload the total data traffic and improve the network social welfare with less computation complexity and communication overhead.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.19 no.1
• /
• pp.23-43
• /
• 2010

This article compares two different auction designs for $CO_2$ emission allowances, namely uniform pricing and multiple pricing, in view of market efficiency. Experimental economic method of Buckley et al. (2004) is applied in this analysis. As a result of this analysis as expected, multiple pricing method brings out Winner's curse. It means that uniform pricing method is more efficient than multiple pricing method.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.10 no.12
• /
• pp.5616-5642
• /
• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
• /
• v.17 no.3
• /
• pp.795-804
• /
• 2006

Most internet auction sites open to users the bid history with the ascending order of bid amounts. Whereas eBay.com presents second bid prices, auction.co.kr provides highest bid prices. In this paper, the bidhistory is arranged according to the passage of tim, which can help to understand the situations and trends of bid prices, especially for multiple auctions. This manipulated data can be visualized by using profile plots. The successful bid prices could be estimated based on some prediction models with appropriate prior informations. Both sellers and bidders can be provided useful informations with these statistical analyses, and then fair online auctions in Korea will grow actively and rapidly.